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Introduction 
A. Research Question and Abstract 
 
 The laws of copyright can be slower to adapt and evolve than the industries they regulate. 
As the landscape of how protected works are made and how the public views how those works 
should be treated changes, the law does not seamlessly follow in course. Rather, it typically slowly 
grows obsolete and then undergoes periodic points of drastic redefinition in order to adapt.  
 Since the Statute of Anne, the foundation for modern copyright law across the globe, many 
nations have implemented subsequent reforms to their copyright acts to adapt both to the modern 
world and to previous failures of the law. The British Copyright Act of 1956 adapted the law to a 
world connected in trade by expanding protection for works whose initial publication was outside 
of Britain.1 In 1998, the United States enacted one of the most important pieces of copyright 
legislation as a reaction to the effects of the internet and technology on the enforceability of 
copyright law. This law is known as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The DMCA, 
among its many alterations and additions to the law, created a safe-harbour provision so that online 
service providers could avoid vicarious liability for the actions of their members- moulding the law 
to the digital space.2 In 2012, Canada passed its groundbreaking Copyright Modernization Act 
which sought to address the rise of user-generated content by legitimising transformative works 
made for non-commercial purposes.3 
 Thus, the overarching trend in copyright law is for it to gradually grow obsolete or 
ineffective within the scope of the industrial or technological power of the market until a great force 
of legislation brings the law back in line. 
 This thesis will argue that we have reached such a turning point. It asserts that an inability to 
adequately apply current law, seen through impotent enforcement mechanisms online, coupled with 
 
1 Copyright Act 1956 (UK) 
2 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (USA) 
3 Copyright Modernisation Act 2012 (CA) 29.21  
 
   Page 8 of 233 
vague legal boundaries has brought about a need for redefinition within copyright law. Further, it 
hypothesises that the that the property-law model used as a basis for copyright law today is the root 
of issues with balancing user’s rights against creators' rights and is no longer the ideal means to 
protect creative works online. It will demonstrate how technology and global communication have 
changed the culture of creativity and creative dissemination in such a way that copyright law is no 
longer a competent tool in protecting and fostering the development of a large body of creative 
works. It will examine current would-be solutions to the problem of online infringements and 
analyse their inadequacies. In analysing the current relevant legal mechanisms, their failures and 
successes, as well as how the notion of property-like rules influence these failures and successes, it 
comes to the conclusion that stepping away from this property model and towards a system of 
liability rules online will not only help to foster new works, but will benefit those who own the 
rights to existing works as well. It concludes with a suggestion for a newly constructed system of 
liability rules, targeting areas previously discussed where the law is failing, to be applied in lieu of 
property rules for certain aspects of copyright protection.  
 The overarching research question this thesis serves to answer is how can we appropriately 
balance author’s rights with the dissemination of information in a digital world in a way that leads 
to a system of copyright law that is practical, fair, and enforceable? It is intended to highlight and 
address the growing inefficacy of copyright law in the digital world, analyse the weaknesses of 
modern attempts to adapt the law to the digital space, and offer unique solutions to the problems it 
addresses. It analyses copyright law from a global perspective through the lens of online 
infringements. I adopt this global perspective for two reasons. First, while copyright law is strictly 
territorial, it serves at the behest of a global economy and has been largely unified through treaties 
with respect to minimum requirements for protection and framework standards.4 Second, a global 
perspective is important for the comparative analyses I employ. The comparisons target the 
successes and failures resulting from enacted solutions to online infringement in an attempt to offer 
 
4 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Text 1971) 
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a workable solution that may be applied anywhere. Thus, this thesis sets out to be a policy analysis 
that dissects copyright law and online infringement as a whole.  
B. Methodology 
 The methodology for the research involved in creating this thesis is a combination of 
theoretical approaches. In many instances, it is doctrinal and comparative, though it also takes a 
reform-oriented approach. Doctrinal research methodology is a general strategy based upon the 
“synthesis of various rules, principles, norms, interpretive guidelines and values. It explains, makes 
coherent, or justifies a segment of the law as part of a larger system of law.”5 Most commentators in 
the area of legal methodology agree that “[s]ome element of doctrinal analysis will be found in all 
but the most radical forms of legal research.”6 Van Gestel and Micklitz have identified three crucial 
aspects of doctrinal research.7 First, in doctrinal work, “arguments are derived from authoritative 
sources, such as existing rules, principles, precendents, and scholarly publications.”8 Second, “the 
law somehow represents a system” so that “through the production of general and defeasible 
theories, legal doctrine aims to present the law as a coherent net of principles, rules, meta-rules and 
exceptions at different levels of abstraction.” Third, “decisions in individual cases are supposed to 
exceed arbitrariness because they have to fit into the system. Deciding in hard cases implies that 
existing rules will be stretched or even replaced but always in such a way that in the end the system 
is coherent again.”9 As a contribution, this thesis represents a “recasting project” which is a subset 
of the doctrinal method10 described by former dean of Harvard Law School, Martha Minow. A 
recasting project is designed to 
(a) Gather more than one ‘line’ of cases across doctrinal fields, categories, or historical developments, and show 
why they belong together or expose unjustified discrepancies. 
 
5 Kelly, J.M., A Short History of Western Legal Theory [1992] Clarendon Press pg.8 
6 Chynoweth, P., 'Legal Research' in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2008) 31.  
7 Van Gestel, R. and Micklitz, H., ‘Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What about Methodology?’ (2011) EUI Law, 
<http://hdl.handle.net/1814/16825> 
8 Ibid. at 26 
9 Ibid.  
10 See: Watkins, D., & Burton, M. (Eds.). Research Methods in Law [2017] Routledge, pg. 15 
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(b) Offer a new framework or paradigm that can recognize past, present and future material.11 
This thesis analyses the legal doctrine and its historical development as well as its application in a 
way that demonstrates the presence of discrepancies and failures of the law. In turn it offers a new 
framework. 
 While this thesis is largely doctrinal, it, like many other works of doctrinal research, 
includes additional disciplines and may best be categorized as an interdisciplinary doctrinal work.12 
Taekema and Van Der Burg state that one applicable discipline that may be combined with the 
doctrinal method is philosophy. They go on to claim that “for almost any doctrinal subject, there is 
a relevant philosophical dimension so that philosophical analysis could provide more depth to the 
research.”13 In chapter four, I employ a philosophical analysis in order to demonstrate that the 
underlying theories upon which copyright law is based no longer align with how copyright law has 
evolved. One of the many purposes of this thesis is to demonstrate how the law has strayed adrift 
from its prescribed purpose. I use the underlying theory upon which the law was built as a spirit 
level to show how the law is no longer aligned with the values that support it.  
 This thesis is also, at times, comparative. Sacco claims that “like other branches of legal 
science, [comparative law] seeks knowledge of the law.”14 Patrick Glenn addresses cases where 
comparative methodologies may be usefully employed. These cases are: comparative law as an 
instrument of learning and knowledge, as an instrument of evolutionary and taxonomic science, 
contributing to one’s own legal system, and harmonization of the law.15  I employ a comparative 
methodology throughout this thesis using it as both an instrument to demonstrate legal evolution 
and as a tool to contribute to the reconstruction of existing legal systems and harmonization. This 
 
11 Minow, M., ‘Archetypal Legal Scholarship: A Field Guide’ (2013) 63 J. Legal Educ. 65, 66 
12 Taekema, S. and Van Der Burg, W., 'Legal Philosophy as an Enrichment of Doctrinal Research Part I: Introducing Three Philosophical 
Methods', (2020) Law and Method, DOI: 10.5553/REM/.000046 
13 Ibid.  
14 Sacco, R., ‘Legal Formants. A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’, (1991) American Journal of Comparative Law, p. 1-34 (part I) and p. 
343-401 (part II) 
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thesis takes a global approach to copyright law and does not focus on any particular territory. 
However, in chapter 5 I focus on two pieces of legislation with similar purposes from two specific 
legal jurisdictions- Canada and the European Union. In comparing these pieces of legislation and 
their effects, I am able to illustrate the way in which disparate solutions to address the same legal 
problem have created separate results and, in turn, solved certain aspects of the problem while 
exacerbating others. The comparison is intended to highlight which aspects of the solutions are 
successful compared to those that are not in order to inform my own conclusions and suggestions in 
the concluding chapter of this thesis. The conclusion of this thesis is neither a contribution to my 
own legal system nor a harmonization but rather something in between. It represents a solution, 
derived in part from the previous comparisons, that may be applied to any legal system.   
  Practically speaking, all research was conducted by surveying published academic writing, 
legislation, judicial opinions, archived political arguments, news articles and other published 
sources of raw materials. One of the many goals of this dissertation is to advocate for works of 
remix and, in many ways, it qualifies as such itself. It represents the analysis of the actions and 
ideas of others moulded together and coupled with my own perspective with the intention of 
presenting an entirely new and valuable contribution to this field of knowledge.  
C. Thesis Outline 
Chapter one outlines the history and evolution of copyright law, how it functions as a property 
right, and how technological advancements have surpassed the scope of the law in a way that 
renders it inadequate. It specifically addresses how the advancement of consumer technology to 
make and adapt content coupled with the dissemination power of the internet have lead to a state of 
near chaos with respect to piracy and its grey areas- namely user-generated content. It also  
addresses the traditional ways the law has combatted piracy and made way for user-generated 
content (“UGC”). It serves to undermine these legal and enforcement mechanisms by highlighting 
their impotence in the digital environment.  
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Chapter Two makes the case that the problem lies in the foundational aspects of copyright law- 
namely the property-like model around which it is built. It argues that, up to this point, copyright 
legislation has been focused on maintaining control over creative works in a newly connected and 
digital world. The notion of control is absolutely necessary in a property system yet, in the digital 
space where most copyrighted works live, it is functionally impossible. It argues that any solution to 
the problem of piracy or user-generated content that relies on re-establishing control over the 
original work will fail in the digital space and calls for a restructuring of the property- model 
foundation that requires this control via the implementation of liability rules.  
 
Chapter Three aims to show that regardless of the law’s ability to function adequately in the 
digital space, it has evolved into an overprotective scheme in which the foundational purposes of 
copyright law are lost. It offers a unique theoretical analysis of copyright law from the perspective 
of users’ rights to demonstrate that the law has disenfranchised common creators and should be 
rebalanced accordingly. This chapter again teases the idea that the best way to do so is by stepping 
away from property rules and using liability ones to govern certain aspects of the law.  
 
Chapter Four focuses on recent legislative measures designed to adapt copyright law to the digital 
space. It compares the Copyright Modernisation Act of 2012 in Canada to the Directive for 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market of the European Union. It outlines how the Canadian system 
of legitimising non-commercial secondary uses of creative works is a step in the right direction but 
fails to go far enough. It compares this to the more recent and impending European legislation that 
takes an opposing stance on the solution and seeks to try and tighten control over online user 
publications via filtering technology. It claims that neither solution is adequate and argues that 
abandoning the property model of copyright protection, or at least some aspects of it, are necessary.  
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Chapter Five looks at the private sector’s influence on copyright law enforcement. It argues that 
legal uncertainty has lead to the evolution of pseudo-laws crafted and enforced by the private sector 
without intervention by legislative or judicial bodies. These private sector initiatives, while looking 
to address the wants of users in the digital space, do so to the benefit of their corporate authors. 
They often undermine legal protections for secondary creativity but go unchallenged because of the 
expense of doing so coupled with the uncertainty of victory on the claimant side. This chapter 
ultimately argues that the private sector initiatives have a lot to offer in terms of copyright 
enforcement in the modern era, but without legislative or judicial oversight, they largely serve as 
oppressive tools.  
 
Chapter Six offers a two-part solution to the problems discussed in the previous chapters- namely 
the balancing of users’ and authors’ rights. First, we must abandon the gatekeeping role of 
technology in online enforcement. Filtering technology should not be used to prevent the 
dissemination of creative works. The private sector has shown that this technology can be used to 
create substantial revenue streams for content owners, but without some form of legislative backing 
and oversight it will be abused. Second, leaving the right of reproduction intact, derivative rights 
offered by copyright law should be enforced with liability, not property, rules. The chapter outlines 
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 This thesis looks to answer the question of how we may appropriately balance author’s 
rights with the dissemination of information in a digital world in a way that leads to a system of 
copyright law that is practical, fair, and enforceable. This first chapter seeks to set the foundation 
for how to answer this question. It provides necessary background information, analyses of the 
cultural behaviours that are legally problematic, as well as how the law currently treats these 
behaviours. The goal of this chapter is, therefore, to establish that a problem exists and introduce 
the legal issues in ways that may be developed further in the coming chapters. It will outline the 
historical purpose of copyright law; argue that copyright law, first and foremost, is a property right; 
and describe how technology has outgrown the scope of current copyright law specifically related 
to issues of internet piracy17 and user-generated content.18 
B. The Purpose of Copyright Law 
 
 To argue that the laws of copyright are no longer able to serve their prescribed purpose first 
entails an understanding of what that purpose is. Because copyright law is strictly territorial, there is 
no singular stated purpose. However, these national laws have not come about arbitrarily and an 
analysis of copyright’s inception coupled with a sampling of the themes found in current laws 
allows one to synthesise an overarching trend that unifies copyright law in an identifiable purpose.  
 Copyright law is first and foremost a response to technology. Even the most superficial 
understanding of copyright law- a law governing the right to make copies- grants the first step to 
 
16 Elements of this chapter have been published in: Longan, M.E., ‘The inadequacy of U.K. law to address user-generated content: a comparative 
analysis with the United States and Canada’ (2017) Queen Mary Law Journal, special conferences issue, p. 109-122. 
17 The act of illegally reproducing and/or disseminating copyrighted material.  
18 Any form of content- including text, images, artwork, memes, scripts, films, videos, etc.- created and disseminated by users of online content 
sharing sites.    
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understanding this notion. While today it is hard to imagine such a world, until the mid-15th 
century making a “copy” of something was impractical to such a degree that laws were not 
necessary to protect the practice. It was not until the invention of the printing press and its later 
introduction throughout Europe that the governance of copies even came about. With the 
introduction of the press, so came a legal fight for control of its use in various jurisdictions. The 
Venetian Republic granted the first known “patent” for printing privileges to Johannes of Speyer in 
1469 for a term of 5 years.19 As the printing press later found its way to England, the foundation for 
modern copyright law was built. The Statute of Anne was the British Parliament's response to a 
centuries long battle for control of printing rights in England.20At the time of the Act, Parliament 
saw a world where authors were unable to profit from their works to such an extent that there was 
no motivation to create. The Statute of Anne created a copyright for authors with the intention of 
incentivising new creation.21 
 This stated purpose represents the “cultural rationale”- one of four rationales for copyright 
law described by legal scholar, Willen Grosheide.22 The Cultural rationale argues that copyright 
acts as an incentive to create and thereby advance knowledge and contribute to cultural heritage.23 
The first copyright law was based on this rationale and other nations echo this philosophy in their 
copyright laws. For example, the Copyright Clause of the United States’ Constitution states that the 
purpose of Copyright law is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”24  
 
19 Bently L., Kretschmer, M., and Deazley, R.(eds), Privilege and Property: Essays on the History of Copyright [2010] Open Book Publishers Pg. 23 
20 Ibid. See also: Gomez-Arostegui, H.T., ‘The Untold Story of the First Copyright Suit Under the Statute of Anne in 1710,’ 25 Berkley Technology 
Law Journal 1247 
21 Statute of Anne 1710 (England) 8 Anne, Ch. 19.  
22 Grosheide, F.W., ‘Auteursrecht Op Maat: Beschouwingen over De Grondslagen Van Het Auteursrecht in Een Rechtspolit.’ Context = Tailored 
Copyrights (Kluwer 1986) pgs.128-45 
23 Ibid. at 128 
24 US Const. Article 1 Section 8.  
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 Grosheide describes three other rationales for copyright.25 First there is the “Personality” 
rationale, or the notion that creative works bear the personal imprint of their creators and that an 
author’s right is an extension of the right to privacy.26 Second, Grosheide describes the “Justice” 
rational.27 From this perspective, “author’s rights are not created by law but always existed in the 
legal consciousness of man.”28 Finally, there is the “economic” rationale whereby copyright is used 
to turn information into a traceable good which ultimately benefits the public.29 
 Various copyright systems differ in premise. European nations often offer “justice” and 
“personality” rationales for their author’s-rights focused systems and other nations like the United 
States make use of “economic” and “cultural” rationales. However, many of the distinctions 
between systems are disappearing.30 Moreover, despite nuanced differences in rationales from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the means of achieving the stated goals of copyright are roughly the 
same across the globe. There is an apparently universal belief that the ideal way to execute these 
purposes is by granting authors an exclusive right to use their works however they choose for a 
limited period of time- as this notion is echoed in copyright law across the world. However, this 
thesis seeks to challenge that paradigm and offer a new one instead.  
C. Copyright as a Property Right 
 
 With an established purpose of promoting the creation of new works, copyright law sets out 
to achieve that purpose by granting authors a bundle of exclusive rights in their creations for a set 
period of time. While both the length of term and rights granted vary from nation to nation, these 
differences are generally negligible and certain rights are ubiquitous. Moreover, the theory of 
 
25 Grosheide (1986) Supra n.22 at 128-45 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid. at 130 
28 Ploman E.W. and Hamilton L.C., Copyright: Intellectual Property in the Information Age [1980] Routledge and Kegan Paul. pg. 13 
29 Grosheide (1986) Supra n.22 at 128 
30 Goldstein, P. and Hugenholtz, P.B.,  International Copyrigh. [2001] Oxford University Press, pg. 4 
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copyright as a property right31 as opposed to a right of economic recompense (‘economic right’) is 
universal. For example, the European Union specifically mentions intellectual property as a 
subsection of the fundamental right to property in its Charter of Fundamental Rights.32 However, 
some academics have criticised this notion, arguing that copyright falls into a vague realm of 
pseudo-property.33 As this thesis hypothesises that a property law system for copyright protection 
leads to various problems in the digital world, it is therefore important to lay to rest any claims that 
the legal framework is anything but such. This section will dispel these notions and set forth the 
argument that copyright is, in fact, a right in property, both in title and application.  
 In comparing the generic rights granted under copyright law to those of traditional property, 
it becomes clear that copyright functions in the same way as a right of property. These property 
rights are: Rights of Exclusion, Use, Alienation, Acquisition, Preservation, and Compensation.34 
Tom Bell uses a comparison of these rights to argue that copyright does not actually represent 
property, but rather a “privilege.”35 Bell makes salient points about the lack of exclusionary aspects 
of copyright law, term limits, termination of transfer and moral rights limiting alienation powers. 
However, Bell’s arguments are misguided and I will offer a contrary analysis under the same 
structure to establish the idea that copyright today is very much a property right.  
 
a. The Rights of Exclusion and Use  
 
 Bell describes the importance of the right to exclude non-owners in property law as its 
“signature attribute.”36 Similarly, “some scholars cast the right to use- to employ, to occupy, or to 
 
31 This term will be used throughout this thesis, often along side the term “economic right.” Within the context of this thesis, I use the term property 
right to refer to aspects of copyright that function similarly to rights granted in property law (as explained later in this chapter). I use the term 
“economic right” to describe a right that grants monetary recompense for access or use, but does not grant the right holder the ability to exclude uses. 
This concept will be developed further in chapter 3.  
32 Article 17(2) 
33 Bell, T.W. ‘Copyright as Intellectual Property Privilege,’ (2008) Syracuse Law Review, vol. 58, no. 3. Pg. 523-546. 
34 Ibid. at 533 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. at 533 
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profit from- property as one of its most fundamental attributes.”37 The rights to use and exclude the 
use of others are most notably seen in copyright law within the right of reproduction- though the 
rights of public display, performance, transmission, and the right to make derivatives and 
adaptations all have a basis in this notion as well. These are, likewise, the signature attributes of 
copyright law. They grant authors the exclusive right to reproduce, communicate or adapt their 
works. However, Bell notes that copyright law fails to prevent the private use of others in a way 
that is wholly unique from traditional property law.38 Bell uses an example of the absurdity of a 
landowner being unable to prevent others from private use of her land to materialise this crucial 
difference.39 He also cites examples of fair use as a requirement that “copyright holders must 
forbear not only unauthorised uses of their works, but even unauthorised uses that profit others.”40 It 
is true that copyright law allows for exceptions to infringement such as private use or other fair 
uses. It is also true that, in some cases, the unauthorised user may be allowed to profit from those 
uses with no payment to the copyright owner. However, if we are operating under an analogy to 
land ownership, these exceptions function as easements created by public policy- a notion not 
uncommon in real property law. In the United States, courts have held that landowners seeking 
discretionary permits from government agencies may be required to give up something in the form 
of an easement or otherwise in return for those permits.41 However, such action which would 
ordinarily constitute a taking will only be allowed without compensation if there is a “substantial 
nexus” between “the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction.”42 If one were to 
apply the exception to the takings doctrine established in Nollan to copyright law and the exception 
to infringement of fair use, a clear argument can be made that the government has an interest in 
making works available to users for private and other “fair” uses and that condition has a substantial 
 
37 Ibid. at 535 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. at 534-5 
40 Ibid.  
41 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) 
42 Ibid.  
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nexus to the granting of a copyright. Thus, exceptions to infringement are harmonious with the 
notion that copyright is a right of property.  
 
b. The Right of Alienation, Preservation, and Acquisition 
 
 “Commentators understand the power of alienation- the power to transfer title to another 
party- as a fundamental feature of property.”43 Bell admits that copyright holders “enjoy broad 
alienation powers”44 but cites the right of termination of transfer as a crucial difference between 
copyright and real property rights.45 Furthermore, he argues that “nobody stands to lose real estate 
or chattel goods after some specified term”46 and cites copyright’s fixed term of ownership as a 
violation of the right of preservation. Moreover, moral rights present in copyright law are a unique 
privilege not seen in traditional property law.  
 The right to acquire copyrights is indisputable. It is granted by the right of transfer of 
ownership in copyright law. Copyright owners are free to transfer copyrights just as they could any 
other piece of property. However, there are certain rules that temper this right of transference 
specific to copyright law that distinguish it from tangible property. The first is the notion of moral 
rights. While a copyright may be transferred limitless times over its lifetime, moral rights will 
remain vested in the original author and may not be transferred.47 However, while the idea that 
certain aspects of a property right are absolutely inalienable may not be present in tangible property 
laws, the spirit of moral rights rules in copyright are enforced in real property as well. Preservation 
societies and commissions protect historic architecture, limiting the rights new owners have to 
adapt and exploit their real property in the interest of preserving the integrity of historic 
architecture.48 The key distinction here is that moral rights are granted universally and the 
 
43 Bell Supra n.33 at 536 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid. at 537 
47 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Text 1971) Article 6bis(1) 
48 See e.g.: The Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England created by The National Heritage Act 1983 (UK) 
 
   Page 21 of 233 
protections offered by preservation commissions  are more discriminate. However, moral rights are 
not a universal construct in copyright law. The United States, for example, offers moral rights 
protections in only the narrowest of circumstances.49 Moreover, while no direct comparison to 
moral rights exists elsewhere in property law, there are circumstances where the rights transferred 
to the new owner may be tempered in the interest of protecting the creator's intentions. 
  The final distinctions between copyright and property law with respect to rights of 
alienation are termination of transfer laws in the United States50 and the fixed-term nature of 
copyright law generally. While these rules seem to conflict with notions of real property law, 
analogies are present that Bell ignores. For instance, reversionary interests in real property act in a 
way similar to the terminations of transfer of copyrights. And, while, in the United States, terms of 
ownership for real property are almost always granted in fee simple absolute- or an infinite period 
of time- finite terms of real property ownership were very common in early property law and still 
exist elsewhere in the world.  
 
c. Interrum Conclusions 
 
 While Bell and others have focused on the differences between copyright and traditional 
property law, I would focus on the similarities. In his paper, Bell argues that while it perhaps 
represents an argument based in semantics, semantics are wholly important with respect to legal 
interpretation.51 However, by choosing to categorise what is commonly called “copyright” as 
“copyprivilege,”52 semantically, Bell fails to offer a viable solution. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
a “right” in a concrete legal sense as “a power, privilege, demand, or claim possessed by a 
particular person by virtue of law.”53 What, then, is the difference?  
 
49 17 U.S.C. §106(a) applies only to visual art.  
50 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) 304(d) (referring to an author’s right, under certain circumstances, to terminate a previous transfer of a copyright.)  
51 Bell Supra n.33 at 543-4 
52 Ibid. 
53 Blacks law dictionary. Emphasis added 
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 Therefore, while accepting that there is academic literature to support the idea that copyright 
does not function entirely as a right of property, I argue that such literature is misleading. Perhaps 
copyright is more like a circular peg able to fit into the square hole of property law, albeit 
imperfectly, as opposed to a square peg completely unable to fit into a circular hole. 
 Copyright law, as it stands, grants a bundle of exclusive rights to authors. Among these 
rights are, generally, the right of reproduction, the rights of public performance and display, the 
right to transmit, the right to make derivative works or adaptations, and the right to transfer 
ownership of a copyright. These rights have a basis in property law and function in a way most 
similar to a right of property. For example, as the owner of a plot of land I have the right to build on 
it or alter what is built on it (adaptation) and the right to sell that land (transfer ownership). I would 
also have the ability to control who should have use of my land and for what purpose- a sentiment 
analogous to the right of reproduction in copyright law. Just as a landowner may exclude those she 
wishes from entering or using her land, a copyright owner may likewise exclude others from using 
her copyright as she pleases. There are exceptions in copyright law which are not present in 
traditional property law such as the inability to exclude private uses. However, exceptions to 
infringement like private use or other fair uses can best be described in traditional property law 
terms as easements created by public policy.  
 While there are distinctions between the rights granted to authors in copyright and those 
granted to owners of real property, they are generally without difference. Furthermore, any actual 
differences can best be attributed to the inherent differences between creative expressions and 
traditional property. Copyright is best described as a right of property. It is one of ownership- albeit 
temporary- but ownership nonetheless.  
 Thus far I have discussed what copyright is and why it exists. The following sections of this 
chapter will begin to outline the factors emerging in the modern world that have disrupted this very 
system I have described. 
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D. How Technology has Surpassed the Scope of Copyright Law 
 
 The world of “content”- entertainment, films, literature, music, the things copyright was 
designed to protect- as we know it, has undergone drastic redefinitions in stride with technological 
advancement. The days are long gone since families tuned in at a certain time on a certain day to 
watch their favourite television program together. The ability to record television onto VHS 
revolutionised this practice. Later, digital video recording devices ultimately gave way to on-
demand content providers like Netflix, Hulu, Disney+, and Amazon Prime Video. These services 
now dominate the space and are slowly supplanting cable television altogether.54 The music 
industry has gone through an almost identical evolution as vinyl gave way to cassettes which gave 
way to CDs that could be downloaded as digital files to a computer and placed on portable players. 
Those digital files could also, however, be uploaded to the internet for anyone in the world to 
download for free. The Napster boom of the late 90s and early 2000s yielded to the rise of iTunes as 
music on-demand slowly supplanted piracy. Now we see subscription-based, on-demand music 
library services like Spotify and Apple Music dominating the market.55 The literary world has also 
been forced to adapt as consumers continue to require on-demand content and Ebooks are forging a 
stronghold in their respective market. 
 However, these changes are not merely limited to when and how we experience media. 
Consumers are now experiencing an expansion of the kind of content they demand- a desire to 
make their own content or to adapt the content they have been fed by the industry and make it their 
own. The E.U. Commission acknowledged this notion in its Green Paper on Copyright in the 
Knowledge Economy by stating:  “[c]onsumers are not only users but are increasingly becoming 
 
54 Snyder, B., ‘Everything TV networks feared about Netflix is coming true.’ (Fortune, 2015) <http://fortune.com/2015/03/11/cable-tv-ratings-
netflix/> accessed 16 November, 2016. (“People familiar with the Cable television Advertising Bureau told the newspaper that as much as 40% of 
TV-rating declines in the third and fourth quarters were attributable to streaming services.”... “We believe the U.S. television industry is entering a 
period of prolonged structural decline, caused by a migration of viewers from ad-supported platforms to non-ad-supported or less-ad-supported 
platforms”) 
55 ‘Have Spotify and Apple Music Just Won the Streaming Wars?’ <https://musicindustryblog.wordpress.com/2016/09/16/have-spotify-and-apple-
music-just-won-the-streaming-wars/> accessed 12 January 2017 
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creators of content.”56 This concept was also echoed by the Irish Committee for Copyright Review 
as it described the world in a state where while “innovation is traditionally presented as a linear top-
down process where innovation is the sole preserve of the producer, it is increasingly an iterative 
and interactive one in which users play increasingly important roles.”57 
 As accessibility has grown, bringing consumers better tech for lower prices, with it has 
come the rise of user-generated content. User-generated content (“UGC”) is a broad term that can 
describe a wealth of genres of creative expression. It is a phrase that encompasses the creative 
outputs made by those who typically consumed content- “users.” UGC is often derivative in some 
way as it is a reflection of the consumer’s newfound ability to interact with the content they love. 
These expressions are often performed without any commercial goals, though some become 
commercially successful works in their own right.58 The Reda Report described UGC within the 
context of the E.U.’s need to welcome transformative creation. It provided the following examples 
of this type of creativity: 
Audiovisual remixes and mashups (like songs created from dozens of found video clips), lip dubs (creative 
reenactments of songs), supercuts (assemblies of similar movie scenes), mods (modifications and 
conversions of computer games, for example to change the characters or add new environments), remakes 
of/hommages to out-of-commerce classics, Machinima (movies recorded using game environments as the 
“studio”), Let’s Plays (live video transmissions of computer gaming sessions), and many more.59 
 
 However, the laws that govern content- copyright laws- have generally gone unchanged in 
comparison to the drastic changes within the industries they regulate. There have been adjustments 
to copyright law to try to address the changing landscape of the content industry. However, these 
amendments and updates have either been ineffective altogether or serve as treatments to the 
growing symptoms of the disease technology has created within copyright law rather than a cure.  
 The massive expansion of technological capabilities for the average consumer has had 
profound impacts on copyright law in two notable areas. These are piracy and UGC. While piracy 
feels like a remittent issue (it’s not), user-generated content, and particularly the blurred legal 
 
56 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Green Paper: Copyright in the Knowledge Economy’ (COM(2008) 466/3) 
57 Irish Copyright Review Committee, ‘Modernizing Copyright’, 2013, page 58 
58 Reda report, section 12, <https://juliareda.eu/copyright-evaluation-report-explained/#transformative> accessed 17 May 2021 
59 Ibid.  
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distinction between legitimate creativity and piracy associated with it, has created the turning point 
we face today.  
 The following sections will generally discuss these two phenomena and the complications 




i. Piracy and the Law  
 
 Over the last 20 years, the law has struggled to counteract piracy. Copyright law at its very 
foundation, theoretically, serves to protect against piracy. However, the internet made the act of 
pirating content so easy that it felt innocuous and the law has been unable to overcome the rapid 
expansion of piracy resulting from this phenomenon. While the nature, popularity, and perceptions 
of internet piracy have evolved since its inception, it remains alive despite global attempts to 
prevent it. This is perhaps because internet piracy is largely unenforceable in an economically 
sensible way.  
 Content owners typically combat online piracy in one of two ways. First, the system of 
notice and takedown is used to remove infringements efficiently but offers no recourse other than 
removal for rights holders. The system also struggles to effectively stamp out acts of piracy online 
and serves more to slow it down than anything else. Apart from notice and takedown procedures 
online, rights holders are also free to enforce their copyrights through traditional litigation. Piracy 
litigation, however, has largely been a fruitless endeavour for right holders. In fact, the most 
effective measure at reducing piracy has not been any sort of legal or enforcement mechanism 
offered by copyright law at all. It has actually been the evolution of private sector business models 
that facilitate legitimate transactions that have lead to the strongest decreases in online piracy. This 
section will look at the notice and takedown system as the primary tool for removing pirated 
material online, the evolution of anti-piracy litigation and its effects, as well as the evolution of 
business models that have had the best success at decreasing piracy online. 
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ii. Notice and Takedown Systems and the Rise of Filtering Software 
 
 The notice and takedown system is the primary mechanism for the assertion of copyrights 
and protection for rightsholders against infringements online. The system originated in the United 
States in 1998 as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.60 Later, in 2000, a similar system 
was adopted in Europe as a part of the Electronic Commerce Directive of the E.U.61  
 The premise of the system is that if traditional rights of intermediary liability were allowed 
to be enforced against online service providers, there would be little incentive for these bodies to 
exist because of the huge risk for liability they would adopt. Therefore, viewing these hosting 
platforms as potentially culturally, economically, and educationally valuable resources, laws have 
been passed to foster their development by limiting their liability. The notice and takedown system 
is a byproduct of that limited liability. Online service providers are given safe-harbour protections 
from infringement liability actions based on the storing, uploading, or downloading of infringing 
material by users to their sites.62 A requirement for maintaining this safe-harbour status, however, is 
compliance with the notice and takedown system.63 Under this system, content owners will provide 
notice of infringing material stored on a service provider’s platform. Assuming this notice complies 
with requirements of a good faith belief that the material in question is infringing, the service 
provider is required to expeditiously remove the content from its platform or block access to it.64 
 This system has been used as the first line of defence against online piracy for the last 20 
years, though its success is disputable. As a means of enabling valuable online services to develop, 
the system is an unquestionable success. Websites like Google, Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, and 
Youtube would never have been able to exist without safe-harbour provisions to protect them from 
 
60 17 U.S.C. §512 
61 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') OJ L 178, 17.7.2000 
62 17 U.S.C. §512(c) 
63 Ibid. (c)(1)(A)(iii) 
64 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C)  
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secondary liability. However, as a means of preventing the existence of or efficiently removing 
pirated material from the internet, the notice and takedown system is hardly a success. The 
Recording Industry Association of America related the process of using the notice and takedown 
system to remove infringing material to “an endless game of whack-a-mole” where as soon as the 
infringing content is removed from one place it immediately reappears in another.65 Moreover, 
because the system is essentially a guideline for good faith behaviour between two corporate actors 
with almost no judicial oversight, it is subject to abuse and misuse.66  
 As technology has developed since 1998, we see a new frontline defence to online 
infringements developing. Filtering software, which uses digital fingerprinting software to 
automatically identify when an infringing work is uploaded to a website, is becoming the new norm 
in anti-piracy efforts online. Essentially, it automates the entire process of the notice and takedown 
system from the detection and location of infringing material to the ensuing takedown of that 
material. Legislation implicating the use of copyright filters has already been passed in the 
European Union.67 This directive was passed in spite of adamant criticism from the academic 
community based on the system's censorship potential.68 
 Despite the thousands worldwide who are employed with the sole purpose of scouring the 
internet for infringing material online and reporting it for takedown and the huge technological 
progress we have made that can automate much of this process, online piracy still appears much 
like the analogy to a game of “whack a mole” described by the RIAA. In the extreme cases, 
however, content owners have the option to litigate.  
 
 
65 Kravets, D., 'Forget DMCA Takedowns—RIAA Wants Isps To Filter For Pirated Content' (Ars Technica, 2020) <https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2017/02/forget-dmca-takedowns-riaa-wants-isps-to-filter-for-pirated-content/> accessed 21 May 2020 
66 This is developed further in the following chapter.  
67 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single 
Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC 
68 Again, this is discussed in depth in the following chapter as well as chapter 6.  
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iii. Anti-Piracy Litigation 
 For the last 30 years, content owners have struggled with where, when, and most 
importantly, who, to sue when it comes to online piracy of their works. As a result, rights holders 
and representative groups have tried their hand at suing everyone from the services allowing piracy 
to occur, the individual users committing acts of piracy, to trying to hold the internet service 
providers responsible for the actions committed by their subscribers. Ultimately we see a three-
decade long game of “who can we sue” that often ends with little economic recompense, poor 
public relations, and no actual deterrence to online piracy- in other words, a failure.  
 The late 90s music downloading service, Napster, brought about the notion of internet 
piracy. Just months after its inception, the Recording Industry Association of America filed a 
lawsuit against Napster.69 Nearly two years later, the site was shut down as a result of the lawsuit. 
However, one month before Napster was forced to shut down, a nearly identical software client 
known as Limewire was released. Limewire offered a service similar to Napster in the form of a 
peer to peer (“P2P”) sharing network and likewise the same opportunities for piracy. A decade later, 
Limewire was shut down and paid out over $100 million to record companies in an out-of-court 
settlement for copyright infringements.70 Since the rise and fall of Napster, a multitude of similar 
software systems have been developed to facilitate piracy with many finding themselves the subject 
of civil and criminal charges.71 Just as in the case of Limewire’s appearance only months before the 
shutdown of Napster, content owners may be able to seek economic reprieve from the most 
successful of these software companies, but they have been wholly unsuccessful at stamping out 
their existence. The legal battles surrounding internet piracy hubs like Napster and Limewire have 
been, in many ways, fruitless, where one lawsuit only prompts the creation of a new technology to 
continue serving the wants of the patrons to the old. While these lawsuits sometimes result in 
 
69 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) 
70 ‘LimeWire Pays $105m Illegal Filesharing Settlement.’ (FACT Magazine, 13 May 2011) <www.factmag.com/2011/05/13/limewire-pays-105m-
settlement-over-illegal-filesharing/> accessed 15 May 2021 
71 Audiogalaxy, Kazaa, Limewire, Grokster and The Pirate Bay, are all file sharing companies that sought to replace the service offered by Napster 
and have faced litigation for copyright infringement.  
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compensation for damages from infringements, those damages cannot and will never represent the 
actual damages suffered from internet piracy as a whole.  
 Recognising the relative futility of suing online companies that enable piracy, the early 
2000s were marred by a string of hard-learned lessons in public relations stemming from lawsuits 
targeted at thousands of end users who illegally downloaded pirated content online. In September of 
2003, the RIAA began its campaign against P2P users with 261 individual lawsuits.72 Over the next 
five years, this campaign would ultimately lead to lawsuits filed against approximately 35,000 
individual users- many of which were less than ideal defendants for public-relations purposes.73 
This campaign found some success early on74 but later demonstrated that the strategy of suing one’s 
own fans- especially children- created such backlash that it was abandoned by 2008.  
 The futility of trying to police direct infringers and/or the software and websites that host 
illegal content has led to a new method of seeking recompense for infringements. In the United 
States, the music industry has begun to try to hold internet service providers responsible for the 
illegal actions of their users.75 Grande Communications, a Texas-based ISP, has argued in Federal 
Court that the music industry is attempting to turn internet providers into “its de-facto copyright 
agents.”76 Grande Communications was sued in 2017 by 18 of the music industry’s largest 
companies for more than one million infringements of copyrighted works committed by its users 
over BitTorrent systems.77 The lawsuit has put Grande Communications in the impossible position 
of choosing between terminating its users’ accounts based on hundreds of thousands of (often 
 
72 Bruno, A., ‘A New Battle Plan,’ (Billboard) vol. 120 no. 42, pg. 16 
73 Silverman, D., ‘Why The Recording Industry Really Stopped Suing Its Customers’ (Harvard Business Review, 2008) 
<https://hbr.org/2008/12/why-the-riaa-stopped-suing> accessed 4 August 2020 
74 Initial data in 2003 showed the number of people over 13 who reported illegally downloading music dropping from 20% to 11.8% after the 
campaign began. Bruno (2008) Supra n. 72 at 16 
75 ‘Texas ISP Slams Music Biz For Trying To Turn It Into A 'Copyright Cop' (The Register, 2020) 
<https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/08/21/texas_isp_copyright_police/> accessed 21 May 2020 
76 See: UMG Recordings, Inc.et al. v. Grande Communications Networks, LLC., Defendant Grande Communications Networks LLC’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Document 140, filed 08/18/2018. Available at: <https://regmedia.co.uk/2018/08/21/grande-copyright-response.pdf> accessed 2 
April 2021. (Herein after, ‘Grande Communications Motion for Summary Judgment’). 
77 UMG Recordings, Inc.et al. v. Grande Communications Networks, LLC. 384 F.Supp3d 743 (2019 U.S. Dist. Ct. W.D. TX)  
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unsubstantiated) copyright complaints it receives each year or facing such legal action.78 The 
copyright complaints are generated via a software system developed by Rightscorp that supposedly 
can identify infringements and the perpetrators of those infringements by monitoring the BitTorrent 
network.79 However, the actual efficacy of the software is dubious as Grande claims that the 
software is unable to log any actual evidence of infringement.80 The legal arguments of this case 
hinge upon whether Grande communications had a duty to respond to each of the hundreds of 
thousands of complaints generated by this questionable software because, if so, it may be seen to 
have contributed to each of the infringements of its users by not doing so and thereby be ineligible 
for the safe harbour protections of the DMCA. The case is ongoing, but the key takeaway is that it 
represents the latest iteration of the content industries trying to find someone, and most importantly 
someone with money who does not represent a public relations risk, to sue for online copyright 
infringement because other efforts to stop piracy have failed.  
 
iv. The Streaming Service Business Model and Piracy  
 
 Despite various legal efforts to thwart piracy, it remains a major competitor to its legitimate 
counterparts. The hit American television show turned global phenomenon, Game of Thrones, was 
used as an example to illustrate the continued pervasiveness of piracy by London-based anti-piracy 
group Muso. Muso tracked piracy data for season seven of the show from its release date on July 
16, 2017 through September 3, 2017 (one week after the season’s finale aired).81 During this time, 
Muso found that the show was pirated over one billion times, with each individual episode 
averaging just under 150 million downloads/views during this time frame.82 To put these numbers 
into perspective, as of August 2, 2017, the season 7 premier had accumulated a record-breaking 30 
 
78 Grande Communications Motion for Summary Judgment Supra n.76  
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Horton, S., ‘Game Of Thrones Season 7 Pirated Over 1 Billion Times’ (Muso) <https://www.muso.com/magazine/game-of-thrones-season-7-
pirated-over-1-billion-times/> accessed 21 May 2020 
82 Ibid. 
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million views across HBO’s global platforms.83 Muso, however, found that the same episode had 
been pirated over 187 million times as of September 3, 2017.84 Despite the fact that determining the 
actual economic impacts of piracy remains an uncertain science, this small set of data indicates that 
HBO is perhaps collecting revenue from only approximately 17% of the massive Game of Thrones 
viewer base. This is a surprisingly small figure for the most popular show in the world, especially 
considering that HBO’s service fits into the modern mould of digital, on-demand content delivery- a 
model that most research indicates is the largest contributor to decreased internet piracy.85 While 
data from Game of Thrones is unlikely to be representative of the film and television industry as a 
whole, this study shows that piracy is far from under-control despite over 20 years of legislative 
measures to try to reign it in.  
 In fact, piracy must be viewed by content industries as a legitimate competitor.86 Regardless 
of one’s moral position on piracy, the reality is that an argument remains that it cannot be stopped 
by traditional legislative and policing attempts. Data currently shows that the most effective way to 
decrease piracy is to increase access to content legitimately.87 Australia’s Prime Minister responded 
to piracy concerns in 2016 by stating that “'rights holders' most powerful tool to combat online 
copyright infringement is making content accessible, timely, and affordable to consumers.”88 
However, while the slow growth of streaming services globally has had an impact on piracy, HBO’s 
Game of Thrones is legally available in 186 countries despite garnering hundreds of millions of 
pirated views per episode. If piracy is to be seen as a global epidemic that has economic effects that 
 
83 Scott, R., (2020)  ’‘Game Of Thrones ’Sets Worldwide Ratings Record As It Climbs To 30M Viewers.’ (TVweb, 2020) <https://tvweb.com/game-
of-thrones-season-7-worldwide-ratings-records/> accessed 21 May 2020 
84 Horton Supra n. 81  
85 Intellectual Property Office, ‘Online Copyright Infringement Tracker Latest Wave Of Research Mar 16 – May 16 Overview And Key Findings’ 
(2016) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/546223/OCI-tracker-6th-wave-March-
May-2016.pdf> accessed 15 May 2021 
86 Van der Sar, E., ‘Disney Says Piracy is a Business Model’ (TorrentFreak, 2006) <https://torrentfreak.com/disney-says-piracy-is-a-business-
model/> accessed 3 March 2021 
87 Titcomb J, ‘Internet Piracy Falls To Record Lows Amid Rise Of Spotify And Netflix’ (The Telegraph, 2020) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/07/04/internet-piracy-falls-to-record-lows-amid-rise-of-spotify-and-ne/> accessed 4 August 2020  
88 Reichert, C.‘ Piracy 'Significantly' Declining Due To Availability Of Streaming Services’ (Zdnet, 2020) <https://www.zdnet.com/article/piracy-
significantly-declining-due-to-availability-of-streaming-services/> accessed 21 May 2020 
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merit legal intervention, then perhaps the best solution is to facilitate transitions for piracy hubs to 
become legitimate.  
 However, the model of removing illegitimate content and/or seeking to license existing 
content and switch from a free (pirate) service to that of a paid (legitimate) one is historically 
unsuccessful. Crunchyroll, a former pirate site that is largely responsible for the rising popularity of 
Japanese anime cartoons in the United States was able to successfully shift to a legitimate business 
model. However, it remains the only successful example of such a transition with a slew of failures 
such as Napster and Limewire to compare it to. Crunchyroll’s successful transition can most likely 
be attributed to its huge market share of a niche sector of content with no meaningful competitors 
during its transition to legitimacy. For traditional online piracy venues whose business models rely 
on offering the same and/or more products than their legitimate competitors do for free, 
transitioning them to paid services will often remove their only competitive advantage and most 
likely direct the attention of their users to other or emerging free sites. However, as data indicates 
that those who pirate material are most likely paying subscribers to at least one legitimate service,89 
perhaps a better solution lies in making content more easily accessible for legitimate services.  
 It is important to note that the private sector has had the most success reducing piracy 
simply by altering its business models. While online streaming services that have increased access 
to and reduced the cost of digital content have had noticeable effects on reducing piracy, most of 
the data indicating this effect was collected from the music industry or at a time where there were 
only a few major film and television streaming platforms for users to choose from. That landscape 
is very much in transition. As film and television streaming services were once competing with 
traditional content delivery services, they are now competing with each other in a way that echoes 
the very systems they sought to replace. Netflix created a generation of “cable cutters,” or those 
 
89 Bode, K., 'Study Again Shows 'Pirates' Tend To Be The Biggest Buyers Of Legal Content' (Vice, 2018) 
<https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/evkmz7/study-again-shows-pirates-tend-to-be-the-biggest-buyers-of-legal-content> accessed 10 August 2020 
(Citing a MUSO survey in which 91% of respondents who admitting to pirating content online also stated that they were paying subscribers to at least 
one streaming service) 
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willing to abandon traditional cable television, by offering a product that was cheaper, easier, and 
arguably better. However, Netflix and its competitors now vie for customers by offering exclusive 
and original content and are growing to look more like the cable television networks they arguably 
have replaced. Streaming services thrive because they are inexpensive compared to cable television 
while offering a product of similar or better quality. However, when consumers are forced to 
subscribe to multiple services to have access to all the content they want, the price gap disappears 
and what we are left with is simply a newer version of cable television that operates over the 
internet. This becomes especially true when we consider the increasing number of streaming 
services available or coming soon that offer exclusive content.90 This is not a model that can 
compete with piracy the way it has up to this point. This is strongly evidenced by research that 
focuses on the streaming services in the music industry. A recent United Kingdom study shows that 
the amount of Britons who pirate music has been reduced by nearly 50% over the last 5 years.91 The 
study also indicates that over 60% of those who have stopped pirating music now subscribe to 
legitimate streaming services.92 Streaming services in the music industry thus far do not rely on 
exclusive content to compete with each other in the way that services in the film and television 
industry do. However, the study indicates that when popular albums are released exclusively on one 
provider, the practice boosts piracy.93 Since such practice is the future of the entire business model 
for the film and television streaming industry, it is likely that we will see an uptick in piracy in this 
area of content as film content becomes nestled more discreetly in exclusive providers.  
 
90 As of now, many American cable television networks are beginning to offer streaming services similar to Netflix and both Apple and Disney have 
also launched streaming platforms. 
91 Yougov.co.uk., ‘Number Of Britons Illegally Downloading Music Falls’ (Yougov, 2020) <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/arts/articles-
reports/2018/08/02/number-britons-illegally-downloading-music-falls> accessed 21 May 2020. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. (51% of respondents found it frustrating when music was released exclusively on one provider- particularly Apple Music and Tidal. 44% 
turned to piracy when they could not access the music they wanted legitimately.) 
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F. User-Generated Content94 
 The Irish Copyright Review Committee noted technology’s influence on UGC by stating 
that interactive innovation is “particularly [increasing] online, where technology is making it 
increasingly easier for users to innovate, and for that innovation to be based upon the 
transformation of existing content.”95 People are no longer forced to merely consume content, but 
rather now have the option to create their own and share it with the world. From Letsplay videos on 
Youtube that entertain and instruct video-gamers all over the world, to fanfiction.net where 
thousands of literary remixes are posted daily,96 to actual remixed music, we are in a world where 
people want to engage with content rather than simply absorb it. With this shift, public perception 
as to what constitutes an infringement has clearly changed. Ideas are now expressed through digital 
collage and it has become a way of cultural communication. Internet memes are the quintessential 
example of this practice. Alice Marwick describes the birth of a meme as such: “If someone uploads 
a photo of her cat, another adds a poorly-spelled caption and posts it to a message board, and 
months (or years) later, someone else changes the caption, this string of reappropriated words and 
images is called a ‘meme,’ in Internet parlance.”97 Such practice notably ignores the concept of 
ownership. The entire culture is about taking something that belongs to someone else, such as a 
photograph, and presenting it in a different light through commentary, often using quotations or 
homages to popular culture- more borrowed content- to present an entirely new idea. This section 
will discuss the interactions between copyright law and user-generated content. 
 At its core, copyright law provides three basic rights. First, it grants the author the right to 
make copies of her work. Whether these are actual copies or take the form of performances, 
displays, etc., control over the use of the actual work and its reproductions is the most important 
goal of copyright protection. Second, copyright also grants the author the right to make adaptations 
 
94 Much of the work for this section has been subsequently published in Longan, M.E., “The inadequacy of U.K. law to address user-generated 
content: a comparative analysis with the united States and Canada” (2017) Queen Mary Law Journal, special conferences issue, p. 109-122. 
95 Irish Copyright Review Committee, ‘Modernizing Copyright’, 2013, pg. 58 
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid. 
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of her work. Adaptations may take the form of translations, sequels, or other derivations that build 
upon the copyrighted material. Third, copyright law grants authors the sole right to make their 
works available to the public. While the first right is more clearly and uniformly expressed across 
all jurisdictions, the right of adaptation goes by many names and the rights offered differ. The 
differences will be discussed as they become relevant.  
 The right of making available, while recently has become more important to the 
dissemination of user-generated content, has limited application to the creation of it. The WIPO 
Copyright Treaty creates a global umbrella solution to this right.98 It has been incorporated into 
national laws,99 as well as the EU Information Society (‘InfoSoc’) Directive, which grants authors 
the exclusive right to communicate their works to the public.100 This right covers all forms of 
communication where the public is not present at the place where the communication originates.101 
It includes two distinct forms of making works available, namely: (1) the right to broadcast the 
work to the public, and (2) the right to make the work available from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by members of the public.102 The United States recognizes this same right 
through a combination of the Copyright Act’s exclusive rights of distribution, public performance, 
public display, and, where an act of communication or making available involves the creation of a 
copy, the right of reproduction.103 
 
98 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art. 8; See also: WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty Articles 10, 14 
99 For example, in the U.K. the Right of Communication to the Public is covered in Section 20 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988.  
100 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 35armonization of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society, OJ L 167, art 3(1); See also: Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 111, art 4(1)(c) 
101 Ibid.  Information Society Directive 
102 For example, the corresponding provision of the UK Copyright Act reads: ``Reference in this Part to communication to the public are to 
communication to the public by electronic transmission, and in relation to a work include (a) the broadcasting of the work; (b) the making available to 
the public of the work by electronic transmission in such a way that the members of the public may access it from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them.'' (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, as amended, Sec. 20(2)) 
103 U.S. Copyright Office, ‘The Making Available Right in The United States,’ (Feb 2016) 
<https://www.copyright.gov/docs/making_available/making-available-right.pdf > accessed 7 May 2021; see also: See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Nothing in the Copyright Act prevents the various rights protected in section 106 from 
overlapping. Indeed, under some circumstances, more than one right must be infringed in order for an infringement claim to arise.”). See also: Foong, 
C ‘Making Copyright Content Available in the Cloud vs the Making of Copies: Revisiting Optus TV and Aereo,’ (2015). 41 Monash  U. Law 
Review. 583, 599 ( “The making of copies could be part of a process of making content available, but making a work available to the public does not 
necessarily require the making of copies.” 
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 User-generated content, when it runs afoul of the law, typically represents a violation of the 
derivative or adaptive right. This is because the term encompasses a diverse body of creativity that 
looks to make use of existing works in the creation of new ones. Not all UGC is adaptive, and not 
all adaptive UGC is an infringement. Generally, adaptive UGC finds safe havens in exceptions to 
infringement. These exceptions vary in breadth and title according to jurisdiction. However, there 
are international treaties that govern limitations on how exceptions to infringement may be applied. 
The ‘Three-Step Test’ first implemented in the Berne Convention sets out a rough guideline for the 
requirement of a right of reproduction as well as how signatories may limit that right.104 Article 9(2) 
gives leave to territories to implement their own exceptions to infringement of the right of 
reproduction “provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”105 This standard is 
echoed in many other international treaties and various EU directives governing copyright.106 
Therefore, copyright laws across the world differ in the limitations and exceptions to the right of 
reproduction, though generally within the confines of this standard. Analysing the copyright laws of 
every jurisdiction across the globe would be both impractical and repetitive. Instead, this section 
discusses the law in generalised groups based on common legal principles. Currently, 47 countries 
containing over a third of the world’s population have adopted into their laws either a system of fair 
use or fair dealing107 and much of the remaining nations have adopted laws that are similar in 
function under different titles.  
 Therefore, the first group I will discuss is composed of those countries that have adopted a 
system of fair dealing to address exceptions to infringement. This group is composed of many 
nations across the globe, but the law originates in the United Kingdom and has nearly identical 
 
104 Berne Convention Article 9 
105 Ibid. Article 9(2) 
106 See: WIPO Copyright Treaty Article 10; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty Article 16(2); EU Computer Programs Directive Article 
6(3); EU Copyright Directive Article 5(5)  
107 ‘Fair Use Handbook’ (Infojustice.2020) <http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/fair-use-handbook-march-2015.pdf> accessed 21 
May 2020 
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execution across all adopting countries. The second group is those countries that have adopted a 
system of fair use. This is mainly composed of the United States, but some fair dealing countries 
have switched or been vocal about considering a switch to fair use.108 Finally, the third group is 
represented by a variety of jurisdictions that have neither adopted fair use nor fair dealing but have 
similar components in their laws under different names. Each legal theory addresses the issues 
presented in different ways and each theory has its own unique strengths and weaknesses. However, 
they all find common ground in an ultimate failure to adequately address user-generated content. 
 
i. Fair Dealing Systems: The U.K. and its Progeny 
 
 This section will focus largely on the laws of the United Kingdom. However, it is important 
to understand that 38 other countries have nearly identical provisions in their laws.  
 United Kingdom copyright law grants two relevant rights to a copyright holder. The first, 
the right of reproduction, is more like a bundle of rights that adds up to the right to make and 
distribute actual copies of the work whether they are in the form of sales, performances, rentals, 
communications or displays.109 When determining whether the right of reproduction has been 
violated, courts will ask whether the defendant’s work competes in the same market as the 
claimant’s.110 
 The second right granted by copyright is to make an adaptation of the work or perform any 
of the previously described rights in the relation to an adaptation.111 The adaptive right only applies 
to literary, dramatic, or musical works.112An adaptation is defined by the statute in various ways for 
each form of media. Adaptations for literary works include translations, conversions from dramatic 
to non-dramatic and vice versa, and versions where the work is conveyed by pictures in part or 
 
108 Australia considered adopting fair use in 2016. Australian Government Productivity Commission, ‘Intellectual Property Arrangements, Inquiry 
Report,’ <https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/intellectual-property/report/intellectual-property.pdf> accessed March 29 2021.  
109 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, Chapter II, Section 16(1)(a-d). 
110 Goold, P., ‘Why the U.K. Adaptation Right is Superior to the U.S. Derivative Work Right’ [2013-14] 92 Nebraska Law Review Page 875. 
111 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, Chapter II, Section 16(e). 
112 Ibid. at section 21 
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whole.113 Adaptations for musical works include arrangements or transcriptions of the work.114 
These rights are narrowly construed and limited purposefully. During Parliamentary debates 
concerning this statute, members of Parliament pushed for a more open-ended wording of the 
statute.115 However, following a persuasive argument by Lord Mancroft, Parliament voted to keep 
the narrow wording of the statute to avoid an influx of litigation.116  
 Therefore, with a narrowly constructed adaptive right, unlike other jurisdictions, such as the 
United States, most forms of UGC will violate a copyright owner’s right of reproduction rather than 
the adaptive right. However, such a violation will only occur if the allegedly infringing work is 
found to occupy a similar market as the base work.   
 In theory, any work of remix or collage can be argued on both sides- that it either does or 
does not occupy the same market of its base work. For example, internet memes often make use of 
watermarked stock photos without licenses paid to the owners. The photos are typically used in full, 
but whether or not they serve a commercial purpose is unclear and whether that purpose undermines 
the market for stock photo licensing is also unclear. Remixed and sampled music fall into even 
blurrier territory, yet the policy of all major record labels is that any sample of a copyrighted 
recording needs to be licensed.117 Nevertheless, the case law on the issue is sparse because many 
remixers opt for licenses or out-of-court settlements in lieu of potentially expensive litigation and 
judgements.118 Some, possibly most, ignore the law in the hope that the work will go unnoticed by 
rights-holders.  
 
113 Ibid. at Section 21. 
114 Ibid. at (3)(b). 
115 Goold, P., ‘Why the U.K. Adaptation Right is Superior to the U.S. Derivative Work Right’ (2013-14) 92 Nebraska Law Review Pg. 872 
116 Ibid.  
117 Jacques, S., 'Mash-Ups And Mixes: What Impact Have The Recent Copyright Reforms Had On The Legality Of Sampling?' (2016) 
Entertainment Law Review, pg. 5  
118 Ibid.  
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 With a presumption in favour of original copyright holders, it is fair to say that for creators 
seeking to borrow another’s work for the purpose of remix, collage, appropriation etc... the current 
law will not act in their favour.119  
 From there, the only saving grace that an appropriated work might find would be in the law 
of fair dealing. However, the current statute lacks the forward-looking nature of similar systems in 
other jurisdictions and will be little help to most creators in this realm. 
 
a. Fair Dealing: 
 The concept of fair dealing first appeared in the UK in the copyright act of 1911. Section 
2(1)(i)-(vi) of the Act set forth six circumstances whereby infringement would be excused.120 These 
six circumstances can be summarised as:  
where the work is used for the purpose of private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper summary; 
for artistic works, preparatory works such as molds, studies, sketches, casts etc may be used for the purpose 
of a work as long as it does not repeat or imitate the main design of that work; with artistic works, making 
or publishing two- dimensional representations of a three-dimensional work; the publication of short 
passages of literary works by schools subject to limitations; newspaper publications of lectures delivered 
in public; public reading of an extract of any published work.121  
 
These provisions were later repealed when the 1956 Copyright Act replaced the Act of 1911.122 The 
1956 Act created provisions for fair dealing generally for research or private study, criticism or 
review, and reporting.123 In the United Kingdom, aside from relevant E.U. Law, the governing law 
on copyright is the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 (CDPA). This act grants 
exemptions for fair dealing in an enumerated manner similar to the 1911 Act but more reflective of 
modern norms seen in the 1956 Act. 
 The CDPA enumerates six separate infringements that will be considered permissible under 
the act.124 These are: research and private study; personal use; copies for text and data analysis for 
 
119 Ibid.  
120 Copyright Act 1911 (UK) 
121 Ibid. 
122 Copyright Act 1956 (UK) 
123 Ibid.  
124 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) 
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non-commercial research; criticism, review, quotation and news reporting; caricature, parody, and 
pastiche; and incidental inclusion of copyrighted material.125 
 A fair dealings analysis has essentially two parts. First, a defendant must show that her use 
falls into one of the enumerated categories of the statute. Courts interpret these exceptions 
narrowly. 
Second, the dealing must be shown to be fair within the context of the exception. Fairness is an 
objective test. "It is … essential not to apply inflexibly tests based on precedent, but to bear in mind 
that considerations of public interest are paramount.”126 In Hyde Park, Aldous LJ stated that it is 
essential to "judge the fairness by the objective standard of whether a fair minded and honest person 
would have dealt with the copyright work in the manner" in question.127 Furthermore, the 
consequence of the infringement is essential to determine fairness.128  
 Courts will also look to two primary factors to make a determination of fairness. First is the 
quantity and quality of the work taken.129 Second, the work in question must contain sufficient 
acknowledgement to the source work to make a viable claim for fair dealing. There are exceptions 
where it may be impossible to acknowledge an author due to anonymity or other reasons. 
 Courts, on rare occasions, are also willing to look outside the narrow list of exceptions to 
find a determination of fair dealing. For instance, a defence claiming that the infringement was 
necessary “in the public interest” will be allowed in exceptional circumstances.130  
 
b. Shortcomings of the Fair Dealing System in the Modern World:  
 
 The structure of the fair dealings statutory provision is inherently unprogressive and unduly 
constraining. In 2004, Shunmugam Jayakuma, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Law of 
 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2002] Reports of Patent, Design and Trade Mark Cases 119(6) 235-256 (Court of Appeal). 
127 Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland and Others [2001] Ch. 143 (Court of Appeal). 
128 Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84. 
129 Ibid. At 94. 
130 Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland and Others [2001] Ch. 143 (Court of Appeal). 
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Singapore at the time, argued for Singapore’s need to move away from its U.K. Model of fair 
dealing because such model has proven “restrictive.”131 Other British copyright scholars have 
argued similarly that fair dealing “offers no principles or vision and that it contains too many 
obstacles undermining its operation.”132  
 By limiting permitted uses to six explicit categories, the law allows no room for natural 
growth or expansion as technology and societal norms progress. In other words, it lacks the ability 
to adapt to what it cannot anticipate. The law serves as a reflection of what Parliament viewed to be 
fair and reasonable exceptions to copyright infringement given the available technology and 
common practices at the time. However, time has passed and its inflexibility is already felt as 
technology and the way we experience content has surpassed the scope of the law. 
 
c. User Generated Content  
 
 In the United Kingdom and most other Fair Dealing jurisdictions, there are little to no 
protections or avenues for protection of adaptive user-generated content (“UGC”). With the mass 
availability of content-creation technology, coupled with a world interconnected by instantaneous 
communication, “remix culture” is ubiquitous. Yet the laws of copyright are tailored to the wants 
and needs of content owners, represented in majority by but a few large corporations.133 Just as the 
public perceives the act of copying the sound files of a CD to an Mp3 player as justified, the 
public’s views have likewise become more liberal with concern to the use of copyrighted material 
to create their own content. Yet the U.K. has failed to address this.  
 Currently the only piece of U.K. legislation that could be construed as intended to protect 
UGC is the section of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act that preserves works of parody, 
caricature, and pastiche as exceptions to infringement.134 However, this legislation protects 
 
131 Sing, (2004) 78 Hansard Parliamentary Debates 10 (Jayakumar) [Debate 2004] 
132 D’Agostino, G., ‘Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada's Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use,’ 53 
McGill Law Journal, 312 
133 Patry, W., How to Fix Copyright [2011] Oxford Univ. Press, 35 
134 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) 
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arguably only two small pieces of a much larger pie. First, while parody inarguably merits 
protection, caricature is likely merely a subcategory of parody not needing separate notation. 
However, the limitations imposed on parodists by the law seem to undermine what should have 
been its very purpose. For example, derogatory treatment of a work will disqualify it from a fair 
dealings defence.135 Such an argument could be made against nearly every work of parody ever 
made. Second, pastiche, while it has not been defined by a British Court, is “an artistic work in a 
style that imitates that of another work, artist, or period.”136 Such a work should not need the 
protection of an exclusion to infringement as it should never be treated as an infringement to begin 
with. If Shakespeare were alive and writing today and tried to copyright iambic pentameter, he 
would surely fail. Therefore, we likewise do not need a law that protects such stylistic generalities.  
 Otherwise, the United Kingdom has failed to grant protection to the growing movement of 
amateur creators who are forging their own share of the content market. Truthfully, very few 
nations have sought to address this issue. Instead, regulation has been left to the hands of content 
owners who have established their own sets of rules for user-generated content- an issue discussed 
in more depth in chapter 5.  
 
ii. The Derivative Right, Fair Use and Transformation: The U.S. and Elsewhere137 
 
 The United States system involves two key distinctions from that of the United Kingdom. 
First, the United States grants separate protection for derivative works that expands on the adaptive 
right in the U.K. Second, the system of Fair Use is far more liberal than that of Fair Dealings. This 
section will focus on United States law, but similar systems have been adopted in seven other 





135 Ibid. paras 11-51. 
136 Oxford English Dictionary. 
137 Some portions of this section also appear in: Towsend-Gard, E., Gard, R., Video Games and the Law, Routledge 2020 for which I was a 
contributing author (credited Chapter 4) and are from my contributions to this manuscript.   
 




a. The Derivative Right:  
 
 While the right of reproduction is almost identical in U.S. law, America offers a broad set of 
derivative rights to copyright owners that go well beyond the adaptive rights offered in the U.K. A 
“derivative work” in the U.S. is a 
work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work 
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship.138 
 
A derivative work uses a preexisting copyrighted work and relies substantially on the protected 
expressions in the preexisting work. Copyright law was intended to promote the creation of new 
works by protecting the pecuniary interests of those who create them.139 The derivative right is in 
place to ensure the ensuing profitability of a successfully expressed concept is retained or controlled 
by the original author.  
 Many works that make use of appropriation in the United States will be found to infringe 
either the right of reproduction or the derivative right, depending on how the base work is 
incorporated into the new work. This legal construct provides a much broader set of rights to 
copyright owners. However, users’ rights are balanced out with a far more liberal system of fair use. 
 
b. Fair Use: 
 
 The law of fair use in the United States and others represents an entirely different approach 
from fair dealings in the United Kingdom. Instead of enumerating specific uses that qualify as 
exceptions for infringement, the U.S. copyright act lists four factors for courts to consider and 
balance when determining a work’s status as a fair use.140 This creates the potential for any type of 
use to be considered fair as long as it passes the balancing test of the four factors. This system has 
 
138 17 U.S.C.A. § 101. 
139 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
140 17 USC §107. 
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lead the U.S. fair use approach to be championed by scholars as the most flexible method, in 
contrast to the laws of the U.K. and Canada.141  
 The Australian Law Reform Commission produced a paper considering a shift towards a 
U.S.-based standard in Australia because fair use “would be more responsive to rapid technological 
change and other associated developments that the current specific, closed-list approach to 
exceptions.”142 The report also championed the legal framework as being more encouraging to 
innovation.143 It noted that Google could not have created its search engine under the current regime 
in Australia and that “other stakeholders shared the view that the current copyright regime puts 
Australian companies and individuals at a disadvantage compared with those in the US, or other 
countries that have a fair use exception.”144 The Commission also concluded that a fair use system 
“restores balance to the copyright system” by reducing what is a broad set of rights granted to 
copyright holders in favour of users, and that fair use “assists with meeting consumer expectations” 
by legitimising many practices that are ubiquitous. For example, the posting a photograph of a book 
to an Ebay auction in order to sell it is a “technical infringement” that does no harm to rights 
holders and is expected by consumers. Fair use easily settles the issue of these harmless 
infringements.  
 However, fair use, while broader and more flexible than fair dealing, still suffers from 
problems in addressing certain forms of UGC. Many of these problems stem from its flexibility and 
open-ended nature.  
 
c. Fair Use and User Generated Content 
 
 The factors of a fair use analysis are: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the 
copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the copyrighted work used, and the effect on 
 
141 D’Agostino Supra n.132 at 344 
142 Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Copyright and the Digital Economy,’ (2012) [4.36] 
143 Ibid.  
144 Ibid. 
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potential markets.145 No one of these factors is meant to be determinative, and courts are free to 
consider other factors they may find important.146  
 The first factor is the purpose and character of the alleged “fair use” of the copyrighted 
work.147 This factor has several facets, the most important of which is whether the alleged fair use 
serves a commercial, nonprofit, or educational purpose. The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he 
crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but 
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the 
customary price.”148 Therefore, even a commercial work, though it will require a more arduous 
showing, may still be found to be a fair use.149  
 The second factor is the nature of the copyrighted work.150 This factor “recognizes that there 
is a hierarchy of copyright protection in which original, creative works are afforded greater 
protection than derivative works or factual compilations.”151 For example, “original work[s] of 
fiction” are “entitled to the greatest degree of protection.”152 Furthermore, works made for the 
purpose of publication will be given a higher degree of protection than those made for private 
purposes.153 It is important to note, however, that this factor is given little weight in parody cases.154  
 The third factor is the amount and substantiality of the portion used.155 This factor will vary 
depending on the alleged fair use. For defendants who rely heavily on the copyrighted work, it will 
cut against a finding of fair use. Likewise, for defendants who borrow only a little from the original 
work, this factor will play in their favour.   
 
145 17 USC §107. 
146 Ibid.  
147 17 USC §107. 
148 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539. 562 (1985) 
149 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) 
150 17 U.S.C. §107. 
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 The fourth factor is the effect on the market for the copyrighted work.156 Despite the 
statutory mandate that the factors should be balanced equally against one another, this is largely 
considered to be the most important of the four factors.157 Under this factor, uses that economically 
substitute for the original work, thereby reducing market demand for it, are generally not protected 
by the fair use doctrine.158 However, in Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications Int., Ltd., the 
Court held that if a copyright holder has no interest in occupying a derivative market, a defendant's 
subsequent use is more likely to be fair.159 The Twin Peaks case hinged on whether the defendant’s 
derivative work constituted a market substitute or equivalent to the original and thereby deprived 
the copyright owner of profits.160  
 
d. Transformative Use: 
 
 As mentioned previously, Courts are free to consider any other factors they may find 
important.161 One additional factor that has emerged in many cases of infringement whose treatment 
has had a monumental impact on U.S. Copyright law is “transformative” use. The notion of 
transformative use as a component of a fair use defence first appeared in a Harvard Law Review 
article by Judge Leval.162 In this article, Leval examined the four factors of fair use and described 
how the concept of transformation should be applied to each factor.163 He argued that a 
transformative use “must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner or 
for a different purpose from the original.”164 Furthermore, “A quotation of copyrighted material that 
merely repackages or republishes the original is unlikely to pass the test” and, in quoting Justice 
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Story from Folsom v. Marsh, “it would merely ‘supersede the objects’ of the original.”165 Finally, 
“[i]f, on the other hand, the secondary use adds value to the original -- if the quoted matter is used 
as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings -- this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the 
enrichment of society.” Leval went further to provide a list of possible transformative uses 
including “criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character of the original author, proving a fact, 
or summarizing an idea argued in the original in order to defend or rebut it...parody, symbolism, 
aesthetic declarations, and innumerable other uses.”166 
 The concept of transformative use found its way into law just years later in the monumental 
Supreme Court decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose.167 In this case, the Court was dealing with an 
infringement action against rap group, 2 Live Crew, for its song, Pretty Woman, that allegedly 
infringed upon the copyright in Roy Orbison’s song, Oh Pretty Woman.168 The version by 2 Live 
Crew was a sexually-explicit hip-hop parody of the original that borrowed the opening musical 
phrase and elements of the chorus to criticise the naivety of Orbison’s ode to a street-walker.169 The 
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit misapplied the first factor of the fair use analysis in ruling 
that the work’s commercial nature barred it from protection.170 The Court, citing Leval’s article, 
held that  “the more transformative the work, the less will be the significance of the other factors, 
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”171 Campbell has since served as 
legal precedent for a multitude of holdings regarding transformative use. 
 The concept of transformative use feels ideally suited to address and legitimise UGC. In 
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though philosophically that may be true, in application the law is often impotent due to other 
factors.  
 
e. The Development of Legal Uncertainty in Fair Use Cases:  
 
 The open-ended and broad-reaching nature of the United States’ fair use system has the 
benefit of empowering courts to adapt the law to changing circumstances without need for 
legislative reform. Fair use has been used to resolve many types of disputes that would have been 
unforeseeable in 1976 when Congress passed the legislation that created the doctrine. One example 
is the treatment of digital image thumbnails in search engine results.172 However, the doctrine is not 
without fault. The open-ended nature of the law that allows courts to adapt to changing 
circumstances also has lead to significant doctrinal confusion and uncertainty which has created a 
sense of legal impotence in many areas. 
 When it considered adopting fair use in Australia, the Australian Law Reform Commission 
described this uncertainty.173 Their concern was a legitimate one as, in the wake of Campbell, the 
United States has seen a murky and confusing evolution of the doctrine of transformative use 
marked by jurisdictional splits and a general lack of clarity as to what actually qualifies as a 
legitimate transformation.  
 For example, in one of the more recent and influential cases, the Second Circuit ruled that 
an artist, Richard Prince, was justified in using the copyrighted work of photographer Patrick 
Cariou for a series of collage-based artworks that garnered millions of dollars in sales.174 Prince 
enlarged photographs he took from a copy of Cariou’s book, Yes, Rasta, and obscured, tinted, 
altered, or collaged over the images.175 In one work, Prince merely superimposed a guitar into the 
hands of one of Cariou’s figures and painted three dots over the figure’s face.176 The Court 
 
172 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) 
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ultimately found that, of the 30 artworks in question, 25 constituted fair uses.177 In these works, the 
Court reasoned that they “manifest an entirely different aesthetic from Carious’s photographs” 
because “[w]here Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed portraits and landscape photographs 
depict the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their environs, Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the 
other hand, are hectic and provocative.”178 However, in his dissent, Judge Wallace noted that he 
was unable “to see how the majority in its appellate role can ‘confidently’ draw a distinction 
between the twenty-five works that it has identified as constituting fair use and the five works that 
do not readily lend themselves to a fair use determination.”179 This is the pinnacle of legal 
unpredictability.  
 In the world of music, however, transformative works are yet to be given the same leeway 
despite the fact that remixing or sampling music is essentially equivalent to Prince’s method of 
creating visual art. Musical remix involves the cutting, editing, and rearranging of sound files to 
create a new piece of music built on the foundation of another’s work- much the way Prince created 
his collage artworks from Carious’ photographs. However, current case law in the United States is 
severely anti-remix.180 The first court decision regarding sampled music was in Grand Upright 
Music, Ltd. v. Warner Brothers Records, Inc. In this case, the Supreme Court evoked the language 
of Exodus to equate the 8th Commandment, “thou shalt not steal,” with copyright law.181 Biz 
Markie, a rap artist, sampled a portion of the music from “Alone Again/ Naturally” by Gilbert 
O’Sullivan for the musical backing of his own song, “Alone Again.”  The Court held that Markie 
had “stolen” from the earlier copyrighted work.182 Granted, some remixes are more or less 
“repackaged” versions of the original song and serve as takings more than original expression. 
 
177 Ibid. at 707 
178 Ibid.  
179 Ibid. At 714. 
180 see: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding willful copyright infringement and 
granting an injunction against the defendant, Biz Markie). see also: Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 799-800 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(Sixth Circuit held that two seconds of a sampled guitar solo, lowered it in pitch, and looped constituted a violation.) 
181 780 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
182 Grand Upright Supra n. 180 at 185. 
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However, many remix artists would have a chance to succeed under a Prince analysis but for the 
fact that Sixth Circuit has given special protection to sound recordings not afforded to other creative 
media.183 As it stands now, in this Circuit, any act of copying a sound recording, even if done so for 
the purpose of amateur experimentation, is considered a per se infringement under the law.184 While 
many circuits have declined to follow185 this bright-line rule, the law remains intact in the circuit 
where the Prince case was decided.  
  In the literary world, doctrinal confusion is just as ubiquitous. In Suntrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co., the Eleventh circuit found that Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone (TWDG), a 
retelling of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind (GWTW) from the perspective of Randall’s 
new character, Cynara, was transformative.186 In writing The Wind Done Gone,  "[Randall] 
appropriated the characters, plot and major scenes from GWTW into the first half of TWDG."187 
The Court, however, focused on the new insights that TWDG brought to light noting that  
"Randall's work flips GWTW's traditional race roles, portrays powerful whites as stupid or feckless, 
and generally sets out to demystify GWTW and strip the romanticism from Mitchell's specific 
account . . . ."188 Citing Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit wrote that Randall’s novel "reflects 
transformative value because it 'can provide social benefit by shedding light on an earlier work, and 
in the process, creating a new one.’”189  
 However, this holding represents a notable departure from a similar case in the Ninth Circuit 
in 1997. In Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books U.S.A Ltd., the plaintiff sued Penguin Books for 
publishing The Cat Not in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice, which was a comedic retelling of the 
 
183 Bridgeport Music, Supra n. 180 at 799-800. 
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O.J. Simpson trial in the style of Dr. Seuss.190 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the work in question was 
not transformative despite the fact that, on its face, the work seemed to meet the accepted standard 
of presenting “new expression, meaning, or message.”191  Renowned copyright scholar, David 
Nimmer, criticised this holding in his copyright treatise by positing "[i]t is hard to imagine a 
message or meaning more disparate from Theodore Geisel's children's classic than making his Cat 
into a murderer who beats the system and gets off scot-free."192 Where two works are both 
seemingly departures from their original sources and contain a message uniquely their own but only 
one is deemed a fair use, it appears, that what constitutes transformative value is subjective and 
unpredictable. 
 Thus, as the law stands, in the Sixth Circuit a sampled sound recording will be a per se 
infringement regardless of transformation but, in the Second Circuit a sampled photograph will 
likely be deemed fair use if it is sufficiently transformed. However, a sampled sound recording will 
be given fair use consideration in other circuits including the Ninth and Eleventh. A satirical or 
parodic work that transforms the message of a piece of fiction while incorporating some of its 
creative elements may or may not be considered transformative depending on the circuit hearing the 
case and a slew of other intangible factors. This is the pinnacle of both inter-circuit and inter-media 
unpredictability under the law. 
 In theory, the fair use system in the United States carries with it a pliability that allows the 
law to adapt to changes in technological innovation and public opinion. However, in practice, that 
pliability has lead to doctrinal confusion and ultimately legal unpredictability. The doctrine of 
transformative use is well-suited to the rapid change of the modern world but falls short in 
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iii. Miscellaneous Jurisdictions: The E.U. and Others 
 
 Jurisdictions adopting fair use and fair dealing only account for 47 of over 190 recognised 
countries. However, nearly all of these remaining nations have adopted exclusions to infringement 
under different titles despite the fact that they generally function in the same way as fair dealing. 
The Berne Convention sets broad guidelines for signatory nations to establish their own exceptions 
to infringement. The treaty only requires that authorised reproductions do not “conflict with normal 
exploitation of the work” or “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”193 
 
a. Exceptions to Infringements in Europe 
 
 Member states of the European Union are subject to the guidelines provided in the European 
Copyright Directive of 2001 when establishing exceptions to infringement in their national laws. 
The directive enumerates an exhaustive list of exceptions that should be allowed but only a few are 
related to user-generated content.194 This includes the right to make incidental inclusions of a work 
within another work,195 the right to make use of a work for educational or scientific purposes,196 the 
right to private use of a work,197 and the right to use a work for the purpose of parody, caricature, or 
pastiche.198 These rights are echoed in the copyright laws of the United Kingdom as, at the time of 
this writing, it is still a member of the E.U. Therefore, in practice, while the various member states 
of the EU will have laws that differ from the UK, the resulting user rights will be similar. Moreover, 
recent caselaw of the CJEU indicates that the list of permitted exceptions to infringement in article 
5 of the InfoSoc directive is meant to be exhaustive. In an analysis of the application of 
fundamental rights to copyright exceptions, the Court has ruled that the enumerated exceptions in 
 
193 Berne Convention Supra n.4 Article 9(2) 
194 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
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197 Ibid. article 5 2(b) 
198 Ibid. article 5 3(k) 
 
   Page 53 of 233 
article 5 are “specifically aimed at favouring fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression 
[…] [and] the freedom of the press […] over the interest of the author” and thus no analysis on the 
interaction of fundamental rights and copyright infringement shall be permitted beyond the scope of 
those enumerated exceptions.199 The inherent inflexibility in the exhaustive list format of exceptions 
to infringement is its key downfall. Yet the pitfalls of the United States’ system illustrates that too 
much flexibility in the law can create just as many problems. 
G. Chapter Conclusions 
 Copyright law is a system of law that was designed to mimic the protections offered in real 
property for the purpose of incentivising new creations via the economic value created by the 
property protections. However, this model of law is antiquated and is now forced to reconcile issues 
created by a digital world that was completely unanticipated at its inception. Up to this point, this 
thesis has discussed the laws of copyright and two particular issues that plague them in the modern 
world- piracy and user generated content. Online piracy has been pervasive since the late 1990s and 
still befuddles both lawmakers and rights holders looking to enforce their copyrights. In many cases 
the law feels like a sword blunt on both edges as rights holders struggle to prevent pirated works 
online or sue for compensation when the infringements occur. Format and time shifting are users’ 
rights that have become unduly complicated by enforcement mechanisms designed to prevent 
piracy. User generated content is a new phenomenon guided by technological innovations and 
changing creative norms that have created a culture of collage and expression by appropriation. The 
resulting creations are often entirely new works with new meanings and value. However, much of 
the products of this creative movement either fall in grey areas within or expressly outside the 
protection of the law. As such, the rights of user-creators have likewise been curtailed by legal 
efforts aimed at piracy. Modern copyright policy should consider these three concepts and try to 
address them all appropriately. As the next chapters will illustrate, however, disproportionate 
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preference is often given to (ineffective) measures to prevent piracy in ways that neglect the other 
rights of users. This is largely the result of the strict application of property rules to a system that no 
longer fits well into that mould. The following chapter will criticise the rigid use of a property 
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II. The Inefficacy of Property-Based Enforcement 
Mechanisms in Copyright Law  
A. Introduction 
 The law, especially in common-law jurisdictions, is deeply rooted in tradition- evolving 
tradition but tradition nonetheless. The system is designed so that the law has enough freedom to 
grow, expand, or morph as the values of the people it governs likewise change over time. However, 
because of this system of slow adaptation, rarely do we find ourselves asking if the very 
foundations of a law or a legal principle remain ideally suited for its intended purpose. The notion 
of completely abandoning a system of law established over potentially hundreds of years for 
something new is radical in legal policy. However, simply because something has been done 
successfully for hundreds of years does not mean that it remains successful. Allowing the law to be 
constrained by tradition is dangerous in a world that is changing at a pace whereby it becomes 
nearly unrecognisable with each passing generation. At times, we must be willing to completely re-
evaluate the efficacy of our laws from their very foundations upwards. For copyright law, that time 
is now.  
 Within the context of this thesis, the goal of this chapter is to analyse the efficacy of the 
property model for copyright protection. It comes the the conclusion that this very model of 
protection has grown ineffective in digital environments and lays the foundation for arguments in 
favor of a system of economic rights200 that follow in later chapters. It will do so by analysing the 
impotence of control-based copyright legal enforcement mechanisms and briefly introducing the 
idea that a system of economic rights is better able to address copyright dilemmas brought about by 
digital culture.  
 
200 In the context of this thesis, economic rights are those that grant the owner of a creative work rights of statutory remuneration and monetary 
compensation for exploitations of their works as opposed to property rights which allow the owner to directly control where, when, how, and by 
whom their creative works are exploited.  
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 B. The Property Model is No Longer Suitable 
 Copyright’s current system of property rights has been allowed to evolve into a legal Hydra 
of seemingly boundless and perpetual protection for creative expressions. Meanwhile, the creative 
world has evolved from being composed of small niche groups of professionals to a much larger 
population where the lines between amateur and professional are far more blurred. The evolution of 
creative technologies and the internet have fostered a culture where anyone today can be a creator 
and copyright law touches the average citizen in ways that never could have been anticipated. At its 
inception, the property-based model was designed to be the most effective way to protect creators 
and likewise incentivise them to keep creating.201 However, the overbearing protections found in its 
modern iteration have been relegated to simply propping up a code of honour amongst the 
professional creative communities and offer very little help to prevent or deter actual infringements 
from average users ranging from works of appropriation to outright piracy.202 This is largely 
because a property-based system of protection is no longer appropriate in the digital world.  
 The property-based model of copyright protection made sense in a world where creative 
expressions shared many of the same qualities with actual property. Literature and poetry were 
printed in books, artwork was solidified in stone or on canvas, music was etched into vinyl, and 
films and photographs were recorded onto actual film. Despite the obvious inherent differences 
between a novel and a plot of land, the novel could still be protected as such because of the relative 
ease with which authors could control its reproduction and use. At the enactment of the Statute of 
Anne, access to the technology required to print a book was not afforded by the average British 
citizen. Therefore, it was relatively easy to control where, when, and how a book would be printed 
in the same way it would have been easy to control who had access to or could make use of a plot 
of land. Piracy is not a new concept. Even in the 1980s, it was relatively common for users to 
record their favourite songs from the radio onto cassette tapes. Furthermore, the sale of double tape 
 
201 Statute of Anne 1710 (England) 8 Anne, Ch. 19 
202 This statement is developed more thoroughly in section C of this chapter. 
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decks allowed the actual copying of entire albums onto blank cassettes. The practice, however, was 
tedious and resulted in degraded sound quality with each reproduction. Therefore, while some 
bootleg tapes were likely given to friends or even sold in flea markets, the opportunity to mass 
produce or widely distribute these reproductions was nonexistent. The music industry tolerated this 
pirate activity because it was relatively harmless and had no visible impact on revenue- which was 
high. However, digital technology reshaped the practice of piracy. Copies can now be made nearly 
instantaneously and without any noticeable quality degradation. Furthermore, the internet allows 
dissemination of those copies globally. Moreover, because of technological advancements, creative 
expressions have taken much different forms. Despite whether a creative work now takes an actual 
physical form or exists in a type of analog media, it will almost always exist in some digital 
capacity too. With digitisation, creators immediately lose the aspect of control found in the 
analogue world that allowed the property system to function so well. Once something is uploaded to 
the internet, the ability to protect it as if it were a piece of property is all but completely lost. 
Finally, technology has also given the average person the ability to convert or transpose most 
analog creations to digital ones- for example: the recording of vinyl music to digital audio files, 
digital photography, and three-dimensional scanning technology. 
 Copyright law is not only easier to infringe, it has become borderline impossible to enforce. 
Global connectivity through the internet means boundless legal jurisdictional hurdles for 
enforcement agencies countered by limitless potential for offenders to evade prosecution. Imagine a 
person in New Zealand having the ability to violate a person in England’s right to quiet enjoyment 
of her home or to steal her television using only an internet connection. Moreover, imagine that 
same person in New Zealand being able to continue to do so from Australia, then Thailand, then 
Sweden, as soon as local authorities are able to shut her down. If such were the case, the legal 
academic community would surely be discussing property law reform. Yet thousands of 
infringements occur on a daily basis all over the world and the academic discussion about copyright 
reform is generally limited to the use of new technology to block infringements at the expense of 
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censoring legitimate creation despite being often circumvented by actual pirates when the problem 
clearly lies in a system of law that is no longer able to achieve its prescribed purpose. Copyright law 
is incapable of serving creators as a property right because creations no longer resemble property.  
 If one can accept that perhaps a property-based system is no longer ideally suited for 
protecting something that is intangible, potentially-infinite, and easily accessible, then the logical 
next step is determining a new model that can be successful. 
 Historically copyright law has represented an economic tool whereby creators are granted 
the right to control their creations in the form of temporary monopoly rights. However the law’s 
critical failures in light of the modern world result largely from creators’ inability to adequately 
exercise these rights of control. Therefore, a practical legal solution should look outside the concept 
of protection based on control and seek to accomplish the same goals through other means of 
economic incentives. An economic-rights based approach would eliminate the major hurdle the law 
currently faces of inability to exercise the rights granted while serving to incentivise creation via 
insured economic compensation for creative works. The following sections will criticise the 
existing paradigm of copyright as a right in property and the continuous legislative efforts to 
perpetuate this system despite being an upriver swim.  
C. Modern Copyright as Grasping to this Antiquated Model - Solutions Seeking Control 
 
 With the invention of the internet and subsequent digital technologies came an onslaught of 
copyright legislation attempting to harmonise or modernise the law across various jurisdictions. 
However, these new laws typically took the form of attempts at reasserting property-like control 
over digital content. These modern legal methods of addressing copyright enforcement in the digital 
world can be broken down into two distinct strategies that are implemented in tandem across the 
globe. These are notice and takedown procedures and gatekeeping software. In the context of 
property law, these strategies are equivalent to digital eviction procedures and digital fences. 
However, as we will see, the fences rarely keep anyone out and the eviction of one digital squatter 
 
   Page 59 of 233 
often leads to the appearance of multiple new ones. This section will analyse these two methods of 
modern copyright enforcement within the context of their intent to maintain control despite 
inefficacy under the property model. 
 
i. Notice and Takedown Procedures 
 
 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of the United States was designed to bring 
copyright law into the age of the internet. It was passed in part to incorporate the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation’s Copyright Treaty of 1996 into U.S. law.203 The act, among other things, 
had the goal of creating a more efficient system of copyright enforcement on the internet. The 
primary mechanism used to achieve this goal is the, now widely used, system of notice and 
takedown. This is a process whereby rights holders may work with online service providers- or 
those who host websites that allow their users to post material autonomously- to remove infringing 
material posted by their users. A similar system was also passed in the European Union’s Electronic 
Commerce Directive of 2000.204  
 The notice and takedown process allows rights holders to request that infringing material be 
removed when posted to one of these sites and allows the online service providers immunity from 
claims of secondary infringement as long as they adhere to the rules of the process. Without this 
safe-harbour provision, sites like YouTube, Google, Facebook, and Reddit could never exist. The 
system attempts to balance users’ rights against those of rights holders while simultaneously 
granting private entities the right to self-police in hopes that doing so would ease the burden of the 
courts. However, the system has its issues in practice.  
 The inefficacy of the notice and takedown system has been tracked through a multitude of 
empirical studies over the last two decades. In 2004, the Liberty Project compared reactions of a 
 
203 Cobia, J., ‘The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notice Procedure: Misuses, Abuses, and Shortcomings of the Process’ (2008) 10 
Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. pg. 388  
204 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') OJ L 178, 17.7.2000 
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U.S.-based ISP to those of a U.K. (E.U.) based ISP to takedown requests sent for obviously out-of-
copyright content.205 The group found that the U.S. ISP refused to remove the allegedly infringing 
material without the complaint specifically adhering to requirements set out by the DMCA, 
compared to the European ISP who immediately removed the harmless material without any further 
vetting of its validity.206 In 2006, Urban and Quilter analysed 876 takedown notices, the vast 
majority of which were issued to Google (734).207 In analysing Urban and Quilter’s findings, 
Mostert and Schwimmer claimed that 9 percent of the notices were defective, 30 percent presented 
questions that should have been determined by a court of law, and 57 percent of the notices were 
filed against competitors.208 In 2014, the Multatuli project conducted a similar investigation into 10 
Dutch ISPs.209 The project again dealt with posting of obviously out-of-copyright material on 
websites hosted by these ISPs, calling for its removal and analysing their reactions.210 Of the 10 
tested, seven removed the harmless material without questioning the complaint’s validity, one 
completely ignored the complaint, and two refused to remove the content because the complainant’s 
identity could not be verified.211 The researchers concluded ‘[i]t only takes a Hotmail account to 
bring a website down, and freedom of speech stands no chance in front of the cowboy-style private 
ISP justice.’212 In 2017, Urban and Schofield published findings resulting from three empirical 
studies of the notice and takedown system.213 The second study described in this paper 
quantitatively analysed a sample of 1800 takedown requests out of 108 million provided by Lumen 
 
205 Ahlert, C., Marsden, C., and Yung, C., 'How ‘Liberty’ Disappeared from Cyberspace: The Mystery Shopper Tests Internet Content Self-
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from a 6 month period in 2013.214 Key findings were: 98.9% of the takedown requests were 
automated;215in one in twenty-five requests the allegedly infringing work described did not match 
the allegedly infringing material;216 in 13.3% of requests it was difficult to located the allegedly 
infringing material;217 and 1 in 15 requests were flagged with characteristics that weighed 
favourably towards fair use;218 and overall, nearly one third of the requests presented serious 
questions about their validity.219 
 There are two key problems with the notice and takedown system that merit discussion. 
First, it is the first of many copyright enforcement mechanisms that have sought to delegate 
copyright adjudication to the private sector in hopes of an increase in legal efficiency. As with other 
areas of copyright law where we see the private sector allowed to self-regulate,220 the practice of 
copyright adjudication under the notice and takedown system has become an unbalanced system 
that favours rights holders at the expense of users’ rights. Second, the system has become 
overwhelmed and is incapable of accurately and efficiently addressing online infringement. 
 
b. Abuse of the Notice and Takedown System 
 
 The premier flaw of the notice and takedown system is its lack of functional legal oversight. 
While it is a legal mechanism of copyright law enforcement, the vast majority of its processes take 
place without supervision by any governmental body. The system was designed this way in order to 
alleviate the burden placed on the courts by allowing the private sector to self-police in a more 
efficient way. However, this lack of oversight has lead to abuse of the system as there are virtually 
no repercussions for doing so. Moreover, the United States’ requirement that service providers 
expeditiously remove infringing content once given notice has lead to a tendency to err on the side 
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of removal instead of performing an in-depth analysis of the legitimacy of each claim received. The 
consequences for failure to remove an actual infringement are steep- the potential loss of safe 
harbour protections and assumption of secondary liability for the infringement. However, there is 
no functional penalty for removing legitimate content. Therefore, the very design of the system 
lends itself to be open for abuse by content owners and those posing as content owners.  
 There are three particular ways in which rights holders may abuse notice and take down 
procedures. First, takedown notices can be sent by those who are not actually the legal owner of the 
rights for the copyrighted material in question. Second, the process may be used for the purpose of 
intentionally censoring free speech. Third, takedown procedures ignore fundamental aspects of 
copyright law such as exceptions to infringement like fair use and are used to chill legitimate 
creativity. 
Takedown Notices by Non-Owners  
 The first issue of note seen in the notice and takedown system is its lack of accountability 
with concern to those filing takedown requests. As a result, takedown notices have been 
fraudulently filed by those who are not the rightful owners of the allegedly infringed copyrighted 
material. This has been done for many reasons. It can be done for anticompetitive purposes as users 
have posed as content owners and filed takedown requests to Google to have their competitors’ 
links removed from the search engine as a way of boosting their own traffic.221 Thieves have also 
abused the notice and takedown system on YouTube to essentially hold other users’ accounts 
hostage under the threat of copyright strikes (which can functionally ruin a YouTube artist’s career) 
unless a ransom is paid.222 This is possible simply because the accusation of copyright infringement 
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on YouTube can carry as much weight as actual infringement. Finally there are examples of the 
system being abused in this way by internet trolls simply seeking to cause mayhem.223 
 Whatever the reason for filing a fraudulent takedown notice, the practice is not only 
possible- it’s easy. Timothy Geigner, writing for Techdirt, aptly wrote that “good internet policy is 
not that which can be easily subverted by impersonating another person, because that happens all 
the time on the internet.”224 Moreover, if theoretically anyone can assert rights of control over a 
copyrighted work then it is not actually being controlled. The simplicity of the notice and takedown 
system is supposed to be its strength. However, it must provide some way of verifying the 
legitimacy of those filing takedown requests and/or a system of recourse against those who file false 
claims. Otherwise, it will continue to be abused at the expense of legitimate users. 
 
Takedown Notices as Tools of Censorship 
 The second way by which the notice and takedown suffers from abuse is that it has become 
an effective tool for copyright owners to censor unwanted but legitimate criticism or speech. 
Because service providers will err on the side of takedown and are likely to remove anything 
requested of them, and because there are essentially no consequences for filing false or fraudulent 
takedown notices, the DMCA is actually a powerful tool for temporary censorship. As such, it has 
been used by the producers of a nazi romance movie to silence critics,225 by a major American 
television network to silence a news article about leaked shows along with subsequent social media 
 
223 'Soundcloud Troll Getting DMCA Takedowns Shows The Weakness Of Notice And Takedown Systems' (Techdirt., 2020) 
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systems.shtml> accessed 21 May 2020 
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posts referring to this censorship,226 and by a video game developer to block a bad review of his 
game.227 These are but a few examples that have happened within weeks of writing this section.  
 The problem here lies in the automatic handling of DMCA requests coupled with the little 
power the subjects of those requests possess to assert their legitimacy. The DMCA does have a 
counter notice system whereby the subject of a takedown request may dispute the claim. Following 
this, the entity who filed the original takedown notice has two weeks to file a lawsuit or the content 
will be reinstated.228 However, many average users are unaware of this process and in some online 
situations- particularly those involving the silencing of free speech- two weeks can be enough time 
to do a significant amount of damage. Therefore, the system has created essentially a built-in 
temporary censorship mechanism with no penalties for abuse. Controlling a copyrighted work 
cannot become so important that we are willing to sacrifice free speech rights to achieve it. 
 
Takedown Notices and Exceptions to Infringement 
 The final, and perhaps largest, abuse or inadequacy of the notice and takedown system is its 
failure to address exceptions to infringement. Fair use in the United States, Fair Dealing in the 
United Kingdom, and various exceptions to infringement in Europe protect a variety of ways in 
which one may use the work of another without permission. However, this body of law is 
completely subverted by the notice and takedown system which makes no attempt to consider 
exceptions to infringement before takedowns are administered. In the United States, Lenz v. 
Universal Music Corp. established that fair use must be considered before a takedown request is 
sent.229 However, the once-believed pivotal holding has proven impotent as there is no standard by 
which to measure what constitutes sufficient consideration by rights holders and there has not been 
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a single case benefiting a user that cites this holding. In Europe, no such requirement even exists. 
Therefore, users are left to assert their rights through the notice and takedown system after their 
works have been removed. Moreover, in some online spaces, users are finding that content owners 
and/or service providers are not complying with requirements of the counter notice system. 
YouTube, in particular, has been known to simply reject a counter notice based on fair use despite 
being directly in violation of the DMCA.230 
 
Counter-Notices as a Poor Safety Net 
 Any abuse of the notice and takedown system should theoretically be balanced out by the 
system of counter notices. Under the DMCA, counter notices allow users to formally contest the 
removal of allegedly infringing material. Once a counter notice has been filed, the original 
complainant has 14 days to seek a court order retraining the user from from engaging in the 
infringing activity or the material will be automatically reinstated.231 However, research suggests 
that this aspect of the system may also be subject to failures. For example, Urban, Karaganis, and 
Schofield write: 
As a procedural matter, material that is targeted by a takedown request is often removed before the target 
is given the opportunity to respond; this was confirmed in interviews with OSPs and rightsholders. Yet all 
available evidence suggests that counter notices are simply not used. It is indicative of the problem that the 
most memorable uses of counter notices for our rightsholder respondents were a few bad-faith, bogus 
counter notices from overseas pirates. Given the high numbers of apparently unchallenged takedown 
mistakes that showed up in our quantitative studies, we would expect to see higher numbers of appropriate, 
good- faith counter notices if the process were working as intended.232 
 
c. The system is Overwhelmed and Cannot Function Adequately 
 
 The issues I have described with the notice and takedown system exist but perhaps provide a 
distorted picture up to this point. Across the plethora of takedown notices filed daily, these abuses 
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represent the exceptions- not the rules.233 However, the ease with which the system may be abused 
is problematic and it is hardly functioning adequately outside of these abuses. In fact, the system is 
overwhelmed with automated requests and there is evidence that, while individual takedown 
requests will result in the swift takedown of the infringing material, they fail to functionally remove 
the infringing content as it will typically reappear instantly elsewhere online.   
 The system is overwhelmed. Automation coupled with overhanded enforcement strategies 
have lead to more takedown requests being sent than could ever be actually dealt with in a just way. 
For example, in just the first three months of 2016, Google alone received over 200 million requests 
to remove infringing material from its search engine.234 Entertainment lobbies have pointed to this 
humongous volume of requests as evidence to a need for a better system to combat online piracy.235 
This argument has been refuted by evidence of a massive amount of redundant takedown requests 
as well as ones for nonexistent material.236 While this counterpoint may call into question a need for 
a new system based purely on the evidence of overwhelming numbers of requests sent, it hardly 
makes for evidence of a functional system.  
 While the massive volume of takedown requests may not be adequate to show a failing 
system, the system is, however, incapable of actually keeping up with the amount of infringements 
that occur online in a reasonable way. In 2017, the Recording Industry Association of America and 
14 other relevant groups lobbied Congress for an overhaul to the DMCA.237 They argued that the 
process of removing infringing content online upon request by content owners has only created an 
“endless game of whack-a-mole” where the removed material reappears instantly somewhere else 
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online.238 This lobbying effort actually lead to a call for the implementation of anti-piracy filters in 
lieu of or to work in tandem with the notice and takedown system similar to the legislation recently 
passed by the European Union- a topic that will be discussed in much more depth later in this 
thesis.239  
 
ii. Gatekeeping Software and Digital Locks 
 
 Just as digital technology has created boundless complications for the enforcement of 
copyright law, it has likewise granted new methods to increase protection for copyrighted works. It 
has therefore become both the sword that aids and the shield that defends against infringement. 
New technology has helped rights holders tighten their grasp on copyrighted works by allowing an 
increased sense of control. The implementation of this technology for the purposes of copyright 
enforcement has come in two main forms- Digital Rights Management (DRM) tools and 
gatekeeping software. The former is a type of digital lock that prevents unauthorised replication of 
copyrighted digital files. It is not a legislative enforcement mechanism but a tool of the private 
sector to enable control over pieces of property that are otherwise difficult to control. Gatekeeping 
software or filtering technology that tracks the uploading of copyrighted works via digital 
fingerprinting technology began as a private sector tool but has recently been incorporated into 
legislative efforts to prevent online infringements.240 It serves as the logical extension of the notice 
and takedown system with the incorporation of advanced technology as the system effectively 
serves to automate the process on both the OSP and copyright holders’ ends. Both tools serve as 
attempts to replicate the antiquated sense of control over pieces of intellectual property felt in the 
pre-internet era with inarguable success in some respects. However, both also suffer from critical 
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points of failure that outweigh their respective successes and render them incompatible with 




 Modern technology has given rise to digital tools that enable the controlled use of 
copyrighted works. These tools are commonly known as digital rights management (DRM). A 
subset of DRM are technological protection measures (TPM) or bits of code used to safeguard 
digital copyrighted works from infringement. These are industry tools and not legislative acts, 
though the technology often has legislative backing.241 DRM technology represents content owners 
using the very technological advancements that made infringement so easy as a tool to help them 
reassert the necessary control over their digital assets for the current property system to continue 
functioning. However, the use of such technology as an enforcement mechanism for copyright law 
has presented two fatal issues. First, the technology ignores fundamental aspects of copyright law in 
order to serve its prescribed purpose. Second, despite sacrificing users’ rights, the technology is not 
generally effective at preventing actual infringements.  
 Technological protection measures seek to serve one purpose- preventing unauthorised 
copying of copyrighted materials. In doing so, TPMs serve to undermine other important aspects of 
copyright law- namely users’ rights in the forms of exceptions to infringement. For example, the 
phonographic industry uses DRM to “fight digital piracy” yet compliance with copyright exceptions 
to infringement is not one of their stated goals.242 The use of technical protection measures to 
enable control over a digital copyrighted work typically ignore the rights of users in two ways. 
First, TPMs will block a legitimate user of a copyrighted work from format and/or time shifting that 
work. Second, TPMs will prevent the work from being copied not only in circumstances of 
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infringement but also for legitimate reproductions where the use would qualify for an exception to 
infringement.  
 Format and time shifting are largely legitimised practices in modern copyright law. In the 
United States, the practice of time shifting, or recording a piece of lawfully accessed copyrighted 
material for the purpose of accessing it later in time, was ruled to be a legitimate fair use in the 
infamous “Betamax” case.243 While this case addressed time shifting, there is no legal holding with 
regards to format shifting and fair use in America. Moreover, the anti-circumvention laws in the 
DMCA make it illegal to bypass any DRM technology imbedded in a copyrighted work even for 
the legitimate purpose of time shifting.244 In Europe, most EU member states have implemented a 
private copying exception to their copyright laws following the Copyright Directive of 2001. This 
exception allows for both format and time shifting practices and uses levies on copying hardware to 
balance the potential economic harm faced by copyright owners. However, like the United States, it 
is also illegal to bypass any TPM even for the purpose of lawful format or time shifting.245 The 
United Kingdom provides a complaint system that users may use when a TPM prevents them from 
benefiting from an exception to infringement.246 However, the process is arduous and appears to be 
scarcely, if ever, used.247 Furthermore, the legislation backing DRM/TPM technology shifts the 
legal focus away from the actual goals of the software- to prevent piracy- to a more restrictive 
place. The question for courts dealing with infringement cases concerning DRM/TPM technology is 
not whether an actual infringement occurred, but rather simply was the technology circumvented in 
some way?248 The actual purpose of copyright law and the means by which digital locks may be 
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used to further that purpose is all but lost in this process. Instead, we are left with a legally-backed 
enforcement mechanism that encourages anti-competitive behaviour and ignores fundamental rights 
of users under the same law it seeks to enforce.  
 Ignoring users’ rights is likely seen as the necessary cost of protecting works from large 
scale piracy. This could perhaps be a forgivable trade off if the technology actually worked. 
However, as it stands, it does not. While TPMs are typically sophisticated enough to prevent 
average users from accessing the digital information necessary to make unauthorised copies of the 
works in which they are imbedded, they fail to provide absolute protection. TPMs offer no 
protection against savvier users and professional infringers. “There is no DRM system, however 
sophisticated, that cannot be worked around if you have the right expertise.”249 An article in 2002 
stated plainly that "to this day, every DRM system with economic significance has been 
‘cracked.’"250 In the United States, Congress enacted the “anti-circumvention” provisions of the 
DMCA for this very reason.251 It was responding to concerns voiced by content owners that their 
works would be pirated despite any digital protection measures they implemented.252 Moreover, 
once the DRM is bypassed, the unlocked version can be uploaded to the internet to be accessed by 
anyone who wishes to do so- particularly the class of casual pirates that DRM is designed to 
obstruct. Once an unlocked version of a copyrighted work enters this space, it falls into the realm of 
notice and takedown protection and there is virtually nothing that can be done to completely remove 
it from the internet. Therefore, anything but absolute protection is functionally the same as no 
protection at all.  
 The use of code to safeguard digital works from unauthorised reproductions makes sense in 
theory in the modern world. Rapid technological growth over the last 30 years has caused the wave 
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of mass infringements that have plagued copyright owners. Using the very technological 
advancements that made copyright enforcement so difficult for content owners as a shield to 
reestablish the sense of inaccessibility that made pre-internet copyright law so easy to enforce feels 
elegant. However, the costs of such a solution must not be ignored. Copyright law is not designed 
as a one-sided protection for creators and content owners. It is a nuanced balancing act constantly 
seeking to resolve the rights of those who own content and those who engage with it. Any 
enforcement mechanism that ignores the rights of those represented by half of this equation is 
unacceptable- especially one that is otherwise ineffective. There is surely a means by which we can 
use code to aid in copyright enforcement. However, the system today is inadequate.  
 
b. Gatekeeping Software 
 
 Gatekeeping software is the newest iteration of the content industry’s attempts to assert 
control over copyrighted works online. It is the logical extension of the enforcement mechanisms 
discussed up to this point and essentially uses the technology behind DRM to automate the notice 
and takedown process. As such, it suffers from many of the same weaknesses. Chapters four and 
five of this thesis discuss the modern implementations of gatekeeping software and their failures in 
depth. However, this section will provide a general overview.  
 Gatekeeping software works via digital fingerprinting technology that seeks to match works 
posted online to copyrighted works compiled in a database. The software has the ability to detect 
reproductions of audio and visual digital files with a high but questionable degree of accuracy.253 
YouTube has been the largest proponent of such software and its proprietary Content ID software is 
the most sophisticated of its kind. Therefore, YouTube also provides the most robust example of the 
use of gatekeeping software online for analysis. Content ID works as an enforcement tool for both 
infringements and for various licensing agreements that YouTube has negotiated with content 
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owners. It detects reproductions and, based on the licensing agreement for the work in question, 
will automatically allow, remove, or monetise the content in favour of the owner of the original 
material.254 The system, however, suffers from a slew of issues similar to DRM and notice and 
takedown including the inability to recognise fair, tolerated, or even licensed uses of a work.255 It 
also suffers from issues in accurately identifying works.256 Moreover, its licensing scheme functions 
in a way where there is no possibility for splitting revenue between content owners and user-
creators and there is virtually no accountability within the system’s review process.257 
 YouTube touts its Content ID program as a huge success, attributing it to billions worth of 
revenue paid to content owners since its inception.258 However, while gatekeeping software is 
arguably the most successful iteration of modern copyright enforcement mechanisms in terms of 
identifying and preventing piracy, it is by no means an ideal solution. First, Content ID operates in 
an isolated microcosm of the internet and is not realistically scalable to a degree that could 
encompass the entirety of the web. Therefore, while it is able to prevent infringements from 
appearing within its community with relative success, it has no means of effectively preventing 
them from appearing elsewhere online and is thereby subject to the same “whack-a-mole” effect 
described in the criticism of notice and takedown. Moreover, the system finds success by drawing 
hard line rules in an area of the law traditionally governed by grey areas and these hard lines are 
typically drawn to disproportionately favour content owners. Mechanisms enabling control are only 
successful if they enable the degree of control authorised by the law. 
 Digital fingerprinting technology that can recognise copyrighted works tied to databases do 
exist. However, copyright law is both complex and, at times, indefinite. While there are computer 
programs capable of recognising the existence of a copyrighted work, an analysis to determine 
infringement requires far more than simply recognition. Determining infringement often requires 
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subsequent analyses relating to statutory exceptions such as fair dealing. Moreover, copyrighted 
works are licensed to users everyday. This can occur through traditional channels involving 
contracts or, more often, through tolerated use initiatives by content owners in the form of no action 
policies. Current examples of filtering technology are not only incapable of determining if a 
publication would qualify for an exception to infringement, but are also unable to recognise if the 
work has been properly licensed or if the use is tolerated by the content owner. Furthermore, claims 
are even, at times, issued via filtering software by those who are not the rightful owners of a 
copyright. These failings to distinguish the intricacies of copyright law become especially 
unacceptable when considering that the current leading filtering software still fails to simply 
identify 20-40% of music recordings within its database.259 These three issues with copyright 
filtering technology online are discussed below.  
 
False Positives and Exceptions to Infringement 
 While the technology that powers existing content identification software is undeniably 
complex and sophisticated, the resulting capabilities of that technology are actually simple. Content 
identification software systems rely on compiling massive databases of content and using 
fingerprinting technology to mark that content in order to determine whether a piece of uploaded 
content matches in whole or in part any piece of content in their database. This process is performed 
solely under a match or no-match condition. In other words, the sole objective, and only capability 
of the tech, is to determine whether or not the scanned content matches a piece of content from the 
database.  
 The first step of an infringement analysis will invariably involve a determination of 
similarity and access- regardless of jurisdiction. In theory, content identification software will 
correctly identify direct copying which would satisfy the required analysis for both of these factors. 
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However, to reduce the process of analysing infringement solely to these two steps is, at best, unfair 
and, more likely, illegal because infringement analyses typically require far more considerations 
than simply access and similarity. All jurisdictions in Europe provide exceptions to infringement 
whereby users may legally make use of protected works without permission. The simple match/no-
match process of content identification software fails completely to address this more complex 
aspect of copyright law and works that should be treated as a fair use are regularly flagged as 
infringements.260 
 Exceptions to infringement are not only foundational aspects of copyright law, but they 
represent uses of copyrighted works that are not illegal and therefore should not be blocked from 
publication or monetised for a third party by any entity- software or otherwise. Such a system 
should not be allowed to exist. Yet, legislative trends are now heading in the direction of requiring 
the adoption of such technology.  
 
Licensed and Tolerated Uses 
 Complex analyses regarding exceptions to infringement aren’t the only failures seen by 
content filtering software systems. Current filtering software will also not take into consideration 
whether a work has been licensed through legitimate channels or falls under a more broad category 
of tolerated use. 
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 With regards to licensed material, YouTube’s Content ID software has blocked content 
containing legally obtained stock audio with such regularity that companies are offering specific 
advice for how their customers may dispute these claims.261  
 Video game companies are at the forefront of tolerated use policies, with a particularly 
active and engaged fan base that bolsters the value of their copyrighted materials through various 
digital fan works such as LetsPlay videos. These videos are tolerated by most game development 
companies with specific policies listed on each company’s website. Ubisoft, a game company that 
has supported user engagement in the form of fan videos and otherwise, spoke out in support of its 
fans who were issued Content ID claims for videos containing permitted footage from its games.262 
 Taking down or monetising these legitimate forms of creation establishes content filtering 
systems as indiscriminate tools of usurpers. Furthermore, this system achieves a goal of preventing 
unauthorised uses of copyrighted material by way of deterring legitimate uses. If a user knows that 
the content will be flagged regardless of legal status, there is no incentive to license content legally.  
 
Illegitimate Third Party Claims 
 Not only do these systems have difficulty analysing what constitutes as material that should 
and should not be taken down. They also struggle to appropriately determine who has the right to 
make a claim on the copyrighted material. YouTube’s Content ID system is rife with reports of 
automatic claims being issued by entities that should not have the power to issue a copyright claim. 
 Among these examples include a claim made for a song in the public domain,263 a magazine 
claiming ownership of a screenshot from a video game because it was published in one of their 
 
261 McElwain J,' Solving YouTube Content ID Claims for Stock Audio’ (Storyblocks Blog, 2018) <https://blog.storyblocks.com/storyblocks-
features/youtube-content-id-claims-stock-audio/> accessed 25 July 2018 
262 Totilo S, ‘YouTube Copyright Chaos Continues. Game Publishers To The Rescue?’ (KotakuDecember 12, 2013) <https://kotaku.com/youtube-
copyright-chaos-continues-game-publishers-to-t-1481517758> accessed 25 July 2018 
263 ' YouTube's Content ID System Brings Humbug to the Holidays’ (Adam the Alien ProductionsJanuary 7, 2014) 
<http://adamthealien.com/2013/12/23/youtubes-content-id-system-brings-humbug-to-the-holidays/#.W1b2Vy_My1s> accessed 25 July 2018 
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editions,264 and Universal Music Group licensing a song from an indie artist to use as a backing 
track in an audiobook and then using that audiobook as a proxy to claim ownership for the original 
song.265  
 However, as the next few chapters will illustrate, the future of copyright enforcement online 
absolutely lies in gatekeeping software- and this is not necessarily a bad thing if done so properly. 
Using the software to imperfectly and unfairly attempt at emulating a judicial analysis of copyright 
infringement is not the answer. However, adapting the underlying system to both the tools of 
enforcement at our disposal as well as cultural creative norms is a viable option to finding harmony 
in the world of digital copyright enforcement. This will require rethinking the current structure of 
copyright law.  
 
D. Using Economic Rights to Balance Infringements 
 The trend in copyright enforcement thus far can be characterised as various attempts to turn 
the very technological innovations that enabled the spread of piracy against itself and use new 
technology to either lock content or monitor and address its propagation online. This strategy is 
reliant on the notion that the current system of copyright will remain viable as long as works of 
intellectual property may be controlled by their owners. However, in order for this system to be 
successful it must achieve two goals. First, it must actually enable control over copyrighted works. 
Second, it must do so in a way that adheres to principles of copyright law. Modern copyright 
enforcement through DRM, gatekeeping software, and notice and takedown fails to achieve either 
of these goals. While some level of control is achieved, it is far from absolute. Moreover, even with 
only marginal success, the system does so by blatantly ignoring the rights of users.  
 
264 Totilo, S., ‘YouTube Copyright Chaos Continues. Game Publishers To The Rescue?’ (Kotaku, December 12, 2013) <https://kotaku.com/youtube-
copyright-chaos-continues-game-publishers-to-t-1481517758> accessed 25 July 2018 
265 ‘UMG Licenses Indie Artist's Track, Then Uses Content ID To Claim Ownership Of It’ (Techdirt.) 
<https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150317/10513630347/umg-licenses-indie-artists-track-then-uses-content-id-to-claim-ownership-it.shtml> 
accessed 25 July 2018 
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 It is therefore time that we accept that absolute control of copyrighted works on the internet 
is likely impossible. We should seek new solutions to ensure that authors continue to profit from 
their works but abandon the concept that controlling them is paramount to doing so. The notion of 
control being the premier component necessary for copyright enforcement stems from the law’s 
basis in property law. Abandoning this property system and replacing it with one of economic rights 
will allow us to likewise abandon the notion that we must control copyrighted works in order to 
protect their authors.  
 This is not a simple solution. For example, it creates immediate questions as to what, if not 
everything, should be governed by compulsory licenses.266 Should all aspects of copyright fall 
under this new regime of protection? Would, then, copies of Hollywood’s latest releases shot in 
cinemas on camcorders be allowed assuming the makers followed some sort of legal procedure to 
obtain the compulsory license? Would other forms of obvious piracy be likewise allowed or should 
the law attempt to only target less harmful forms of fringe piracy like remix? Is it even possible to 
legislate one and exclude the other? Would such a law end up creating a scheme where it is 
necessary to obtain a compulsory license for something that would not have previously necessitated 
one under laws like fair use? These are all very important questions that will be addressed in the 
following chapters. However, this chapter is merely intended to offer the foundation- the notion that 
such a system has strengths where the current one has developed weaknesses. The online 
marketplace of culture is far better suited to liability rules than property ones.  
 Transitioning copyright law to a system of economic rights is not an entirely new concept 
and the notion of even incorporating economic rights into the existing system- for example 
compulsory licensing- has already been met with criticism. The following section will discuss this 
criticism of the inherent inadequacy of using liability rules to solve modern copyright dilemmas.   
 
266 A compulsory license or system of compulsory licenses would be the main tool of protection for a system of economic rights in copyright law. A 
compulsory license is a statutorily mandated license that a rights holder is required to grant when requested. The terms of the license may be rigidly 
or vaguely defined by the governing statute.  
 
   Page 78 of 233 
 E. The Myth of the Inferiority of Liability Rules in IP 
 
 Lawmakers’ persistent perpetuation of the property system despite continued impotence in 
the modern world is likely attributed to the lack of a viable alternative. Abandoning copyright law 
altogether is hardly an option as entertainment lobbies would never allow it nor would such a move 
likely serve any public good. The most obvious alternative is a shift to an economic-rights based 
approach that uses compulsory licenses. However, while such a system has become a more popular 
topic of debate for legal academics, the notion remains heavily criticised and no such academic 
proposal has been welcomed by legislators. One key criticism of note is that compulsory licensing 
systems are inherently inferior to private collective licensing bodies operating within a property-
rights system. This argument is, however, dated and has become less true as the state of digital 
technologies have evolved at speeds well beyond those of the laws that regulate them.  
 In the 1990s, Robert Merges wrote a paper urging American legislators against the use of 
compulsory licenses to solve intellectual property rights issues in new media.267 Merges premised 
his argument on the value of collective rights organisations and claimed that “society and industry 
will be better off if Congress exercises restraint, creating an environment in which private 
organisations can flourish.”268  
 Merges analysed the Calabresi-Melamed Framework,269 which subdivides all legal 
entitlements into either those governed by “property rules,” “liability rules,” or “inalienable 
entitlements.”270 These two types of rules govern the way entitlements are treated. Calabresi and 
Melamed define an entitlement as the legally prevailing interest when two or more opposing 
interests conflict.271 Property rules are rooted in control and require permission from, and often 
 
267 Merges, R., ‘Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations’ (Oct. 1996) California Law 
Review, Vol. 84. No. 5. 1293 
268 Ibid. at 1300  
269 Ibid. at 1302 
270 Ibid. See also: Calabresi, G. and Melamed, D., ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) Harvard 
Law Review, vol 85, no 6, 1089, 1092 
271 Calabresi. and Melemed (1972) Ibid. at 1090  
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payment to, the owner of the entitlement.272 An example of this sort of entitlement in the 
intellectual property context is traditional licensing negotiation for use of a work. The owner of a 
copyright is granted power under the law to license it at her discretion and therefore permission is 
required up front for any potential licensor to make use of the work. However, liability rules, allow 
for the destruction of an original entitlement in cases where an objectively determined price is paid 
to do so.273 Merges claims these rules “are best described as ‘take now, pay later.’”274 These sets of 
rules allow the use of an entitlement by anyone who wishes to do so as long as adequate 
compensation is paid later.275 Merges describes the concept of eminent domain as the quintessential 
liability rule, but in the IP context, compulsory licenses fall distinctly into this category of rules. 
Finally, Calabresi and Melamed define inalienable entitlements as those whose transfer are “not 
permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller.”276 In the context of copyright law, moral 
rights which continue to vest in the original author of a work regardless of copyright transfer and 
may not be sold or transferred themselves fall into this category of inalienable entitlements. 
 Merges criticises the use of liability rules to govern IP licensing for a number of reasons. 
First, compulsory licenses create standardised and inflexible valuations for a diverse body of 
goods.277 Second, standardised valuation creates a price ceiling that results in top-down bargaining 
outside the compulsory scheme.278 Third, compulsory license valuations are a legislated mechanism 
and are subject to pitfalls of the current legislative system including disproportionate influence from 
lobbyists and difficulty of revision leading to system obsolescence.279 
 One of the main difficulties in using liability rules for creative content is setting valuations. 
The value of certain pieces of content can fluctuate tremendously both across and within media. For 
 
272 Ibid. at 1092 
273 Ibid. 
274 Merges (1996) Supra n.267 at 1302 
275 Ibid.  
276 Calabresi and Melemed (1972) Supra n.270 at 1092 
277 Merges (1996) Supra n.267 at 1311 
278 Ibid. at 1305 
279 Ibid. at 1313 
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example, how can a standardised rate for use of a film clip be set by a government body when the 
use of a clip from a Hollywood blockbuster like Star Wars would command a significantly higher 
license fee than a less-known independent film. Moreover, can the rates for films, music, and 
images be standardised across the board? These are difficult but not insurmountable problems. First, 
the historic use of compulsory licenses in the music industry provides some guidance for how to 
deal with intra-media price discrepancies (ignore them). Second, other academics discussed later in 
this thesis have begun to offer novel solutions to this problem. 
 The notion that compulsory licenses create a price ceiling is admittedly true. In his analysis 
of the mechanical license for musical compositions in the United States, Howard Abrams wrote that 
“even the most popular or potentially most popular songs normally cannot obtain more than 
statutory rate for their mechanical licenses in the current context of the music industry except in the 
rarest circumstances, if at all.”280 Moreover, the government scheme for mechanical licensing has 
become relegated to nothing more than a price ceiling as it is only rarely actually used. Abrams 
found that in 2008 only 274 notices of intent to invoke the compulsory license were filed with the 
U.S. Copyright Office.281 Compared to the 2.44 million mechanical licenses issued by the Harry 
Fox Agency in 2008, Abrams made it clear that music publishers and those looking to license 
content preferred to negotiate licenses privately despite the existing government scheme.282 Abrams 
attributed this largely to the stringent and atypical payment requirements of the scheme compared to 
industry standards.283 However, the notion that the legislated license rate remains the ceiling for 
bargaining in private settings holds true.  
 Merges also argues that the fixed or inflexible nature of royalty rates will, over time, 
inevitably become problematic. Merges claims that the disparity of difficulty in passing new 
legislation compared to preventing it or maintaining the status quo results in quickly outdated 
 
280 Abrams, H.. ‘Copyright’s First Compulsory License.’ (2010) Vol. 26, Santa Clara Computer and High Tech L.J.. 215. at 235 
281 Ibid. at 238 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid. at 240 
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license rates.284 For example, the original mechanical license rate of 2 cents per use that was 
established in 1908 went unchanged until 1978285 despite the fact that the retail price for a one-song 
phonorecord quadrupled over this time.286 This resulted in what was originally functionally an 8 
percent royalty falling to 2 percent simply because of the legislative body’s failure to adjust the rate 
according to inflation.  
 Merges uses this evidence to claim that the mechanical license and any future compulsory 
licenses are “not an effective solution to the problem of high transaction costs” and counsels against 
adoption of rigid legislative liability rules.287 Merges, however, pivots slightly and concedes that 
one “might function as an effective solution under different circumstances.”288 In the world of 
modern intellectual property, the circumstances are in fact far different. Merges’s criticism of 
compulsory licensing as a solution is understandable, but it is also premised on factors that are no 
longer present. For Merges’s argument that private sector licensing bodies are more efficient and 
effective than governmental ones to succeed, it relies on a clear and fair body of law within which 
the private sector may operate. Merges presupposes this point because in the 1990s copyright law 
felt much more defined that it does today. His article was published three years before the inception 
of Napster and in a time where copyright had not yet fallen prey to the wild west of the internet. 
While the law remains well defined, yet ill equipped to fight, with respect to piracy, in the 20+ 
years since Merges’s paper, new media in the realm of user-generated content has rendered the law 
far more vague in its limits of protection.289 Therefore, there are not clear legal boundaries within 
which the private sector can collectively license. The result has been the inception of various 
collective licensing bodies that freely and openly operate in a predatory manner such as YouTube’s 
 
284 Merges (1996) Supra n.267 at 1312  
285 Ibid. at 1310 
286 Abrams (2010) Supra n.280 at 233.  
287 Merges (1996) Supra n.267 at 1315-16 
288 Ibid. at 1316 
289 See: Chapter 1 E(ii)e 
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Content ID system. While the Content ID system is undoubtedly more efficient than any 
government-created licensing body could hope to be, it cannot be valued by its efficiency alone.  
 
F. Conclusions 
 The internet has had an unforeseeable impact on the way in which copyrighted works are 
consumed and disseminated. It has lead to the absolute loss of control over creative works once they 
are published in any sort of digital form. Meanwhile, the current system of copyright protection first 
conceptualised in the 18th century is absolutely reliant on control over creative works for successful 
protection. Modern adaptations to copyright law and enforcement technologies such as the notice 
and takedown system, DRM, and gatekeeping software are all designed at using technology to re-
assert the necessary control to maintain the functionality of the current copyright system. However, 
these legal and enforcement mechanisms not only fail in re-creating property-like control over 
copyrighted works but they simultaneously neglect other important aspects of the law such as 
exceptions to infringement and free speech. If the root of the problem with the modern copyright 
dilemma is lack of control, then a proper solution will not rely on it. Liability rules offer such an 
alternative. The implementation of liability rules in lieu of property ones in copyright law will allow 
us to stop fighting for control over copyrighted works online and focus on the purpose of copyright 
law- getting artists compensated for their creations so that they may continue to create. The 
following sections of this thesis will begin to offer the foundation for implementation of liability 
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III. A Theoretical Analysis of Users’ Rights and How to 
Balance them Against those of Creators 
A. Introduction 
 The previous chapter discussed the inefficacy of property-based mechanisms for copyright 
enforcement in the digital space. It represented the practical argument for the expansion of liability 
rules in copyright law. This chapter is designed to take a philosophical approach, furthering the 
same point from a different perspective.  
 Aside from the ineffectiveness of property-like enforcement mechanisms online, there is 
another reason why perhaps a shift away from this system would be ideal. With the internet and 
new technologies have come a generation full of creators. The internet is ideally suited for the 
propagation of amateur creativity and consumer technology has made it easy for the average user to 
have access to the necessary tools and skills to be a creator. Moreover, the lines between amateur 
and professional creativity are far more blurred than they were 30 years ago. The content industry is 
no longer composed solely of a few large corporations yet the rules are still built for such a system. 
Instead, there are millions of would-be creators, or “users,” online who lack the resources to take 
advantage of the current system in the same way that their corporate counterparts can. As it stands, 
copyright law creates a barrier to a lot of amateur creativity and a steep paywall to professional 
creativity. Copyright reform has lead to a dilution, and sometimes disintegration, of both the public 
domain and the rights offered under exceptions to infringement coupled with the fact that licensing 
opportunities are often not realistically achievable for average creators.  
 Copyright law will be forever a delicate balance between the rights of content owners and 
the rights of users. Historically, this balance has been struck via absolute ownership tempered by 
various “safety valves” of exceptions to said control.290 Yet throughout the last few decades we 
 
290 Trosow, S., 'The Illusive Search For Justificatory Theories: Copyright, Commodification And Capital' (2003) 16 Canadian Journal of Law & 
Jurisprudence, pg. 220. (Arguing that “these safety valves are the fair use/fair dealing doctrine, the idea/expression dichotomy, the originality 
requirement, the limitation on the duration of copyrights, and the concept of the public domain.”) 
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have seen gross expansion on the ownership side of the balancing scale291 coupled with arguably 
synchronous diminution of safety valve provisions.292 While proponents of these changes will argue 
that they have been necessary to incrementally update an out-of-date system and keep it aligned 
with the digital era, the result has been a tangible shift in the balance of power between owners and 
users. In 2003, Brian Fitzgerald wrote: 
 [t]he great divide, which has been exacerbated by the rise of the digital generation, is between content 
 owners (Theories 1 and 2) and users (Theory 4). My sense is that the theory will fuel the rhetoric of this 
 fiercely contested debate and that the prevailing economic, social, and cultural tradition will define its 
 victor.293 
 
 This chapter has three goals. First, it will seek to analyse what exactly the rights of users 
should be. It will do so through analysis of four major theories of copyright law within the scope of 
users’ rights. These theories are economic, labour, personality, and utilitarian. Second, in doing so, 
it will make the case that users have been disenfranchised by the current system. There is an 
imbalance of power characterised by extensions of term limits for copyrighted works, an increased 
protectionist philosophy for treatment of secondary uses, and a functional lack of access to proper 
licensing mechanisms for average users. Third, it will argue that a rebalancing must occur to not 
only restore users’ legal standing but also that the historical property model of copyright law is 
unsuitable for such a rebalancing and should be restructured accordingly.  
B. Philosophical Theories of Copyright Law  
i. Introduction 
 
 Copyright law is justified and explained by various philosophical theories. This section will 
analyse three primary philosophical justifications for copyright law within the scope of users' rights. 
These three theories are: appropriation theories, economic theories, and utilitarian theories. 
 
291 Ibid. at 221.  
292 See: Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital 
Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC (For an example on how Europe is restricting users’ rights that will be discussed in 
depth in a later chapter).  
293 Fitzgerald B, 'Theoretical Underpinning Of Intellectual Property: “I Am A Pragmatist But Theory Is My Rhetoric”' (2003) 16 Canadian Journal 
of Law & Jurisprudence, pg. 189 
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Ultimately, it will aim to show that each theory supports a far more liberal interpretation of users’ 
rights than is currently granted by the law today. This is true particularly with respect to the creation 
of derivatives. While each theory supports strong copyright protection for the right of reproduction, 
none of them support an absolute right to make derivatives as well.  
 
ii. Appropriation Theories 
 
 Appropriation theories for copyright law are best described through a quote from Lysander 
Spooner: “he who does discover or first takes possession of, an idea, thereby becomes its lawful and 
rightful proprietor; on the same principle that he, who first takes possession of any material 
production of nature, thereby makes himself its rightful owner.”294 This section will analyse two of 
the more prevalent appropriative theories of copyright law: Lockean and Hegelian philosophies. 
Both theories are creator-centric, using notions of labour or self-actualisation by or of the individual 
creator to justify protection of her creations. Finding the intersection of users’ rights within these 
theories of legal justification relies on analysing the impact of secondary uses on concepts of 
original labour and self-actualisation. I find that, from the Lockean perspective, many secondary 
uses do not violate the justified exploitation of the fruits of the original creator’s labour. Moreover, 
users are entitled to their own right to appropriate from works of intellectual creation that can be 
considered part of the commons- even when those works are not legally part of the public domain. 
From the Hegelian perspective, some but not all secondary uses may impact the creator’s sense of 
self-actualisation through her work but only when those secondary uses are believed to originate 





294 Palmer, T.G., ’Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Copyrights and Ideal Objects’ (1990) Harvard Journal of Law 
and Public Policy, 13, 816-65 at 823.   
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a. Labour Theory: Locke  
 
Philosopher John Locke is likely the father of modern copyright law295 and is still regularly 
cited in modern court opinions.296 Application of his theories to copyright law often rely on 
transposition of his remarks on property rights found in Chapter V, “Of Property,” from the 
Second Treatise of Government, to intellectual property concepts.297 However, his Liberty of 
the Press,298 which specifically addresses intellectual property issues, is of particular value 
as well. Lockean theory of property is also referred to as “labour theory” and is founded on 
the notion that men and women have a property right in the fruits of their own labour. Lior 
Zemer summarises this perspective as follows:299  
By mixing his labor with a commonly owned object, the labourer becomes the owner of the object. He has 
annexed something to it ‘more than Nature, the common Mother of all, had done.’300 Labor justifies the 
integration of a physical object into the laborer’s realm, the suum,301 and the result is ownership.302 
 
Locke adamantly advocates that any violation of an individual’s property right is an unacceptable 
and unlawful intrusion.303 However, while often seen as a creator-centric philosophy with respect to 
 
295 Zemer L, 'The Making Of A New Copyright Lockean' (2006) Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. Pg. 904. (Where Zemer draws a 
comparison between Locke’s recommendations for authorial rights to substitute the Licensing of the Press Act.) 
296 See: Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-3 (1984) The Court held:  
 The “general perception of trade secrets as property is consistent with a notion of ‘property’ that extends beyond land and tangible goods 
and includes the products of an individual’s ‘labor and invention.’ 
See also: CCH Can. Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can., [2004] S.C.R. 339, 15. The Court held:  
 There are competing views on the meaning of "original" in copyright law. Some courts have found that a work that originates from an 
author and is more than a mere copy of a work is sufficient to ground copyright. This approach is consistent with the "sweat of the brow" or 
"industrious- ness" standard of originality which is premised on a natural rights or Lockean theory of "just desserts [sic]," namely that an author 
deserves to have his or her efforts in producing a work rewarded. Other courts have required that a work must be creative to be "original" and thus 
protected by copyright. This approach is also consistent with a natural rights theory of property law; however it is less absolute in that only those 
works that are the product of creativity will be rewarded with copyright protection. 
297 Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, Second treatise §24-50, McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought. [1999] 
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/suss/detail.action?docID=3117731 [hereinafter Locke, Second Treatise].  
298 Locke, J., Liberty of the Press (1695), reprinted in Locke: Political Essays (Mark Goldie ed., 1997) 329 [hereinafter Locke, Liberty of the Press]  
299 Zemer L, 'The Making Of A New Copyright Lockean' [2006] Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, pgs. 915-16.  
300 Locke, Second Treatise § 45 pg. 123-4 
301 Ibid. § 28, pg. 117 
302 The suum means "what belongs to a person is what is one's own." See Olivecrona, K., Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin 
of Property, [1974] 35 Journal of History and Ideas. Pg. 225.; See also: Buckle, S., Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume. [1999] 
Clarendon Press. Pgs. 169-74 
303 Zemer (2006) Supra n. 299 at 917-18.  
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copyright law, Locke placed similar emphasis on protection for the collective.304 Therefore, “any 
violation of the collective right by virtue of disproportionate enclosures of cultural and social 
portions of the public domain violates the public’s property right in its labor.”305 In fact, Lockean 
justifications for copyright law carry a delicate balance between the rights of the creator and those 
of users- or what Locke describes as the “commons.” Moreover, analyses of Locke’s theories 
indicate that he placed higher interest on the community’s wellbeing than that of the individual.306 
 With respect to the balance between individual property rights and those of the common, 
Locke invoked his principle of “no harm.” Lockean philosophy dictates that when a property right 
is created, the unauthorised use or taking of that property by third parties harms the labourer and 
should be unlawful.307 The no-harm proviso tempers rights of a Lockean property owner based on 
how that ownership affects the collective. The “no harm” proviso also carries with it three 
conditions. First, the labourer may appropriate only the amount that he is able to use.308 This is 
known as the “no-spoilation proviso.”309 Second, one may appropriate from the common only 
where there is “enough, and as good left in common for others.”310 Third, Locke indicates a charity 
proviso whereby, in extreme circumstances, commoners may take and consume the private 
resources of others.311 However, when applying these notions, particularly conditions one and two, 
to intellectual property instead of real property, problems occur. As Hughes observes:  
Physical property can be used at any one time by only one person or one coordinated group of people. Ideas 
can be used simultaneously by everyone. Furthermore, people cannot be excluded from ideas in the way 
that they can be excluded from physical property. You may prevent someone from publicly using an idea, 
but preventing the private use of ideas may not be possible. These two basic differences between ideas and 
physical goods... suggest that ideas fit Locke’s notion of a ‘common’ better than does physical property.... 
With physical goods, the inexhaustibility condition requires a huge supply. With ideas, the inexhaustibility 
condition is easily satisfied; each idea can be used by an unlimited number of individuals.312 
 
304 “For this ‘labour' being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to at least where 
there is enough, and as good left in common for others.” Locke, Second Treatise §26, P. 116 
305 Zemer (2006) Supra n. 299 at 917-18  
306 Favale, M., ‘Death And Resurrection Of Copyright Between Law And Technology’ (2014) 23 Information & Communications Technology Law, 
pg. 120 
307 Zemer (2006) Supra n. 299 at 918 
308 “Nothing was made by God or Man to spoil or destroy” Locke, Second Treatise supra n.297 at §30, 117-118 
309 Zemer (2006) Supra n. 299 at Pg. 919  
310 Locke, Second Treatise Supra n. 297 at §27,  305-06. 
311 Zemer (2006) Supra n. 299 at  919  
312 Hughes, Justin. ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (1988) 77 Georgetown Law Review, pg. 315 
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When we look at users as not usurpers of property but rather secondary creators with valid 
appropriation rights of their own, the Lockean perspective becomes clear. That is to say, this 
perspective is best applied to users’ rights in two points. First, copyrighted works are works of 
ownership, but that ownership shall be tempered where communal use is necessary. In a sense, 
aspects of copyright protection should be communally owned. Second, accepting that copyrighted 
works represent commonly owned goods within a Lockean understanding, then the addition of 
labour to copyrighted works is not only permissible but creates separate ownership in the secondary 
work to be vested in the secondary author. This argument is, in some senses, supported by modern 
legal frameworks as it underpins modern notions of fair use and fair dealing- especially those that 
address works of transformation.313 However, these assertions must be parsed and boundaries 
articulated. Otherwise, the smallest changes to a copyrighted work could be interpreted to create 
new authorship. Yet the current law does not support enough freedoms for users to appropriate 
works protected by copyright by adding their own labour.   
 Copyrighted works, while valid pieces of property, remain at least partially in the commons. 
Some scholars have criticised Locke’s philosophy for being too individualistic in nature. They 
claim that copyrighted works should actually be collectively owned. Zemer provides an excellent 
outline of these criticisms in his paper, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean:  
For example, Tom Palmer once noted that if rights are to be recognized in works of art and authorship 
anywhere, “they should be in the audience, and not in the artist, for it is on the audience that the art work 
depends for its continued existence, and not on the artist.”314 Rosemary Coombe argues that the creation of 
cultural commodities is an essential process that involves the collective as much as it involves the individual 
author.315
 
Margaret Chon claims that “the production of a ‘work’ that is subject to protection by copyright 
is an activity undertaken by both author and audience.” 316  Carys Craig observes that because “the 
interdependent nature of human culture means that intellectual works are necessarily the products of 
collective labour” they “ought to be owned collectively.”317 Susan Scafidi remarks that as members of a 
 
313 In the United States, works considered to be a fair use by transformation are permitted under fair use and given their own copyright protections.  
314 Palmer, T.G., ‘Are Patents and Copyright Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects,’ (1990) 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y, pg. 848 
315 Coombe, R.J., ‘Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue,’ (1991) 69 Tex. L. Rev., pg. 
1863 
316 Chon, M., ‘New Wine Bursting From Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet, Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship,’ (1996) 75 Or. L. Rev., pg. 
264 
317 Craig, C.J., ‘Locke, Labor and Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law,’ (2002) 28 Queen’s L.J, 
pg. 36 
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cultural unit we “already share the same culture and jointly ‘own’ its cultural products.”318 In other words, 
these scholars argue that the public’s contribution to the creative process amounts to labor. 
 
Consumers, audiences, and users play a distinct role in the creation of value in creative works. 
Without them, in fact, a work has no value to exploit. This role that cultural consumers play, 
however, may not amount to labour which would justify a property right under Lockean 
philosophy.  Locke vigorously disapproved of the misappropriation of another’s labour319 and it is 
hard to frame the act of appreciating the results of another’s labour as a laborious contribution that 
justifies a property right. Regardless, creative works that become particularly important to certain 
communities become pieces of their cultural heritage. William Fisher describes seven distinct 
categories of raw materials with which a Lockean labourer may add his labor: 
a. the universe of “facts”; b. languages-the vocabularies and grammars we use to communicate and from 
which we fashion novel intellectual products; c.our cultural heritage – the set of artifacts (novels, 
paintings, musical compositions, movies, etc.) that we “share” and that gives our culture meaning and 
coherence; d. the set of ideas currently apprehended by at least one person but not owned by anyone; 
e. the set of ideas currently apprehended by at least one person; f. the set of all “reachable” ideas-that 
is, all ideas that lie within the grasp of people today; [and] g. the set of all “possible ideas” – that is, all 
ideas that someone might think of.320 
 
Cultural heritage is distinctly mentioned. The ability to use existing culture as a starting point for 
the creation of new works is necessary for a functioning social dialogue through creation. However, 
copyright law currently impedes this dialogue and interaction with culture by gatekeeping cultural 
heritage. Where ideas are a limitless resource, it cannot be said that copyright law fails to leave 
enough, in the Lockean sense, for the public to make use of. Yet, within the paradigm of cultural 
heritage, some ideas and expressions of those ideas are more important than others. Placing legal 
fences around a society’s most important pieces of cultural identity is a violation of the “as good” 
portion of the no harm proviso regardless of the labour involved in creating them. For example, 
while there is limitless potential for the creation of stories based in outer space, for the purposes of 
cultural interaction and dialogue, the ability to build on and use the Star Wars stories is of far more 
 
318 Scafidi, S., ‘Intellectual Property and Cultural Products,’ (2001) 81 B.U. L. Rev., pg. 810 
319  “…he desired the benefit of another’s pains, which he had no right to…” Locke, Second Treatise supra n.297 at §33, pg. 119 
320 Fisher, W., ‘Theories of Intellectual Property,’ in  New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property [2001] Stephen R. Munzer ed. Pg. 
186. 
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importance to a creator than the ability to create a new story. The Star Wars stories are socially 
relevant and distinct pieces of modern cultural heritage. Legally restricting derivative authors from 
building on these stories impedes their ability to add labour to a foundational raw material of 
creation- cultural heritage. However, this behaviour is easily confused with the notion of “free-
riding” whereby an author creates a derivative with the sole purpose of profiting off of the 
established popularity and goodwill of the existing work. Lockean philosophy does not support 
free-riding and neither should the law. However, a balance can be struck between enabling access 
and preventing free-riding by using liability rules for derivative rights instead of property rules.   
 The monopolisation of cultural heritage is theoretically balanced in the law by the public 
domain- a realm of absolute commons that all creative works eventually fall into. However, cultural 
dialogue takes place in the present, not the past. Yet it would be an extreme rarity for anyone to live 
to see a work created during their lifetime enter the public domain. The lengthy time limits placed 
on copyright protection ensure this. Therefore, while the public domain does provide a commons of 
culture, it is not the culture relevant for a social dialogue because it is often generations old. It is 
therefore an inadequate substitute for a functioning commons of culture.  
 A Lockean creator has the right to claim a property right in the products of her creative 
labour. However, she may not do so at the expense of the commons. Creative works remain parts of 
the commons both by virtue of consumer contribution and their designations as cultural heritage. As 
a result, users should be able to add their own labour to existing creative works as they represent 
raw materials for the creative process. This philosophy in no way supports direct copying but 
should limit the power of copyright law to oppose unauthorised derivatives. Wendy Gordon argues 
that, in terms of Lockean philosophy, attributing an absolute property right to creators is 
conceptually wrong.321 Such a right unfairly compresses the entitlement of the public.322 I agree 
with both Gordon and Favale in their conclusion that a liability right, not enforceable by injunction, 
 
321 Gordon, W., ‘A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property ’(1993) 201 Yale Law 
Journal pg. 1540 
322 Favale (2014) Supra n. 306 at 121 
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is the most appropriate solution as it would protect the fruits of a creator’s labour while allowing 
access for secondary creativity and thus safeguarding users’ rights to the commons.323  
b. Personality Theory: Hegel 
 
 The Hegelian perspective is founded on the idea that “property provides a unique and 
especially suitable mechanism for self-actualizsation, for personal expression, and for dignity and 
recognition as an individual person.”324 Once the ideas are appropriated, the creator’s sense of self 
and well-being are intrinsically tied to the fate of the creation. Thereby comes the rational for 
providing individual protection to those creations.325 While many common law countries such as 
the United States and the United Kingdom apply mixtures of economic and Lockean justifications 
for their copyright laws, much of continental Europe applies a more Hegelian, individual-centric, 
justification to their copyright laws. As such, Hegelian philosophy supports stronger protections for 
the integrity of a work and its author- known as moral rights that are found in European law but 
noticeably absent from that of the United States.326 Despite seeming like a philosophy focused on 
strongly protecting both authors and their works, Hegelian philosophy supports a liberal system of 
users rights under certain circumstances. These circumstances are namely where the integrity or 
reputation of an author is not harmed by virtue of secondary uses of her works and when those 
secondary uses are paid for, thereby recognising the property rights of the first author and, by 
extension, her personhood.  
 Hegelian philosophy supports secondary uses of creative works where the integrity or 
reputation of an author is not harmed. Because Hegelian philosophy is based on the intrinsic 
relationship between an author’s personhood and her work, it is most often used to justify moral 
rights in copyright law. These rights are typically expressed as the right to paternity, or the right to 
claim authorship and be identified as the author of a work, and the right of integrity, or the right to 
 
323 Ibid.  
324 Hughes, J.. ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property.’ (1988) 77 Georgetown Law Review, pg. 330  
325 Becker, L. C., ‘Deserving to Own Intellectual Property.’ (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review, pgs. 610, 626-29. 
326 The U.S. has very narrow moral rights protections which are limited only to some forms of visual art. See: 17 U.S.C. §106A  
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object to any distortion, modification, or derogatory treatment of one’s work that would lead to 
harm of the author’s reputation.327 However, the appropriation of another’s work rarely results in 
reputation harm for the original author. In order for such harm to occur, two factors must be 
present. First, the secondary use must be distorted or modified in such a derogatory way that the 
author should feel an attack on her personhood by the use. Second, the secondary use must also 
present itself as or be reasonably confused to be the work of, or at least condoned by, the original 
author.  
 The first factor is subjective and difficult to measure. For instance, J.K. Rowling has stated 
publicly that she supports fan fiction based on her works except in cases where her characters are 
used in sexually explicit stories.328 However, S.L. Armstrong describes her feelings towards all 
types of fan fiction as such: “My knee-jerk reaction is I wouldn’t like it and would want it to go 
away because those characters would never BE in those situations and I feel it detracts from what 
my purpose with them is.”329 Moreover, some degrees of harm to one’s reputation are already 
accepted today. For example, most jurisdictions allow for some uses of a work without permission 
for the purposes of criticism and review. Not all criticisms and reviews will be positive and it is 
reasonable to believe that the negative ones will negatively impact the reputation of the author 
under criticism. Defining what constitutes an attack on one’s personhood is, at least, difficult and 
likely impossible. The standard of what an acceptable distortion may be will invariably differ from 
author to author and any legal standard outside of absolute rigidity will leave some authors craving 
more protection. Yet, such a rigid standard is unnecessary under Hegelian philosophy because, even 
if the standard were adequately defined, most secondary uses still cannot be said to violate an 
author’s personhood.  
 
327 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1886, art. 6bis, S. Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 
(1986) 
328 'Rowling Backs Potter Fan Fiction' (News.bbc.co.uk, 2020) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/3753001.stm> accessed 21 May 2020 
329 Armstrong, S. ‘Fanfiction and Copyright’ (2010) <https://slarmstrong.wordpress.com/2010/05/08/fanfiction-and-copyright/> accessed 27 August 
2019 
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 The second factor is most important to users’ rights, however. Only secondary uses that are 
falsely presented as the work of the original author, or easily confused as such, may cause harm to 
that author’s reputation and thus her Hegelian personhood. Secondary uses, like original works, 
represent a form of Hegelian self-actualisation for the secondary author with the same sense of 
personhood attached to them as original works hold for original authors. Hegel argues “everyone 
has the right to make his will a thing or to make the thing his will, or, in other words, to supersede 
the thing and transform it into his own…” indicating that the property right is created by personal 
attachment- an attachment that may be superseded by another.330 This line of reasoning appears be 
disqualified by Hegel’s own statement “a second party cannot take possession of what is already the 
property of someone else.”331 However, Hegel speaks apparently in reference exclusively to 
concrete objects (“taking possession of a thing makes its matter my property”332). Moreover, 
secondary creativity results in the creation of an entirely new work, one whose existence is the 
result of the secondary author’s personality. Therefore, she does not seek to take possession of an 
otherwise owned work, but rather the newly-created work which may be viewed as ownerless. Just 
as one may take ownership in logs crafted from a days work of felling trees and another may take 
ownership in a house they have built from the same logs, artistic creations may serve as building 
blocks for future creations. Moreover, when the secondary creator presents the secondary work as 
her own, there can be no harm to the reputation of the creator of the original work as she has no 
attachment to the new work outside of supplying creative raw materials. The crux of this process of 
transfer and re-appropriation is, however, payment.  
 Hegelian philosophy supports secondary uses of intellectual property when they are paid for 
because payment represents a recognition of artistic personhood. Payment to use a work serves as 
an acknowledgement of an individual’s claim over the intellectual property and through such 
 
330 Hegel, G.W.F., Elements of the Philosophy of Right, edited by Wood, A.W., Cambridge University Press, 2003 §44 pg. 76  
331 Ibid. §50 pg. 81  
332 Ibid. §52 pg. 82 
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acknowledgement, the content owner is recognised as a person.333 Hughes cites this notion of 
“recognition” as an important factor in the self-actualising nature of creative property and argues it 
must not be mere “lip service.”334 Recognition is manifested through actions, via the treatment of 
one’s property, not by any statement or verbal acknowledgement.335 To acknowledge the creator of 
a work as such but then go on to use her work without permission or payment is insufficient for 
Hegelian recognition. However, the act of payment can serve as such and “purchasers of a 
copyrighted work or licensees of a patent form a circle of people recognising the creator as a 
person.”336 Moreover, this income promotes further self-actualisation in that it may facilitate further 
expression.337 For an artist, the generation of revenue means the ability to fund more creative 
endeavours and likewise maximise personality. Thus, personality theory will support users’ rights 
to appropriate works when those uses are paid for.  
c. Economic Theory 
 
 Copyright law is often justified not only by philosophical theories but economic ones as 
well. Theoretically, copyright law is used as a tool to correct market imperfections inherent to the 
economics of the creative industries. There are two characteristics of intellectual property, 
specifically copyrighted works, that create market imperfections not typically seen with tangible 
property. First copyrighted works are non-rivalrous.338 This means that a creative work may be 
enjoyed an infinite amount of times by an infinite number of people without depleting others of 
further enjoyment.339 This affects the competitive nature of intellectual creations as there is little 
direct competition between works, even in the same medium or genre, as the sales of one will not 
necessarily deplete the need for another similar work. Second, intellectual creations are non-
 
333 “Contract presupposes that the contracting parties recognize each other as persons and owners of property…” Ibid. §71 page 103. See also: 
Hughes (1988) Supra n. 324 at 349 
334 Hughes (1988) Ibid at 349 
335 Ibid.  
336 Ibid.  
337 Ibid.  
338 Favale (2014) Supra n.306 at 125 
339 Ibid. 
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excludable.340 This means that it is not always possible to prevent people who have not purchased 
or paid for the works from accessing and enjoying them.341 This particular characteristic of 
expressive works has become exacerbated in the digital environment. This unique characteristic of 
expressive works not found in real property or goods facilitates free-riding behaviours- or the use 
and benefitting from the work without paying for its consumption.342 This is considered a market 
failure as it will result in a decrease in the desire to create marketable expressive works due to the 
difficulty to recuperate investments and profit from those works. Copyright law is designed to 
correct these market failures by offering creators a bundle of exclusive rights intended to facilitate 
compensation and thereby promote creativity.343 This theory is derived from classical economics. 
However, the more prevailing neoclassical economic theory that governs copyright law today can 
be summarised as such: copyright protection corrects the public-good characteristics of expressive 
works, by turning them into vendible commodities.”344 Yet, while copyright law has been able to 
adequately correct these stated market failures inherent to expressive works for the last three 
centuries, the age of the internet and digital technologies has rendered the law less capable of doing 
so. Moreover, while economic theory undeniably supports a strong right of reproduction in 
copyright law, the evolution of strong derivative rights345 has come to undermine the notion of 
encouragement that underpins economic theory and copyright. From a user-centric perspective, this 
concept is paramount. When looking at the rights of users, the right to make derivative works serves 
as the greatest barrier to users’ rights of secondary creativity. While an economic theory of 
copyright justifies strong protections for the author’s rights of reproduction, it cannot be said to 
justify similar protections for derivative rights because derivatives are typically non-substituting, 
 
340 Ibid.  
341 Ibid.  
342 Ibid.  
343 Ibid.  
344 Ibid.  
345 In United States copyright law, the phrase “derivative right” is a legal term of art not present in other jurisdictions. Here the phrase is used 
generally to describe the bundle of rights offered in copyright laws all over the world that prevent the creation of unauthorised derivations not 
permitted by exceptions to infringement such as sequels, remixes, spin offs, and adaptations.  
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often have a net-zero or net-positive effect on revenue for the works on which they were based, and 
represent new additions to the creative economy which overall increase public welfare. Moreover a 
system of strong protection for derivative rights actually supports underproduction of creative 
works.  
 Economic theory supports expansion of users’ rights to make derivatives because 
derivatives are non-substituting and typically have positive or no economic effect on their original 
counterparts.  From an economic perspective, creative works are inherently non-substituting for one 
another. However, this is premised by the notion that any two creative works are are at least 
different enough from each other to provide unique enjoyment to the same audience. As a result, 
pirated works and other facsimiles are obviously substitutive as they offer the same experience to 
the same audience. Derivatives, however, typically fall into the former category of works that, 
despite appealing to similar or the same audiences as the original works that they build upon, do so 
without siphoning revenue from them. In terms of economic effects on the originals they build 
upon, derivatives typically bolster sales of the works they adapt by raising or reawakening public 
awareness and interest in them.346 Much of the data on this comes from authorised derivatives. 
However, unauthorised derivatives would likely have similar effects.  
 The economic justification for copyright can also be described as an encouragement theory 
in that it is designed to encourage the production of creative works through economic incentives. 
The economic justification for copyright law is based on four premises. First, a growing body of 
creative works are necessary for social wealth. Second, without protection, the cost of creative 
works would diminish to a value marginally higher than the cost of making a copy of those works 
and in the digital world this value is often functionally zero. Third, without the ability to profit from 
 
346 'Confirmed: Radiohead Landed On Charts Because Of Remix Tracks (Updated)' (WIRED, 2020) <https://www.wired.com/2008/04/confirmed-
radio/> accessed 21 May 2020 (showing how Radiohead made the top 100 because of remixes); See also: 
'"Old Town Road" Just Became Billboard’s Longest-Running No. 1 Ever' (Vox, 2020) <https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/7/29/8937934/lil-nas-x-
old-town-road-billboard-charts-record-breaking-single> accessed 21 May 2020 (explaining how remixes of old town road kept interest piqued) 
See also: Knight, M., ‘The World of Fan Fiction: Where Creative Expression and Copyright Collide’ (Articles.ibpa-online.org, 2017) 
<https://articles.ibpa-online.org/article/the-world-of-fan-fiction-where-creative-expression-and-copyright-collide/> accessed 21 May 2020 (IBPA 
article telling authors to encourage their fans to write and publish fan fiction based on their works because it can boost sales.)  
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their creative works, creators will stop creating altogether- or at least at a rate that would 
significantly diminish the output of creative works and likewise social wealth. Fourth, copyright 
protection counteracts this market failure by ensuring financial exploitation of creative works for a 
period of time and thereby incentivises production of new works. Premise one is easy enough to 
accept and a philosophical discussion about the value of art in society is outside the scope of this 
thesis. Premise two is also easy to accept as it is factually true. However, premises three and four 
are less certain. First, can we be certain that without copyright protections we would see such a 
significant decrease in creative output? Are financial motivations significant enough in the creative 
process for this to be true? The answer will vary depending on the creative sector. There are 
thousands of musicians in London alone playing gigs for tiny audiences and recording albums that 
may only be heard by a handful of people. It is hard to believe that these creators, who are more 
than likely losing money by making their music, would stop creating if there were no laws 
protecting the financial integrity of their creations. However, it is also equally hard to believe that 
Disney would have invested the 356 million dollars it took to make the most recent Avengers film 
without the ensured protections offered by copyright law. It is therefore likely that, without any sort 
of copyright protections, the creative industry would not die altogether but would look vastly 
different than it does currently. However, the fourth premise is most important for understanding 
economic theory and the rights of users. Does copyright law actually incentivise production of new 
works? A look at the creative landscape of popular culture today indicates that perhaps it does not. 
In fact, if anything, copyright law seems to incentivise the financial exploitation of existing works 
over the creation of new ones. Instead of seeing an incentive to create new works, we are seeing the 
creative industries using copyright powers to release the same creative content over and over until it 
is no longer economically viable. We are living in the age of the sequel and reboot. Under the 
current copyright system, we do not have a healthy economy of creative works. Instead we have an 
oligopoly of content owners selling us new or slightly different iterations of the same stories over 
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and over again. The potentially enormous value of a copyright coupled with its finite time period 
does not incentivise the creation of new works but rather the exploitation of existing popular ones.  
 This problem is reminiscent of the “chicken and egg” paradox.347 On one side, the power of 
a valuable copyright incentivises content owners to reinvest in existing works until they are no 
longer economically valuable- a deterrent to new creation. However, theoretically, this power 
likewise promotes the creation of new works by virtue of their potential economic value in the 
future and for years to come. The incentive theory, in this way, functions much like a lottery ticket. 
The potential for massive wealth encourages people to buy a ticket. However, it is hard to imagine 
someone continuing to purchase new lottery tickets after winning a life-changing jackpot- not even 
necessarily out of complacence but more so because there are plenty of more secure ways than 
buying lottery tickets to continue to accumulate wealth if you have a massive fortune at your 
disposal. This analogy admittedly does not accommodate for the idea that there are millions of 
creators who create out of passion- not the potential for wealth. However, the fact that popular 
culture is dominated by creative corporations is likewise inarguable. Disney built a creative empire 
on the back of a handful of great stories. Now, it seems more interested in milking those stories dry 
while their copyrights are still valid than investing in new ones.348 
 Limiting derivative rights in a way that opens access for third parties to easily make them 
would siphon the majority of the economic value of a copyright into the right of reproduction, or 
the actual work itself. This is not necessarily a bad thing. While derivatives are a viable market and 
revenue stream for a copyright, they are far from the only one and potentially outside the scope of 
copyright protection anyway. While copyright law explicitly does not protect ideas, derivative 
rights functionally do. They protect an infinite amount of yet-to-be-expressed ideas with respect to 
an existing expression. For example, the copyright for Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, book 
 
347 Which came first? 
348 Economic data shows that Disney has made over $7 billion by remaking their old animated films into live action movies since 2010. 'Disney 
Remakes Have Made Over $7 Billion Since 2010' (The Independent, 2020) <https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/news/disney-
remake-box-office-gross-total-lion-king-a9028641.html> accessed 21 May 2020  
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one in the series, not only protected the author, J.K. Rowling, from unauthorised reproductions of 
the book, but also gave her the sole power to write or authorise the writing of the 6 ensuing sequels, 
the theatrical play, and the two Crimes of Grindlewald spin-off films. These creative works were 
protected by virtue of derivative rights before they were ever conceived.  
 Ultimately, economic theory supports strong rights of reproduction because they are 
necessary to correct the market failures inherent to creative works. However, such market failures 
are not nearly as present with derivatives. The derivative right may be tempered under economic 
theory as long as free-riding is prevented. This can easily be achieved in a multitude of ways. Using 
compulsory licenses to limit the derivative right protects against free-riding because uses, while no 
longer requiring permission, will still require payment. Moreover, the right to exclude others from 
making derivatives may be allowed only in cases lacking an established standard of additional 
creativity. Finally, the law could be tailored so narrowly as to allow the continued protection of 
sufficiently delineated characters as a reproductive right, ensuring the protection against 
unauthorised sequels/prequels/spinoffs involving those characters and thereby streamlining 
protection limited only to potential markets that the original author may yet exploit. Under such a 
regime, the story of the life of Obi-Wan Kenobi would be protected for Disney alone to exploit, but 
original stories taking place in the Star Wars universe even those potentially making use of obscure 
characters would be allowed.349 This section, and this chapter even, is not the place to discuss which 
of these options has the most merit or would be most effective, but the point is that there are options 





349 See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Axanar Productions Inc. WL 83506 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2017) for a real-life example of this same concept, where 
Axanar raised money to produce an original story based on an obscure character from Star Trek that took place in the Star Trek universe. The United 
States case was settled with the public terms of the agreement reflecting CBS’s fan films policy which drastically altered the course of the proposed 
film.  
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d. Utilitarian Theory 
 
 Founded by philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, utilitarian philosophy is a formulaic approach to 
ethical questions that analyses the perceived effect of an action in terms of the happiness or pleasure 
it will create for a given number of people compared against the suffering it would reciprocally 
create for a given number of people. Bentham defines utility as: 
that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency it 
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is 
the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness.350 
 
Under Benthamian Utilitarianism, all are equal and happiness and pain are measured on quantitative 
not qualitative scales; the happiness or suffering of one individual bears the same weight as that of 
another.351 The appropriate solution to any moral or ethical dilemma is, therefore, whichever one 
leads to the least amount of suffering for the least amount of individuals- or conversely, the greatest 
pleasure for the greatest number of individuals.352 While early copyright laws were largely 
utilitarian constructs,353 centuries of legal evolution influenced by individualism has lead to a 
system of laws that no longer reflect utilitarian values. Sara Stadler writes in reference to American 
copyright law: 
As a nation, we began with Bentham; but we have ended up with John Locke, and as a result, we find 
ourselves strangled by the very monopolies about which the Framers repeatedly warned in their public 
writings.354 
 
A truly utilitarian copyright law would likely serve to promote social welfare by advancement of 
arts, sciences, and thereby learning. However, it would also reject the strong monopoly protections 
that often benefit individuals over society that have come to define the modern legal framework. 
Utilitarian philosophy supports liberal users’ rights that must be carefully balanced against the 
minimum individualist protections necessary to promote creation.  
 
350 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principals of Morals and Legislation, [1907, reprint of 1823 edition] Oxford Clarendon Press, available at 
<https://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html?chapter_num=2#book-reader> Chapter 1, §II.  
351 Ibid. Chapter 4 §V. See also: Gorecki, O., ‘Utilitarianism: Doctrinal Analysis Evolution of Thought.’ [2017] Vol. 20, No. 5, Special Issue, 
Annales. Ethics in Economic Life. 141–153, at 143. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1899-2226.20.5.11  
352 Bentham (1907) Supra n.350 at Chapter 4, §V.  
353 Stadler, S.K., 'Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright.’ (2006) 91 Iowa Law Review, pg. 611 
354 Ibid.  
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 Applying the utilitarian formula to the question of copyright law protection leads to, 
perhaps, an answer inappropriately skewed in favour of users. Here there are multiple forms of 
happiness that factor into the equation. First, there is the intrinsic happiness of creators- their right 
to create without restriction.355 A secondary aspect of this happiness is the right to preserve the 
integrity of their creations.356 Second, there is the happiness of users and consumers. This 
encompasses both their ability to access creative works357 and utilise them in the creation of 
secondary works.358 Though the lines between user-creators and consumers have become more 
blurred, there are still far more consumers of creative works than there are creators. Therefore, a 
purely utilitarian construct would favour the overall happiness of this larger group of individuals 
and would open access to works for creative consumption. This, at first glance, seems to indicate 
that the most utilitarian copyright law would be no copyright law. However, with no protections in 
place at all, the output and quality of creative works would surely decrease and thereby diminish the 
happiness of the larger body of creative consumers. Moreover, later utilitarian philosophers noted 
that rigid application of the formula can lead to a tyrannical majority which imposes its will despite 
violating the rights of the minority individuals.359 Thus, a balance must be struck where the 
minimum amount of protections are offered to ensure the maximum output and quality of creative 
works and protect intrinsic rights of first creators, but still allow easy access to both consume and 
adapt those works for users and consumers. The logical response to this statement is something 
along the lines of: “is that not what we have now?” I previously discussed my thoughts on how the 
current law supports underproduction of creative works and the continued pervasiveness of piracy 
and various forms of unauthorised remixes360 indicate that the larger body of users and consumers 
 
355 “The pleasures of skill.” Bentham (1907) n. 350 Chapter 5, §V.3 
356 “The pleasures of a good name.” Ibid. Chapter 5, §VII.5 
357 “The pleasures dependent on association.” Ibid. Chapter 5, §XV.13 
358 “The pleasures of skill.” Ibid. Chapter 5, §V.3 
359 Gorecki, O., ‘Utilitarianism: Doctrinal Analysis Evolution of Thought.’ (2017) Vol. 20, No. 5, Special Issue, Annales. Ethics in Economic Life. 
141–153, at 147. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1899-2226.20.5.11 
360 This refers to remix in its broadest sense, encompassing traditional remixes of musical compositions and sound recordings as well as fan fiction, 
memes, video and musical mash ups, modded video games, machinima, etc. 
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are both unhappy with their ability to access and re-use creative works. The law we have now is not 
the utilitarian answer to copyright protection.  
 A more appropriate utilitarian answer for what copyright should look like is absolute 
protection for the right of reproduction (defence against unauthorised copies, fakes, and forgeries) 
coupled with a system of derivative rights governed by liability rules. The strict right of 
reproduction ensures commercial viability and ethical preservation of a copyrighted work and thus 
promotes creation. It protects the rights of the creative minority to ensure their happiness and 
stimulate creation. As consumer access will remain the same, piracy will surely continue but may 
be economically offset in other ways such as levies. Using liability rules to govern derivative works 
appeases both the user’s desire for access to creative raw materials in the form of existing works 
and the content owner’s desire to profit from her works. Liability rules create revenue streams for 
the content owner without unduly burdening the derivative creator with upfront payments for 
access. While such action would serve to diminish the overall economic value of a copyright by 
virtue of standardising the value of a derivative right- which for some works may be valued in the 
billions in the current economic market-361 this decrease in the individual value of some works is 
offset by both the economic and social value of new creations able to enter the market. Moreover, 
this solves the dilemma I discussed earlier of an overprotecting copyright system that encourages 
creative underproduction once a creator owns a popular copyright. In reducing the derivative value 
of copyrights, this system encourages the continued production of entirely new works as they would 
have the strongest protections and therefore the highest potential economic value. This system looks 
first to the wants and needs of the majority population, but not in a way that tramples the rights of 
the minority. It is the ideal utilitarian compromise that offers something to everyone.  
 
361 In 2012, Disney announced its purchase of Lucasfilm for $4.05 billion. While the sale included all aspects of the Lucasfilm business, a large 
portion of the valuation came from the derivative rights to the Star Wars and Indiana Jones stories and characters.  
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C. The Disenfranchisement of the Common Creator 
 Up to this point, this chapter has discussed the main theories underpinning modern 
copyright law. These justifications, however, upon close inspection, do not actually justify the 
imbalanced system of rights we have in place today. Philosophical ethics have been pushed to the 
wayside in favour of corporate lobbying and capitalist individualism. The balance of rights between 
users and creators under the current system inarguably favours creators by a gross margin. Yet each 
of the theories discussed up to this point that have been in some way used to justify the modern 
system we have support a liberal balance of rights between the two groups. We have, however, 
allowed the law’s evolution to be dictated by corporate lobbyists and, as such, we are left with a 
legal regime that systematically favours the increasingly fewer corporations that control the vast 
majority of the most valuable copyrights. This thesis is neither an advocation of creative anarchy 
nor a marxist manifesto of creative protection. There should be protections in place for creative 
works and, in some aspects, those protections should be strong. However, the fundamental purpose 
of copyright law should always be the promotion of creative works and, in its current state, it is no 
longer doing so. The paradigm of creators versus users versus consumers has shifted and the rules 
designed for this trichotomy in the 18th, 19th, and even 20th centuries can no longer be applied. 
The previous chapter demonstrated the futility of the law in the modern iteration of this trichotomy. 
This chapter is intended to show the callousness of it. The law has become something that neither 
functions adequately nor represents something we should not want even if it did. Overprotection in 
copyright is a symptom of the same individualist philosophies that have lead to huge wealth 
disparities in countries like the United States. It is a legal blind eye to the wants and needs of 
common people at the behest of corporate giants. The facilitation of a healthy creative economy 
relies on addressing the needs of all parties- not just those with the highest profits. There is an 
imbalance in the current standards of protection that grossly favours content owners. This 
imbalance is characterised by the extensions of copyright terms over the course of the last century 
coupled with increased protectionist treatment of secondary uses online and the functional lack of 
access to proper licensing mechanisms for average users.  
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i. Extension of copyright terms 
 
 There is a stark reason as to why the notion of the public domain is commonly associated 
primarily with very old works. This is because, since its inception, the terms granted by copyright 
law have undergone multiple extensions that, at some stages, were designed by corporate content 
owners to perpetuate protection of modern works. These extensions are the product largely of a 
miniature trade battle between the European Union and the United states coupled with the double 
edged sword of American legislative susceptibility to corporate influence and its global economic 
power to influence other nations to follow suit. This section will chart the evolution of copyright 
term extensions in European and American law as well as the ensuing international 
accommodations.  
 The first copyright law in the United States was passed by Congress in 1790 and provided a 
total of twenty-eight years (a once-renewable fourteen-year term) of protection for maps, charts, 
and books.362 Since then, the American Congress extended the term of protection four times. In 
1831, the initial fourteen-year term of protection was extended to twenty-eight years but Congress 
kept the renewal term at the original fourteen.363 In 1909, the renewal term was also extended to 
twenty-eight years.364 In 1976, Congress extended the term of protection to seventy-five years (an 
addition of 19 years).365 This act did not apply retroactively. Therefore, all works published in 1923 
or later received the benefits of this extension but those published prior to 1923 remained in the 
public domain. The oldest of these works, those published in 1923, were slated to enter the public 
domain in 1998 under this new law. However, in 1998 Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) which added an additional twenty years of copyright protection to 
all existing works under protection.366 The CTEA stated that works created between 1923 and 1978 
would now receive protection for a total of ninety-five years and any work created after 1978 would 
 
362 Act of May 31,1790, ch. 15,1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831)  
363 Act of Feb. 3,1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870) 
364 Act of Mar. 4,1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976) 
365 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541  
366 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)  
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receive a term of the life of its author plus seventy years.367 Anonymous, pseudonymous, and works 
for hire would also receive a ninety-five year term of protection.368  
 To give an example, H.P. Lovecrafts’s The Lurking Fear would have been slated to enter 
the public domain in 1989 as it was first published in 1923 and subject to the 1909 Act granting 56 
total years of protection. However, its term was extended in 1976 and the new law meant that the 
novel would not enter the public domain until 1998. Its release to the public domain was then again 
blocked by the CTEA in 1998 which extended its term of protection to 2018- 39 years after it was 
originally intended to enter the public domain.  
 Among these amendments to the legal term of a copyright, the CTEA has received the most 
criticism from legal scholars for both its blatant pandering to corporate lobbyists and its lack of 
constitutional justification. It was, however, largely a response to the European Union’s copyright 
directive designed to harmonise its copyright laws in 1993.369  
 The EU Directive achieved two goals. First, it harmonised the length of copyright terms 
among its member states, requiring each member state to adopt a term of life plus seventy years by 
1995.370 Second, it set out to increase European economic leverage in global creative markets by 
requiring member states to adopt the “rule of the shorter term” when dealing with foreign works.371 
The “rule of the shorter term” is a provision set out in the Berne Convention372 that dictates when 
there is a disparity in term of copyright protection between two nations, the nation with the longer 
term may choose to shorten the term of protection to match that of the other nation with regard to 
works originating from it.373 For example, if France offers a term of life plus seventy years and the 
United States offers a term of life plus fifty years, when applying protection to American works in 
France, France may choose to apply the shorter, life plus fifty, term instead of its own more 
 
367 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (2011).  
368 Ibid.  
369 Directive on Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. L 29019 
370 Ibid. Article 7 
371 Ibid. Article 7(1) 
372 Berne Convention Supra n. 4  
373 Ibid. Article. 7(8).  
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generous life plus seventy. This is because French works in the United States will only receive the 
life plus fifty protection and is designed to allow nations to match the economic imbalance. Under 
the Berne Convention, the rule of the shorter term is permissive. However, under the EU Directive, 
it became compulsory for EU member states. This was a calculated move to increase Europe’s trade 
leverage against the United States with regard to creative works. In the debate over its response to 
the European Law, the United States estimated that the disparity in protection would cost its film 
industry alone as much as $200 million a year by the year 2020.374 Thus, Europe’s move sparked 
the debate in the United States Congress to extend its own terms so that it would be able to maintain 
its favourable trade imbalance in creative works with Europe.  
 However, regardless of the perceived necessity to maintain competitive viability of United 
States’ copyright works abroad, the CTEA was also the product of intense lobbying from the 
creative industries.375 Disney, who was slated to lose protection for its iconic cash-cow, Mickey 
Mouse, was particularly involved in the legislative process for the CTEA. Eighteen of the twenty-
five sponsors for the bill received campaign money from Disney, including Senate Majority leader, 
Trent Lott, on the very day he signed up as a co-sponsor.376 Congress’s failure to address potential 
issues of the new law, such as the fact that term extensions were arguably a hidden tax on 
consumers or its conflict with the constitutional mandate that copyright laws should “promote the 
 
374 Bryce, S.C., ‘ Life Plus Seventy: The Extension of Copyright Terms in the European Union and Proposed Legislation in the United States.’ 
(1996) 37 Harv Int’l L J 525, 528. Citing: Hearings Before the House of Representatives Subcommn on Courts and Intellectual Property of the 
Comm. on theJudiciary,104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative). 
375 See: Pocaro, K. ‘Private Ordering and Orphan Works: Our Least Worst Hope?’[2010] Duke Law and Technology Review. Pg. 15 ("The current 
state of copyright law, with wildly longer term limits and automatic protection, is a result of continuous content-industry lobbying to protect their 
valuable, ageing intellectual property.")  
376 See: Buccafusco, C. and Heald, P., ‘Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term 
Extension,’ Berkely Tech. Law Journal, Vol. 28:1, 1, 8. Citing: Landes, W.M. and Posner, R., The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law 
[2004] AEI-Brookings Joing Center for Regulatory Studies, pg. 16 (noting that the Center for Responsive Politics showed that in 1996 media interests 
donated $1.5 million to six of the sponsors of the Copyright Term Extension Act); See also: Solomon, J., ‘Rhapsody in Green’, BostonGLobe, Jan. 
3,1999, at E2. John Solomon wrote:  
 “Behind the scenes, however, [Disney] has been active. Congressional Quarterly reported that Disney chairman Michael Eisner personally 
lobbied Senate Majorit)' Leader Trent Lott, a Republican from Mississippi. That day, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, Disney gave 
Lott a $1,000 contribution, following up two weeks later with a $20,000 donation to the National Republican Senatorial Committee.”  
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Progress of Science,”377 suggest that the CTEA’s swift passage through congress was a reflection of 
the power of corporate money in the American legislative process.  
 Ultimately, life plus 70 has become nearly a global standard with over 80 nations offering 
protection of at least this term and the vast majority of the rest offering at least life plus 50 years.378  
However, just over 100 years ago when the United States was considering its second copyright term 
extension, Congress rejected the term of life plus fifty years because it believed that such a length 
was a radical departure from what was then the scope of copyright law.379 Yet many of the nations 
with lengthy copyright terms of protection, including Australia,380 Japan,381 Jamaica,382 South 
Africa,383 were directly influenced by the United States.  
 The extension of copyright terms across the globe has directly contributed to the imbalance 
of rights between users and content owners. Copyright law is designed to create temporary 
monopoly rights in order to incentivise creation. However, those monopoly rights are balanced by 
the public domain- a legal space of unrestricted use which every work eventually enters into. Yet 
the last century has been marked by so many extensions to copyright terms that one may wonder if 
legislators will ever allow modern works to enter into the public domain. Even if we truly have 
reached a place where lawmakers are content with the terms set, we have still gone too far 
 
377 U.S. Const. art 1§8, cl. 8. (The CTEA was later challenged on the grounds that extending the terms of existing works failed to promote the 
creation of new ones as per this mandate in Eldrid v. Ashcroft.)  
378 'List Of Countries' Copyright Lengths' (En.wikipedia.org, 2020) <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries%27_copyright_lengths> 
accessed 23 July 2020 
379 Bryce, Shauna C, ‘ Life Plus Seventy: The Extension of Copyright Terms in the European Union and Proposed Legislation in the United States.’ 
(1996) 37 Harv Int'l L J 525, 530. Citing: Hearings Before the House of Representatives Subcommn on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. 
on theJudiciary,104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Marybeth Peters). 
380 Se:e Rimmer, M., ‘Robbery Under Arms: Copyright Law and the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement’, (2006), 11 First Monday, No. 
3 http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1316/1236 (“In the trade negotiations, [the U.S. Trade Representative] 
demanded that Australia ratify the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty. He 
supported an extension of the copyright term, so that Australia adopted the standards set by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.") 
(emphasis emoved); see also Sainsbury, M., ‘Governance and the Process of Law Reform: The Copyright Term Extension in Australia,’ (2006) 9 
Canberra Law Review 1. (detailing lobbying effort in Australia to ratify the Free Trade Agreement). 
381 See Masnick M, 'Copyright Extension Moves To Japan' (Techdirt., 2020) <http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20091119/1840217016.shtml> 
accessed 21 May 2020 
382 See Masnick, M, ‘Jamaica Latest to Embrace Retroactive Copyright Term Extension,’ (Techdirt.com, 2020) <http://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 
20111014/00471816347/jamaica-latest-to-embrace-retroactive-copyright-term-extension- screw-public-domain.shtml.> accessed 21 May 2020 
383 See Rens, A. & Lessig, L., ‘Forever Minus A Day: A Consideration of Copyright Term Extension in South Africa’ [2006] 7 South African 
Journal of Information & Communication, 22  
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considering the time extensions have not been met with equivalent expansions for users’ rights. If 
anything, in the aftermath of term extensions, the last decade might be described as a period of legal 
attack on users’ rights, constricting them even more and thus furthering the imbalance.  
 
ii. Increased protectionist treatment of secondary uses 
 
 Alongside the seemingly perpetual extensions of copyright terms in the modern world, the 
enforcement issues associated with the internet have brought about new standards in copyright 
protection which serve to undermine users’ rights. Technical protection measures (“TPMs”), 
filtering software, and the notice and takedown system are the primary means of enforcing 
copyrights in the digital environment and each serves to whittle away at users’ rights for secondary 
creation. The previous chapter addressed the issues associated with these enforcement mechanisms 
and their effects on users’ rights in detail. However, to recap the sentiments covered previously, 
TPMs, filtering software, and the notice and takedown system are all used online to prevent or 
remove infringing content at the expense of often removing legitimate secondary uses and even 
licensed uses with little recourse granted to the legitimate secondary authors.384 The nets designed 
to catch infringements are cast widely with little care for the rights of authors whose legitimate 
works are caught in them. These legal mechanisms are also subject to various abuses and used as 
tools of censorship385 and extortion386 with little repercussion for doing so. The use of technology 
and automation to enforce copyright in the digital space has resulted in an inadvertent shrinking of 
 
384 Longan, M. (2018, August 17). Big Brother is Watching but He Doesn’t Understand: Why Forced Filtering Technology isn’t the Solution to the 
Modern Copyright Dilemma. Script’ed Journal of Law Technology and Science. Blog. <https://script-ed.org/blog/big-brother-is-watching-but-he-
doesnt-understand-why-forced-filtering- technology-on-the-internet-isnt-the-solution-to-the-modern-copyright-dilemma/> 
385 Ehrenkranz, M., ‘Producers of Nazi Romance Movie Appear to Be Using DMCA Takedowns to Silence Critics’ (Gizmodo, 2019) 
<https://gizmodo.com/producers-of-nazi-romance-movie-appear-to-be-using-dmca-1831555053> accessed 16 May 2021 (Where producers of a Nazi 
romance film used the notice and takedown system to silence critics). See also: ‘Video Game Developer Says He Won't Send a Takedown of a Bad 
Review, Does So Anyway’ (EFF, 2019 <https://www.eff.org/takedowns/video-game-developer-says-he-wont-send-takedown-bad-review-does-so-
anyway> accessed 16 May 2021 (Where a video game developer uses notice and takedown to remove bad reviews.)  
386 Hale, J., ‘Here's How A Scammer Abused YouTube's Copyright Infringement System In An Attempt To Extort Money From Users’ (tubefilter, 
2019) <https://www.tubefilter.com/2019/02/07/youtube-content-id-copyright-infringement-scam/> accessed 16 May 2021  
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users’ rights in a time where we should be looking to expand them to balance the expansions of 
owners’ rights.  
 
a. Lack of access to proper licensing mechanisms 
 
 While facing unnecessarily long terms of copyright protection as well as enforcement 
mechanisms that will often prevent secondary uses of works- even those that fall under exclusions 
to infringement- the process of actually obtaining a license to make a derivative is often nearly 
impossible for the average secondary creator. This is because licenses can be difficult to obtain in 
the first place and, when available, often come with exorbitant price tags making them functionally 
unavailable for the average person. The system of using property rules to govern licenses for 
derivatives has become prejudicial against average creators in favour of wealthier, more established 
professionals and organisations. The argument for the status quo is that access is and will always be 
available for all but must be negotiated privately and individually with the copyright holder in the 
spirit of a free market. These negotiations will inevitably be guided by relevant economic and non-
economic factors alike— i.e. the perceived value of the work, the current demand for licenses, the 
perceived economic and intangible effects of granting the license on the commercial value of the 
work, etc. This free-market system functionally serves to deny access to the most socially relevant 
works for all but the wealthiest of secondary creators.387 Second, the non-economic factors 
associated with determining the price for a license often include unreasonable emotional 
attachments by authors to their works which can lead to outright denial of licenses or inflated prices 
beyond actual market value. Finally, the system of upfront payments coupled with the often high 
prices of obtaining a license discourage secondary creativity in general- not just for amateur or 
pseudo-professionals- because of the steep investment costs that must be paid before the secondary 
creator has any idea what the commercial success of her work may be.  
 
387 Norek, J., Comment, ‘You Can't Sing without the Bling: The Toll of Excessive Sample License Fees on Creativity in Hip-Hop Music and the 
Need for a Compulsory Sound Recording Sample License System.’ (2004) 11 UCLA Entertainment Law Review 83, 90-91 (arguing that the high 
cost of licensing samples for remixes prevents new music from being developed and unfairly favours established, wealthy artists).  
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 The cost of a license to make a derivative is often exorbitant and out of the range of access 
for most secondary creators.388 Economic theories claim this cost is justified. The use of a 
copyright, like that of any other good, is worth whatever price the seller is able to charge in a free 
market. However, copyrights are not governed by a free market. There is no competition because 
each individual work is unique and subject to temporary limited monopoly rights. While this is by 
design, as these monopoly rights are in place to ensure the commercial viability of creative works 
and thereby promote their creation, extending these monopoly rights to derivatives overshoots this 
purpose. Moreover, the use of free-market economics to govern a market that is not free allows for 
secondary and irrelevant factors to artificially inflate the price of a copyright. For example, authors 
often allow emotional attachments to their creations to affect their prices or even willingness to 
consider a licensing offer.389 This is especially true when the proposed license would have a 
perceived negative effect on the author’s reputation.390 Studies done on libel claimants suggest that 
no amount of money will make ridicule worthwhile.391 Allowing the market for copyright 
derivatives to operate freely has fostered an environment that chills secondary creativity for amateur 
and pseudo-professional creation. 
 However, the property rule system for derivatives also chills secondary creativity from 
professional sources. While it is true that inflated prices have created a paywall blocking entry for 
less established or financially-flush creators, the same system also serves to deter secondary 
creativity from even the wealthiest creators. While high price thresholds may be surmountable for 
the larger content companies, the high investment cost will limit their willingness to make 
secondary creations but for the most financially safe investments. As a result, the most popular 
 
388 See Ashtar, R. ‘Theft, Transformation,and the Need of the Immaterial: A Proposal for a Fair Use Digital Sampling Regime.’ (2009) 19 Albany 
Law Journal of Science. & Technology 261, 273 ("Flat fees are generally made available, with prices set between one and five thousand dollars”) 
389 Yen, A.C., ‘When Authors Won't Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law.’ (1991) 62 University of Colorado Law Review 79, 
84 
390 Ibid. at 103 
391  Morrison, R.J., 'Derivers' Licenses: An Argument for Establishing a Statutory License for Derivative Works' (2006-2007) 6 Chi-Kent J Intell 
Prop 87, 103. Citing: Ibid. at 105.  
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creative franchises like Harry Potter, Star Wars, and Marvel will find investment money for 
derivatives despite the high price tags but less proven works will not.  
 We have allowed the law to develop in such a way that creativity, particularly secondary 
creativity, at best, has become a privilege unique to the wealthy and, at worst, is deterred for all but 
the original creator of a work. Copyright terms have been extended to such a degree that no person 
will likely live long enough to see a work created during her lifetime enter the public domain. 
Works made using exceptions to infringement and laws of fair use are being treated as 
infringements online without repercussions. Licensing is a tool of the law that finds utility in only a 
small percentage of the creative community and serves more often as a barrier to new creation. 
Changes must be made to the law in order to redirect some creative power into the hands of users 
and non-corporate creators.  
D. How Liability Rules are Ideally Situated to Open Access and Rebalance the Rights of 
Users Against Owners 
 Liability rules would serve to immediately shift the balance of power in copyright derivative 
licensing in two ways. First, they would open access by dissolving the system that allows for the 
absolute refusal of licenses or functional refusal via overvaluing a work. Second, they remove the 
upfront barriers to secondary creation brought about by steep investment costs associated with 
derivative licenses by offering a take-now-pay-later system. The result will obviously diminish the 
value of derivative rights. However, a narrow focus when changing the law will limit this reduction 
in value for content owners while simultaneously spurring new creative production and thereby 
creating new revenue streams for both owners and secondary creators. The value will not dissipate 
but will be redistributed.  
E. Conclusions 
 Copyright law is a philosophical and economics-based construct that sets out to protect 
perceived rights of creators- both moral and economic- as a means to incentivise production of new 
creative works for the benefit of society. This chapter has discussed the underlying philosophies 
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that serve as the basis for copyright law within the scope of users’ rights and secondary creativity. 
While I have left the right of reproduction alone as there is much literature already on the subject 
and I have no desire to contest its utility in the modern world, I find that none of the theories 
analysed offer any justification for the strong derivative rights the law offers creators. Moreover, 
each theory seems to advocate for a strong balance of power between primary and secondary 
creators. Today the law offers no balance. The safety valves in place designed to promote secondary 
creativity and protect the rights of secondary creators such as the public domain, exceptions to 
infringement, and licensing mechanisms have become distorted over the course of time and legal 
evolution to the point that they no longer function as such. They have become impotent tools and 
empty promises to the average secondary creator. The solution to this problem of imbalance in the 
legal dichotomy is a shift in the nature of copyright law itself- in at least some facets- from that of a 
property right to a liability right. Such a move, if applied narrowly, would redistribute power to 
make secondary creations by removing the upfront financial and permissive barriers to do so while 
still ensuring a healthy pecuniary interest in derivatives for primary creators. How such a system 
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 IV. Legislative Attempts to Address these Issues: A 
Comparison of the Copyright Modernisation Act in Canada 
and Article 17 of the New European Copyright Directive 
 
A. Introduction 
 Thus far, this thesis has sought to establish copyright law’s increasingly weak position in the 
digital age. This notion is, on its own, not an entirely new concept. In fact, academics and 
legislators have been wrestling with this dilemma for years- to little or no success. Chapter two 
addressed how the private sector has tried, in the absence of up-to-date legislation, to adapt 
copyright to the digital era via modernised control-based mechanisms. This chapter will provide an 
analysis of actual and proposed legislative measures that are designed at adapting copyright law to 
the digital world. It will do so by comparing two particular legislative measures from separate 
jurisdictions. The first is Canada’s Copyright Modernization Act and the second is the E.U.’s 
Directive for Copyright in the Digital Single Market. These two pieces of legislation are attempting 
to solve some of the same problems but in very different ways. The European approach represents 
the status quo- a system that requires either extensive licensing efforts on the part of online content 
service providers or de facto adoption of filtering technology designed to increase rights holders’ 
ability to control the uses of their works online. The Canadian approach marks the first step away 
from this model and serves to legitimise much of the content the European approach will end up 
censoring- either by design or inadvertently.  Ultimately, I find that both proposals fall short and 
this chapter will serve as a critique of both systems- the European directive for its massive 
censorship potential and the Canadian approach for balking at absolute reform. The conclusions 
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B. Canada: An Evolved Standard392 
i. Introduction 
 
 The Canadian approach to adjusting its copyright law to the modern world has been two 
faceted. The first prong is the common-law hybridisation of its fair dealing provisions with that of 
American fair use. The second is the Copyright Modernization Act of 2012- a piece of legislation 
designed to accommodate certain forms of user-generated content that make use of copyrighted 
works online. Both examples represent legal transitions towards a more liberal and open-ended type 
of copyright law enforcement regime while remaining squarely within the established property-
model system. The Canadian approach has nuanced strengths, though. It represents the first piece of 
legislation to address non-commercial393 remix head-on and legitimise the practice. However, it 
ultimately fails to offer new solutions to piracy and has lead to an increase in the value gap for 
creators. Moreover, within the context of issues described in this thesis, it only addresses non-
commercial remixes and fails to offer an easier path to legal monetisation for would-be creators.  
 
ii. Hybridizing the Two Systems 
 
 While Canada’s fair dealing statute originally appeared in the Canadian Copyright Act in 
1921 as an exact duplication of the fair dealing clause in section 2(1)(i) of the U.K. Copyright Act 
of 1911,394 it has subsequently evolved into something entirely distinct from its predecessor.  
 In 2004, in the landmark case of CCH Canadian Ltd. V. Law Society of Upper Canada, 
Canada made its first distinct divergence from traditional fair dealing in the U.K. In this case, the 
Canadian Supreme Court ruled by unanimous decision that the Law Society of Upper Canada’s 
 
392 Portions of this section have been subsequently published in: Longan, M.E., “The inadequacy of U.K. law to address user-generated content: a 
comparative analysis with the United States and Canada”. (2017) Queen Mary Law Journal, special conferences issue, p. 109-122. 
393 The term non-commercial is used throughout this chapter. Legally speaking, a non-commercial work is one that is created by individuals for 
personal enjoyment or consumption and is done outside of hte market sphere. It excludes works created for profit, within the context of a business 
activity, or directed at a commercial advantage or monetary compensation. See: Hugenholtz, P.B., Copyright Reconstructed: Rethinking Copyright’s 
Economic Rights in a Time of Highly Dynamic Technological and Economic Change, 2018 Wolters Kluwer. p.264-65. 
394 Copyright Act, S.C. 1921, c. 24, s. 16(1)(i) 
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request-based reproduction libraries constituted a fair dealing under copyright law.395 The Law 
Society of Upper Canada runs a law library in Toronto that provides copies of requested materials 
to its patrons as well as on-site photocopy machines.396 CCH Canadian Ltd. is a publishing 
company that claimed the Law Society infringed its copyrights in several publications, including 
treatises and other legal commentaries, by providing copies to patrons and allowing them to make 
their own copies.397 The Court determined that providing photocopies of selections from 
copyrighted works to its patrons for the purpose of research- be it commercial or non-commercial 
research- was quintessential fair dealing. However, it was how the Court came to this decision that 
is important.  
 The Court made a momentous shift from a narrow construction of the fair dealings 
exceptions by holding that such exceptions “must not be interpreted restrictively.”398 The Court 
noted that, in order to prove a dealing was fair, the defendant must prove that the dealing was (1) 
within an enumerated exception and (2) fair.399 Such an interpretation of the law is very much in 
line with the modern fair dealing analysis in the U.K. However, the Court added certain factors that 
it deemed to be relevant in determining fairness in the future.400 These factors were: the purpose 
(and commercial nature) of the dealing, the character of the dealing, the amount of the dealing, 
alternatives to the dealing, the nature of the work, and the effect of the dealing on the work.401 
These factors, by no coincidence, come straight from United States copyright law- specifically the 
law of fair use.402  
 In this one decision, the Canadian Supreme Court essentially merged the antiquated fair 
dealings doctrine of the United Kingdom with the current fair use analysis practiced in the United 
 
395 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada (2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 236 D.L.R. (4th) 395 [CCH]) 
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399 Ibid.   
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401 D’Augustino, G. ’Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada's Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use.’ 
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States to create a hybrid of the two doctrines. However, the Canadian Supreme Court sought to 
draw a line distancing its newly created doctrine from that of American Fair Use. In SOCAN, the 
Court stated that “[u]nlike the American approach of proceeding straight to the fairness assessment, 
we do not engage in the fairness analysis in Canada until we are satisfied that the dealing is for one 
of the allowable purposes enumerated in the Copyright Act.”403 In doing so, the Court gave the fair 
dealings doctrine a sense of pliability that it desperately needed while maintaining its narrow 
foundation to avoid the “notorious ambiguity”404 seen in the United States. 
  However, in requiring that a use fall into one of the enumerated purposes before conducting 
the fairness analysis, Canadian law would continue to operate much in the same way that U.K. Law 
does today. Because of the importance of users’ rights to the furtherance of creative expression in 
the modern world, Canada passed separate legislation to deal with UGC. 
 
iii. The Copyright Modernization Act: 
 
 In 2012, Canada passed the Copyright Modernization Act into law. This act, while having 
many purposes, legitimised two important acts that previously constituted infringement. These are 
format shifting and non-commercial user-generated content. 
 First, the act granted consumers the right to reproduce legitimately acquired materials for 
private purposes.405 This provision allows consumers to shift the format of content that they 
purchase legally to make it more accessible. The provision contains an exception for reproductions 
onto an “audio recording medium,” meaning that consumers may copy songs purchased on iTunes 
onto their phones or an mp3 player, but not onto a compact-disc.406 This provision legitimised an 
already widespread behaviour.  
 
403 Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 
at para. 26 
404 Tehranian, J. Infringement Nation: Copyright 2.0 and You. [2011] Oxford Scholarship Online. pg. 4 
405 Copyright Modernisation Act, Canada, 2012, 29.22. 
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 The second, and more important to this thesis, function of the act was to legalise all forms of 
non-commercial user-generated content.407 The amendment states that it is not an infringement for 
an individual to use an existing copyrighted work in the creation of a new work if the use is non-
commercial, proper acknowledgement to the source author is given, the individual had reasonable 
grounds to believe that his act was not an infringement, and the new work does not have a 
substantial adverse effect on the existing work, financial or otherwise.408 The text of the exception 
in the act is concerned largely with striking a balance between two opposing forces in copyright 
law- users’ rights and creators’ rights. While it sets a groundbreaking precedent in terms of 
permissive treatment of copyrighted works, it does so with a clear purpose in continuing to 
guarantee certain authors’ rights- namely the moral interest in receiving proper recognition for 
secondary uses as well as the economic interest of continued opportunity to exploit a work for 
financial gain expected from copyright law.   
 The Canadian government’s website lists common examples that would fit this exception. 
Such examples are: “making a home video of a friend or a family member dancing to a popular 
song and posting it online, or creating a ‘mash-up’ of video clips.”409 The first example is an 
homage to the controversial United States case of Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. that arose when 
Universal Music issued a takedown notice to Lenz under the DMCA for her YouTube video of her 
young children dancing while Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy” played from a quiet and distorted radio in 
the background. Lenz sued Universal claiming fair use and the case ultimately lead to a holding that 
fair use must be considered before issuing a DMCA takedown notice.410  The second example is an 
acknowledgement of remix culture and its rightful place as an accepted practice within the law.  
 The modern Canadian approach is two-fold. First, it hybridises the restrictive fair dealings 
doctrine and the free-for-all fair use doctrine into an approach that is neither too rigid to adapt as 
 
407 Ibid. at 29.21(1) 
408 Ibid.  
409 ‘What the Copyright Modernization Act Means for Consumers’, online: Government of Canada <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-
prda.nsf/eng/rp01186.html> 
410 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 
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technology changes but not so open-ended that the law becomes muddied and unpredictable. 
Second, it uses statutory provisions to remove what it views as harmless activity from the modern 
notion of piracy by legalising format-shifting and non-commercial UGC. Canada uses its hybridised 
fair dealings approach in conjunction with specific statutory provisions to cast the boundaries of 
copyright law in a manner that achieves nearly every goal of the transformative/fair use doctrine in 
the United States without suffering legal unpredictability.  This law, however, fails to legitimise 
transformative works that have a commercial purpose- theoretically one key asset of American law. 
 
iv. Legislative Suggestions Borrowing the Canadian Model 
 
 There have been three notable discussions about copyright reform based on the Canadian 
model. The first is the Irish Copyright Review Committee’s report of 2013 which suggested reforms 
echoing the Canadian model.411 The second is a proposal by Peter Yu for the implementation of the 
Canadian system in Hong Kong.412 The third is a paper by Lambrecht and Cabay that served as a 
proposal for European copyright reform inspired by the Canadian adjustments discussed thus far.413 
 In 2013, the Irish Copyright Review Committee issued a report outlining weaknesses in 
Irish copyright law and concluded with suggestions for reform. Among those suggestions were both 
an amendment to fair dealing deeming the list of exceptions non-exhaustive and allowing the 
possibility to accept other acts not included as well as the introduction of an exception for non-
commercial UGC.414 
 In 2014, Peter Yu proposed a new piece of legislation in Hong Kong regarding UGC and 
copyright law.415 The proposed act was modelled after the provision on non-commercial UGC in 
Canada’s CMA and reads nearly word-for-word as such. However, Yu argued that that the act was 
 
411 Irish Copyright Review Committee, ‘Modernizing Copyright’, 2013 
412 Yu, P. ‘The Quest for a User-Friendly Copyright Regime in Hong Kong’. [2016]  American University International Law Review. Pgs. 283-362 
413 Lambrecht, M. and Cabay, J. (2016). ‘Remix allowed: avenues for copyright reform inspired by Canada.’  11(1) Journal of Intellectual Property 
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supported both by Canadian law and the doctrine of transformative use in the U.S. He noted that 
“Canadian and U.S. models are so closely related that policymakers and commentators, including 
those in the Australian Law Reform Commission, have considered the Canadian UGC exception a 
form of the transformative use exception.”416 Accepting this line of analysis, the Canadian 
approach, while accomplishing the same goals as the transformative use doctrine, does so without 
fear of unpredictability. The precise language of the law does not force the role of art critic or 
philosopher upon judges that seems to have created confusion in the U.S. However, his proposal 
remained open to using United States case law as a foundation for Hong Kong as its courts apply 
the law.417  
 Yu made one significant change to the wording of the Canadian provision for his proposal. 
In the phrase “solely for non-commercial purposes” seen in the CMA, he changed “solely” to 
“predominantly.”418 Yu aptly argues that such a change allows for a broader range of works that 
may be denied protection under the Canadian approach for harmless monetisation to succeed.419 
Harmless monetisation can be characterised by inconsequential ad revenue through social media 
sites. It is an elegant harmonisation of the strengths of both the Canadian and U.S. Systems coupled 
with a tactful understanding of the way creative works are typically disseminated online whereby 
the key strength of the transformative use doctrine is its allowance of monetised works under 
certain circumstances. Furthermore, there is precedent for such a provision in private regulations 
within certain markets. For instance, in its Game Content Usage Rules,420 Microsoft addresses its 
policy on machinima, or the usage of a video game’s source code to make films. The Rules state 
that such usage is permitted if done for non-commercial purposes only.421 However, Microsoft 
explicitly notes that ad-generated revenue from sites like YouTube will not constitute a work as 
 




420 Xbox, ‘Game Content Usage Rules,’ <http://www.xbox.com/en-us/developers/rules> accessed 31 March 2016  
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commercial.422 Another video game development company, Blizzard, states in a similar provision 
that “as long as the website that hosts your Production provides a free method to allow viewers to 
see the Production, Blizzard Entertainment will not object to your Production being hosted on that 
site.”423 Such a provision likewise allows for ad-driven revenue from YouTube and other social 
media sites as long as those who access the content are not paying for the privilege. 
 In 2016, Lambrecht and Cabay published a paper considering two potential proposals for 
European copyright law reform based on the Canadian model.424 These proposals were the 
introduction of a specific exception for user generated content and a transition to a semi-open fair 
dealing exception aimed at providing needed flexibility to European copyright interpretation.425 
Ultimately, they found that a model based on the decision by the Canadian Supreme Court in 
SOCAN and able to be implemented by the CJEU would be most appropriate for Europe.426 
 The Canadian approach seen in the CMA has been, in some ways successful- as 
characterised by its inspiring of multiple copycat legislative proposals. However, to date, no 
jurisdiction has actually adopted a system based on the CMA.  
 
v. Criticising the Canadian Model  
 
 While it has inspired legislative proposals elsewhere, the Copyright Modernisation Act has 
also been the subject of much criticism- particularly by Canadian content creators citing huge 
reductions in royalty revenues as a direct result of the act.427 However, these criticisms are isolated 
to a section of the law that included educational purposes as a fair dealing and essentially opened 
the door to large sections of copyrighted works being legally copied and used by educational 
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institutions without permission or payment.428 As that section of the law is largely outside the scope 
of this thesis, so are the criticisms associated with it. However, in 2017, the Standing Committee on 
Industry, Science and Technology released a report as part of a statutorily mandated 5-year review 
process of the Copyright Modernisation Act.429 The Industry Committee also requested a separate 
advisory report from the Canadian Heritage Committee (the other federal department in charge of 
copyright policy in Canada). This Heritage report was released a few weeks before the final 
Industry Report.430 With these reports came countless testimonies from witnesses representing the 
creative communities affected by the CMA. Much of it focused on the problem-ridden educational 
fair dealing provision. However, many addressed the non-commercial user-generated content 
provision as well. 
 With respect to the section authorising all forms of non-commercial user generated content, 
the Canadian government received mixed feedback from stakeholders. Laurent Dubois, the general 
manager for the Union des ecrivaines et des ecrivains quebecois (UNEC), spoke out against the 
provision.431 He argued that the new law unduly ignores moral rights of authors stating:  
It is important to remember that the concept of copyright is not merely an economic one. There is copyright 
and the economic right to royalties, but there is also the idea of moral rights that we would like to put on 
the table today. This concept seems to be missing from the current act. We would like to discuss it.432  
However, his argument lost traction as he immediately began to cite the economic harm supposedly 
created by the act. He went on to say:  
Moral rights refer to the idea that an artist has the right to grant or withhold permission for their work to be 
used, disseminated or even altered. With its many exceptions, the 2012 act has stripped many artists and 
writers of their income. I do not want to be more dramatic than necessary, but I will just give you some 
figures. In Canada, the average annual income of a professional writer is $12,879. In Quebec, the median 
income was $2,450 in 2008, and about the same right now. As a result, professional writers in Canada could 
be an endangered species.433 
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Neither I nor the Canadian parliament found Dubois’s argument about the distinction between 
moral and economic rights that was, ironically, substantiated by claims of economic harm 
convincing.  
 Ken Thompson, Chair for non-profit group, Artists and Lawyers for the Advancement of 
Creativity (ALAC) offered a slightly different perspective on the user-generated content 
exemption.434 He asked parliament to limit its scope and allow creators to issue their own policies 
on both commercial and non-commercial UGC and, in the case of the former, allow collective 
management bodies to control the licensing arrangements.435 He claimed that “a song mash-up or an 
unauthorised sequel to a novel or film by someone else could scoop the value of the author’s or 
performer’s original.”436 However, his proposal can be simply described as a calling for the new 
law to be abolished and the old system reinstated. Moreover, his basis for this claim is poorly 
founded. Mash-ups typically serve to boost revenue for the songs they make use of.437 Unauthorised 
sequels likely have similar effects on their predecessors as they are intended to appeal to the 
fanbase of the original work that they build upon- thus reigniting interest in the base work. Finally, 
he ignores the most relevant issue which is that these works of UGC represent new creativity 
despite their derivative nature and the legal system should foster their creation without bias. 
Copyright is and has always been about protecting expression, not ideas. Legally mandating the 
stifling of new creative expression because it makes use of the ideas of another author is not the 
purpose of copyright law. Moreover, it can be argued that expression is, in some ways, always 
derivative to a degree.438 Creatives are constantly building on the works of those who came before 
them. Drawing hard lines that criminalise derivative creativity when it represents new expression 
goes against the very purposes of copyright law.  
 
434 'Evidence - INDU (42-1) - No. 110 - House Of Commons Of Canada' (Ourcommons.ca, 2020) 
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/INDU/meeting-110/evidence> accessed 21 May 2020 
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 Finally, multiple parties testified that a key problem with the user-generated content 
exception lies in the fact that most of the content created under this exception is posted online and 
thereby generates revenue solely for the sites that host it, with the primary authors and secondary 
creators receiving no compensation.439 Such a system represents an exploitation of the exception by 
online service providers and an unfair diversion of revenue.440 This point is perhaps the most 
insightful. However, it is the necessary result of only authorising non-commercial UGC as the rule 
will automatically exclude revenue for both the original and derivative authors. The derivative 
author may not profit from her work as the exception requires it to be non-commercial. The primary 
author may also not profit from the derivation because it is created under an exception to 
infringement and no license is required. While it does not necessitate that a content-hosting third-
party shall receive revenue for these works, such is the nature of content dissemination today. One 
solution would be to require the establishment of a fund for creators paid into by these OSPs that 
are unduly profiting from the uses of their works. However, simply expanding the provision to 
allow for commercial works as well and establishing either a baseline for license negotiation or a 
simple and efficient body of collective licensing would open the doors for revenue streams for both 
the primary and secondary authors and rebalance the division of revenue. 
 
vi. The Copyright Modernization Act of Canada: Conclusions 
 
 The CMA is a multifaceted piece of legislation with each prong having distinct strengths 
and weaknesses. The educational fair dealing section has received the most criticism but is least 
relevant to the scope of this thesis. The section that establishes non-commercial works of UGC as 
non-infringing works is the most relevant and, in many ways, is lightyears ahead of copyright 
modernisation efforts of other nations. However, it is not without its downfalls. While being 
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progressive, it is a short-sighted half-measure. Limiting its scope to only non-commercial works of 
UGC helps the creative community by providing a tangible legal support for the right of expression 
and effectively says that new creativity and expression should not be stopped by the law. However, 
in failing to address the commercial side of this puzzle, parliament has allowed the law to be 
exploited economically by online service providers who host content as they are the only ones 
legally allowed to profit from this newly allowed creativity. If copyright law is treated as a tool to 
inspire creation through economic incentives, it should not be inadvertently diverting all of the 
revenue from creations to the only party involved in the transaction with no creative input. 
Expanding the provision to include commercial works and finding ways to make licensing 
transactions efficient and fairly-priced for average creators would serve to maintain this new notion 
that all creativity should be fostered by the law and facilitate economic exploitation of the new 
works for all creative parties involved. 
C. The E.U.: The Directive for Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
i. Introduction 
 
 The European Parliament has recently passed a directive designed, among other things, to 
address problems of piracy and other forms of copyright infringement associated with the digital 
world.441 The relevant provision of the copyright directive, originally article 13 but now article 17, 
sets out new legal requirements to be imposed upon online content-sharing service providers.442 The 
directive originally called for these content-sharing service providers to adopt digital filtering 
technology to prevent infringements uploaded by their users.443 However, the proposed law faced 
fierce backlash from the public. It became colloquially known as the “meme killer” as it was 
perceived as a threat to appropriative creative expression online because of the well-documented 
 
441 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single 
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inability of filtering technology to adequately deal with works that qualify as fair dealings or other 
exceptions to infringement.444 While the public opposition failed to prevent the passing of the 
directive, it likely contributed to its subsequent alteration.445 
 At its present and adopted state, the directive no longer requires implementation of filtering 
technology by content-sharing service providers but will now impose a liability on these companies 
for infringements by their users.446 The directive requires that content-sharing service providers 
cooperate with rightsholders to obtain licenses for the right to communicate and share to the public 
their works.447 This represents a stark departure from what has become the modern standard in 
internet-age copyright law whereby online service providers may not be held liable for the 
infringements of their users as long as they comply with notice and takedown procedures.448 The 
new directive also requires that this cooperation shall not lead to the prevention of the availability 
of non-infringing works including those covered by exceptions to infringement.449 This is the 
European legislators’ response to criticism that the previous iterations of the directive would result 
in the chilling of free expression. However, it is unclear what the EU expects to result from the 
implementation of this directive. Despite its new wording, the directive likely will lead to the 
adoption of filtering technology by content-sharing providers in order to avoid liability for 
infringement themselves.450 
 
444 See eg: Kelly, J., ‘Potential ‘meme killer’ law moves forward with EU lawmakers’ (Globalnews.ca, 2018) 
<https://globalnews.ca/news/4446228/meme-killer-copyright-eu-article-13/> accessed 16 May 2021; See also Longan (2019) Supra n.253 
445 Goosens, S., ‘Article 13 (now Article 17) of the new Copyright Directive: what you need to know’ (Reedsmith, 2019) 
<https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2019/04/article-13-now-article-17-of-the-new-eu-copyright-directive>  accessed 16 May 2021 
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 While the European Parliament has correctly identified a problem- a failure in the law to 
adequately address online infringements, the new solution would represent a regression in legal 
evolution. The digital world has revolutionised the way creative works are created and 
disseminated. That revolution has likewise extended to perceptions as to how copyright law should 
function. As copyright law in the European Union has gone largely unchanged since 2001, the 
content industries have set in place sophisticated pseudo-legal systems designed to combat these 
issues of unauthorised uses.451 However, these systems are generally focused on allowing low-value 
uses while establishing mechanisms to monetise them- both for the users that publish them and the 
copyright holders themselves.452 Article 17 undermines these programs that are functioning 
successfully on the internet. Moreover, Article 17 stands to create more problems than it solves if it 
implicitly forces the adoption of filtering technology that is currently incapable of addressing many 
fundamental aspects of copyright law such as exceptions to infringement and legitimately-licensed 
materials.453 Forcing internet portals to adopt copyright filtering software is the wrong solution not 
only because the available technology is incapable of adequately determining copyright 
violations454 but also because current industry developments illustrate that monetisation, not take-
downs or blocking, should be the focus of legislators.455 While it is counter-intuitive, this means 
inevitably that filtering technology is likely the future of copyright enforcement online. However, in 
its current state it is unacceptable. Rather than requiring the adoption of subpar technology with 
little oversight, legislative measures should be aimed at facilitating the growth and fair use of 
filtering technology as a tool to empower online creators and content owners by monetising works 
for both parties in the form of automated licensing mechanisms. Instead, this new directive simply 
shifts liability to the party with the most to lose in hopes that the created risk will result in stronger 
policing online. This should not be the burden of content-sharing service providers and, in reality, 
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will likely force them to adopt the simplest solution to avoid their newly created liabilities- upload 
filters.  
 This new iteration of the law raises two important questions- one practical and one 
philosophical. First, how can online service providers comply with this new law in real world 
situations? Regardless of whether it claims to do so, the new directive continues to functionally 
require that content-sharing services adopt copyright filtering technology as doing so is the most 
practical way to comply. Second, who should we hold accountable for infringements online? Article 
17 is a paradigm-shifting piece of legislation that will potentially hold large corporations 
accountable for infringements that they did not commit, did not intend to commit, had no 
knowledge of, and did not facilitate outside of providing a digital venue that has a multitude of 
legitimate purposes and cultural value. Is this a legal principal we are prepared to accept? 
 
ii. The Inevitable Result is Filtering Technology  
 
 The rewording of Article 17 no longer explicitly requires the adoption of filtering 
technology by content-sharing service providers. However, there is a consensus among academics 
that the law leaves no option but adoption of filtering technology.456 Upon analysis of the reality of 
complying with the law, this becomes even more apparent.  
 The requirements set out by Article 17 read as such:  
1.   Member States shall provide that an online content-sharing service provider performs an act of 
communication to the public or an act of making available to the public for the purposes of this Directive 
when it gives the public access to copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter uploaded by 
its users. 
An online content-sharing service provider shall therefore obtain an authorisation from the rightholders 
referred to in Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2001/29/EC, for instance by concluding a licensing 
agreement, in order to communicate to the public or make available to the public works or other subject 
matter. 
 
456“There is scientific consensus that Article 13 changes the obligation on service providers to act upon obtaining constructive knowledge 
(established under the e-Commerce Directive) to what will become a filtering obligation that benefits big players.” (Create.ac.uk, 2020) 
<https://www.create.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Academic_Statement_Copyright_Directive_29_06_2018.pdf> accessed 21 May 2020 
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Copyright Directive: A Tour D'horizon – Part II (Of Press Publishers, Upload Filters And The Real Value Gap) - Kluwer Copyright Blog' (Kluwer 
Copyright Blog, 2020) <http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/06/17/the-new-copyright-directive-a-tour-dhorizon-part-ii-of-press-publishers-
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2.   Member States shall provide that, where an online content-sharing service provider obtains an 
authorisation, for instance by concluding a licensing agreement, that authorisation shall also cover acts 
carried out by users of the services falling within the scope of Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC when they 
are not acting on a commercial basis or where their activity does not generate significant revenues. 
3.   When an online content-sharing service provider performs an act of communication to the public or an 
act of making available to the public under the conditions laid down in this Directive, the limitation of 
liability established in Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC shall not apply to the situations covered by 
this Article. 
The first subparagraph of this paragraph shall not affect the possible application of Article 14(1) of 
Directive 2000/31/EC to those service providers for purposes falling outside the scope of this Directive. 
4.   If no authorisation is granted, online content-sharing service providers shall be liable for unauthorised 
acts of communication to the public, including making available to the public, of copyright-protected works 
and other subject matter, unless the service providers demonstrate that they have: 
(a)  made best efforts to obtain an authorisation, and  
(b)  made, in accordance with high industry standards of professional diligence, best efforts to ensure the 
unavailability of specific works and other subject matter for which the rightholders have provided the 
service providers with the relevant and necessary information; and in any event  
(c)  acted expeditiously, upon receiving a sufficiently substantiated notice from the rightholders, to disable 
access to, or to remove from their websites, the notified works or other subject matter, and made best efforts 
to prevent their future uploads in accordance with point (b). 457  
 
 
The act goes on to expressly forbid OCSSPs from preventing their users from sharing works made 
legally under exceptions to infringement: 
7. The cooperation between online content-sharing service providers and rightholders shall not result in the 
prevention of the availability of works or other subject matter uploaded by users, which do not infringe 
copyright and related rights, including where such works or other subject matter are covered by an 
exception or limitation.  
Member States shall ensure that users in each Member State are able to rely on any of the following existing 
exceptions or limitations when uploading and making available content generated by users on online 
content-sharing services:  
(a) quotation, criticism, review 
(b) use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche. 
8. The application of this Article shall not lead to any general monitoring obligation.458  
 
 The language of article 17 is plain. OCSSPs have two available options to comply. The first 
is to obtain authorisation to communicate content uploaded by the public to their users.459 This will 
require the negotiation of a license scheme on a massive scale in order to include the millions of 
potential works that may be incorporated in uploads by users. While the music industry has a 
sophisticated system of collective rights management already in place, other creative industries 
have not had the necessity to do so. The task of negotiating permissions for an already huge and 
ever-growing body of creative works across all media is likely impossible for any OCSSP to do. 
 
457 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single 
Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC 
458 Ibid.  
459 Ibid. Article 17(1) 
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This, coupled with the potential incurred liability for any communicated piece of content that slips 
through the cracks in licensing efforts, results in little incentive for OCSSPs to comply via this 
method. The second means by which OCSSPs may comply with article 17 is via adherence to three 
cumulative conditions. They must demonstrate that they have:  
"(a) made best efforts to obtain an authorisation; (b) made best efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific 
works for which the right holders have provided them with the relevant and necessary information; and (c) 
acted expeditiously, subsequent to notice from right holders, to take down infringing content and made best 
efforts to prevent its future upload.”460 
 
Despite the fact that section 8 of article 17 states that this article shall not lead to any general 
monitoring obligation, the best way to adhere to these three cumulative conditions is, in fact, by 
employing upload filters. Both EU officials461 and national governments462 have conceded that this 
is the reality of the situation. 
 With Article 17’s newly created burden of liability for communications to the public, 
OCSSPs now face tremendous liability potential for each piece of content uploaded by their users. 
Moreover, the removal of safe-harbour status for this type of infringement compounds that liability 
potential. From a business perspective, absolute compliance will be crucial- copyright infringement 
lawsuits are not cheap, whether you win or lose. Minimising exposure to the risk of lawsuit will 
become the number one priority for OCSSPs. Even if it were feasible to negotiate licenses for 99% 
of the available content, the easiest and most economically sensible way to comply still appears to 
be the adoption of the industry standard upload filtering technology. In doing so, coupled with an 
efficient system for the removal of requested content (which would be typically in place already as 
it carries over from the notice and takedown system), OCSSPs would easily satisfy all three 
conditions of compliance and effectively shield themselves from liability for any upload to their 
 
460 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single 
Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC (Article 17(4)).  
461 EU Commissioner Gunther Oettinger Admits: Sites Need Filters To Comply With Article 13' (Techdirt., 2020) 
<https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190329/15501341902/eu-commissioner-gunther-oettinger-admits-sites-need-filters-to-comply-with-article-
13.shtml> accessed 21 May 2020 
462 'After Insisting That EU Copyright Directive Didn't Require Filters, France Immediately Starts Promoting Filters' (Techdirt., 2020) 
<https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190327/17141241885/after-insisting-that-eu-copyright-directive-didnt-require-filters-france-immediately-starts-
promoting-filters.shtml> accessed 21 May 2020 
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site- not just any upload that falls within the catalogue of works they have sought licenses for. Thus, 
the reality of article 17 is that it will result in the incorporation of upload filters by OCSSPs to 
prevent the communication of infringing material.  
 
iii. Who to Hold Accountable for Online Infringement  
 
 The new European directive turns the notion of who we hold accountable for online 
infringements on its head. Up to this point, online enforcement of copyright infringement has had 
two primary purposes. First, limit and remove the publication of low value infringements by users 
through the notice and takedown system. Second, dismantle and try to recover damages from high-
value piracy organisations via litigation. The late 1990s was a valuable learning experiment for 
content owners as suing individual users in court, even for outright piracy, created such backlash 
that the process no longer made economic sense.463 Moreover, safe harbour provisions in modern 
copyright law have limited the liability of wealthier, less personal (i.e. easier to sue without a 
publicity nightmare), internet corporations for online infringements provided they follow the notice 
and takedown procedures.464 Online hubs whose purpose were solely for the dissemination of illicit 
copyrighted materials were therefore the only safe option for litigation- legally, financially, and 
reputationally speaking. However, after decades of struggling to find someone to safely sue, the 
new European directive provides content owners with just that. Article 17 will effectively shift the 
burden of copyright enforcement online to online portals- many of which host primarily legitimate 
uses of content- and leave these deep-pocketed corporations open to litigation should they fail to do 
so. Holding internet companies that provide a legitimate service liable for infringements that they 
neither encourage nor know of is more of a legislated cash-grab for content owners than an actual 
solution to the problem of online infringement. The new law places those with the least 
involvement in online piracy yet the most to lose financially in the proverbial hot seat and will 
 
463 See: the analysis conducted in Chapter 1 E(iii) and the conclusions drawn from it.  
464 See: Chapter 1 E(ii) 
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likely lead to over-protective behaviours where concerns of censorship become an afterthought in a 
constant battle to remain shielded from liability.  
 As modern copyright enforcement has become a game of who-to-sue, one of the biggest 
questions the new European directive raises, though, is who can/should we hold liable for 
infringements online? The process of keeping individual users accountable is both inefficient and 
unpopular. Content owners in the United States have tried holding ISP’s liable for the actions of 
their users to no avail.465 Large online companies that host content submitted by users like 
YouTube, Facebook, and Reddit were the next obvious target. However, is it legally just to hold 
these companies accountable for infringements made by their users that they do not encourage or 
condone and are unaware of? Strictly speaking, I believe the answer is no. Moreover, the solution to 
copyright problems created by the internet has been proven over and over again to not be simply 
finding the right person or entity to sue.466 At some point this game of whack-a-mole must come to 
an end and we must humbly accept our inability to adequately police a property-right system of 
copyright on the internet and look for solutions outside of that box.  
 
iv. An Erosion of Intermediary Liability Protection Regimes 
 
 Article 17 of the new European Copyright Directive is built upon the right of 
communication to the public. The right of communication to the public was first mentioned in 
international law in article 11 bis of the revised Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works.467 It was later a requirement by signatories the WIPO Copyright Treaty in 1996.468 
The right was subsequently harmonised in the EU by the Infosoc directive in 2001. Absent adequate 
definition in the directive, the boundaries of the right have been subsequently defined by the CJEU 
over the course of a few important cases. Article 17 of the new copyright directive uses the right of 
communication as a basis for the imposition of liability on OCSSPs. Therefore, in asking whether 
 
465 See: Grande Communications Supra n.76  
466 See: the analysis in Chapter 1 E 
467 Berlin Act (1908). 
468 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art. 8 
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the directive justly places liability on OCSSPs for actions of their users, it is important to analyse 
the history and purpose of the right of communication in E.U. law.  
 When determining whether a copyrighted work has been communicated to the public, the 
CJEU follows a three-step formula. First the Court must find that there has been an “act of 
communication.”469 The act of communicating relies on the defendant having played and 
“indispensable role” through a “deliberate intervention.”470 Second, upon finding that a 
communication has occurred, the Court seeks to determine whether that communication has been 
made to “a public.”471 This refers to a group of people of an indeterminate number that is of a 
certain, not insignificant, size. The relevant public may be reached either simultaneously- in the 
case of a screening, display, or live stream- or cumulatively over the course of a period of time- in 
the case of content that remains accessible like a torrent, download, hyperlink or social media post.  
 In Stichting Brein v. Ziggo,472 the CJEU was called to make a determination as to whether 
online portal, The Pirate Bay, made communications to the public of copyrighted material in order 
to determine whether anti-piracy group, Stichting Brein, was eligible to receive injunctive relief 
from ISP, Ziggo, in the form of blocked access to the p2p portal.473 In determining whether The 
Pirate Bay committed a communication to the public, the Court acknowledged that the infringing 
material was not directly communicated by the platform itself, but rather its users.474 The Pirate Bay 
served as an indexing service for infringing material on the bittorrent network that ultimately could 
be downloaded through peer-2-peer services. However, the Court noted that, nevertheless, the 
efficiency of the system is so reliant on the indexing services provided by sites like The Pirate Bay 
that “their role may be regarded as necessary.”475 The Court ultimately found that “the decisive role 
 
469 Rosati, E., The Construction of Economic Rights in the InfoSoc Directive. In Copyright and the Court of Justice of the European Union. [(2019] 
Oxford University Press. Retrieved 27 Jul. 2020, from https://www-oxfordscholarship-
com.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oso/9780198837176.001.0001/oso-9780198837176-chapter-5. Pg. 96 
470 Ibid. at 97 
471 Ibid. at 96 
472 Case C-610/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:456  
473 Ibid. 
474 Ibid.  
475 Ibid. at 50 
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in the communication to the public of a given work cannot be attributed to it if it is unaware that the 
work has been made available illegally or if, once it has been made aware of the illegality, it acts in 
good faith to rectify the matter.”476 Moreover, once the operator has knowledge that it is making 
available works that have been illegally reproduced, if it does not take action to remove access to 
the work/s in question then “its conduct may be regarded as being intended to allow, expressly, the 
continuation of the illegal making available of that work and, hence, as an intentional action.”477 
Plainly, the Court in Stichting saw the role of a hosting service in the act of communicating to the 
public as requiring either actual or functional intent. In the absence of actual intent, functional intent 
may be found in cases where there is knowledge that an infringement is being communicated and 
no action to stop such communication is taken.  
 The definition of what constitutes a communication to the public provided in Stichting is 
therefore contradictory to the new use of the law in article 17 of the copyright directive. In fact, 
article 17 now imposes liability on legitimate online portals where the vast majority of content 
posted by their users is non-infringing and, in the cases of infringing content, the portals are 
typically “unaware that the work has been made available illegally.”478 Ultimately, what article 17 
does is remove the requirement of intent for hosting platforms described in Stichting from the 
communication to the public analysis, making it now a matter of strict liability.  
 
v. Failure to Address Current Industry Demands 
 
 While article 17 arguably looks to trends in digital copyright enforcement, as it is built 
around the notion of using copyright filtering technology as a gatekeeping tool, it fails to see the 
bigger picture with respect to this technology. As legislative reform concerning copyright in the 
digital era has been stagnant, content industries have been left to find their own solutions to 
infringements online. An analysis of the evolution of tolerated use and similar adopted programs 
 
476 Ibid. at 51 
477 Ibid. at 51 
478 Ibid.  
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illustrates a growing favour for pecuniary rights over exclusivity among content owners.479 Whether 
this emerging trend is a result of the impracticality of preventing users from publishing 
unauthorised uses of copyrighted works online or simply content owners preferring to establish new 
revenue streams from copyrights is difficult to tell. Yet, legislators have a responsibility to 
acknowledge this change in perception regarding copyright law. While legislation is needed to 
address the issues associated with unauthorised uses online, any legislation passed should expand 
on the industry norms rather than invalidate them. Here, that means finding ways to help content 
owners monetise low-value infringements efficiently- not preventing users from sharing the 
content. 
  There is an argument to be made that this is precisely the goal of Article 17. It is designed 
to force licensing arrangements which would both create revenue streams for content owners and 
facilitate use of their content by secondary creators online. However, the system, as it stands, is 
predatory and unfairly compensates both content owners and the hubs to which UGC is posted 
while leaving out secondary creators. Permission to use is an inadequate form of compensation 
when, in most cases, permission would not be required under the law. Moreover, for the cases 
where permission would be required, granting permission in exchange for 100% of the revenue 
resulting from the use is an unfair standard to set. The facilitation of licensing mechanisms is 
meaningless when the benefits of the license are one-sided.  
 The following chapter will discuss at length the evolution of tolerated use online and how it 
has morphed into a system where content owners take advantage of the vaguely defined borders of 
exceptions to infringement and their own financial power to force users into accepting unfair terms 
with respect to secondary uses. Article 17 is an extension of this practice whereby the law ignores 
the rights of amateur and small-time professional creativity to appease the wants of larger, more 
economically influential content owning corporations. Chapter seven will then illustrate the ideal 
way in which we can step away from this behaviour towards a system that acknowledges and 
 
479 This is discussed at length in Chapter 5 
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 Article 17 fails on many fronts. The European Parliament quieted public outrage by 
removing the express requirement of upload filters and incorporating a provision designed to 
protect existing rights. However, the law still functionally requires upload filters as they are the 
most efficient way to comply and it is unclear whether the provision designed to protect users rights 
will have any actual effect. The current available software is not only inadequate at addressing 
intricate aspects of copyright law but it regularly fails to simply identify copyrighted material in its 
database. As a result, the technology is far from sufficient to merit a compulsory adoption 
regulation. Furthermore, such a regulation would demonstrate absolute ignorance to the changing 
tides of perception towards copyright law and its function from both users and content owners alike. 
Both the online creative community480 and national governments481 have expressed concerns with 
the new European Directive and its implications. It is not a modernising piece of copyright 
legislation. It is, instead, a cash-grab by the content industry disguised by fear mongering. It is the 
newest iteration of the constantly failing “who can we sue?” status-quo.  
D. Comparison and Conclusions 
i. Focusing on Users’ Rights   
 
 These two pieces of legislation, while having the overarching goal of updating copyright 
law to function more efficiently in the digital world, have separate means of achieving this broad 
aspiration. Article 17 of the European Directive redefines the European right of communication to 
the public to force online content-sharing service providers to either negotiate licenses with 
 
480 Survey shows that 46% of streamers in UK concerned about article 13. See:  ‘46% Of UK Streamers Are Worried About Broadcasting Content In 
Light Of Article 13’ (influencerupdate.biz, 2020) <https://www.influencerupdate.biz/news/68115/46-of-uk-streamers-are-worried-about-
broadcasting-content-in-light-of-article-13/> accessed 21 May 2020 
481 See: ‘Poland challenges article 13’ (Theinquirer.net, 2020) <https://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/3076379/poland-vs-article-13> accessed 
21 May 2020 
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rightsholders or implement stronger policies to prevent infringements from being posted on their 
platforms. These policies must be, however, implemented and enforced with existing users’ rights 
in mind. Though, no expansion of those rights has been made. By comparison, the Copyright 
Modernisation Act in Canada expands and redefines users’ rights by granting carte blanche for 
secondary creativity as long as those expressions remain non-commercial.482 Key problems in the 
CMA arise from its inability to close the value gap for primary creators and diverting revenue from 
creators to online content hosting service providers.483 For the European Directive, the crucial issue 
is a fear of its implications for the diminution of users’ rights in practice as a side effect of its 
efforts to close the value gap for creators.484  
 In many respects, these two laws take opposing stances on the appropriate solution to the 
same problem. The Canadian approach envisions the expansion of users’ rights as a key component 
to aligning copyright law with the digital world while the European approach arguably constricts 
them. Ironically, the key criticisms of each opposing approach are rooted in their lack of ability to 
address the issues that the other seemingly tackles. More clearly, the European approach is touted 
for its predicted diminution of the value gap but has faced much criticism for its implied 
constriction of users’ rights. Likewise, the Canadian approach has been criticised for its part in 
increasing the value gap but praised for its expansion of users’ rights in the digital environment. Is 
it, therefore, simply impossible to solve both problems simultaneously?  
 
a. The Value Gap  
 
 The phrase “value gap” has become a buzzword in copyright discussion of late. It refers to 
the disparity in value generated by creative industries compared to compensation received by those 
same industries and their members. The increasing value gap is a two-fold problem. First, the 
dissemination of creative works requires an increasing number of intermediaries in the digital 
 
482 See: Copyright Modernisation Act Supra n. 405 
483 See: Chapter 5 B(v)  
484 See: Chapter 5 C(ii-vi) 
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space- each of whom claim a piece of the value pie. To give an example, in the music industry, the 
value of a single song’s stream will be split amongst multiple parties including the record label, the 
publisher, the performer, the songwriter and the streaming company. Second, and more important to 
the increasing value gap, the largest revenues from creative works are paid to the newest addition to 
these intermediaries- online service providers who host the digital spaces where creative content 
may be accessed. In some instances, like with music streaming services like Spotify and Apple 
Music, these intermediaries are forced to negotiate licenses with rightsholders in exchange for the 
use of their material. However, in the case of OCSSP’s like YouTube, who are protected by safe 
harbour provisions, the negotiation of licenses for rights is not a necessary element of their business 
models. Yet, in many ways YouTube functions much like a streaming service, except one supported 
by ad revenue instead of subscription fees and the negotiating power it receives from safe harbour 
provisions has lead to an overall decreased amount of revenue paid to content owners when their 
content is accessed on its platform. For content owners dealing with companies like YouTube, their 
options are to either negotiate on YouTube’s terms or fight the inevitable uploads of their content 
on the platform through the notice and takedown system. Thus content owners are forced between 
choosing the “rock” of spending money and time trying to (impotently) prevent that content from 
being uploaded and accessed or the “hard place” of foregoing the hardship and expense of online 
copyright enforcement at the price of being underpaid for access to their content. Both the European 
Directive and the Copyright Modernisation Act (more so in the suggestions from its five-year 
reviews) are concerned with narrowing the value gap. The value gap, like piracy, is a real problem 
for copyright law created largely by the internet. The European approach, heavily influenced by 
lobbying from the entertainment industry,485 is directly concerned with solving this problem while 
the Canadians are currently looking at how the Copyright Modernisation act has increased the value 
gap and, in many ways, looking to Europe for solutions. 
 
485 Dusollier, S., ‘The 2019 Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market: Some Progress, a Few Bad Choices, and an Overall Failed 
Ambition’ (2020) Common Market Law Review 57, 979-1030, pg.979 
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 The European approach to narrowing the value gap is simple. Forcing online content-
sharing service providers, like YouTube, to negotiate licenses with rights holders directly will result 
in both higher and more (in the cases where there are no mechanisms in place for rights holders to 
receive remuneration for communications of their works) revenue streams for primary creators. The 
directive is, in many ways, a tax on these online companies with the revenue directly diverted to 
rightsholders and will likely lead to increased revenue for them. 
 However, the European approach is decidedly one-sided and seeks to reform the law with 
only one party’s needs in mind- content owners. While users’ rights are acknowledged in the new 
law, they are treated as necessary obstacles in the protection of the rights of content owners. There 
is, however, a second value gap that goes largely undiscussed in copyright reform conversations. 
While the value paid versus value generated for creative content online has inarguably diminished, 
with respect to secondary creativity there is an even larger disparity. Secondary works of creativity 
nearly always result in no revenue streams for their authors when published online- even when 
those works are legitimately made under exceptions to infringement. This is because venues for 
posting this sort of content online either offer no means of revenue or divert the entirety of any 
revenue to the owner of the base copyrighted work. In rare cases where venues are created 
specifically for secondary authors to sell and profit from their works, like in the case of Kindle 
Worlds for fan fiction, the terms of the license offered are often predatory.486 New laws that seek to 
help authors get paid for uses of their works in the digital space cannot ignore the new generation of 
secondary creators in doing so.   
 
ii. Neither Solution is Ideal 
 
 Chapter Four of this thesis addressed the philosophical justifications for a system that more 
strongly promotes and protects users’ rights. Those points will not be remade here. The Canadian 
approach expands users rights infinitely within one sphere of creation- non-commercial works. The 
 
486 This will be discussed in depth in chapter 5.  
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European approach undermines users’ rights by making them a secondary priority compared to 
those of first authors. As stated before, copyright law should be a delicate balance between the 
rights of creators and the rights of users. Each law differs by focusing on opposing parts of this 
scale. However, a balance must be struck. Both parties’ rights should be accounted for. The CMA 
fails both users and creators in that its structure has not only failed to facilitate further financial 
exploitation for either party, but it has also diverted any potential revenue from the new works it 
promotes solely to non-creative third parties. The law can be seen as a win for the right of 
expression but a loss when viewed within the scope of the purpose of copyright law- the promotion 
of new works through economic incentives. The European Directive, though still in the theoretical 
stages as it has yet to be fully adopted and implemented by member states, is a win for primary 
creators as it will undoubtedly serve to diminish the value gap they have suffered. However, it is 
likely a loss for users as it will undoubtedly have censoring effects despite its provisions intended to 
prevent them. Moreover, it is a loss for online content distribution companies who play a pivotal 
role in the dissemination of largely legitimate content. They have become the unfortunate targets for 
compensation simply by virtue of their financial success and the industry’s inability to hold anyone 
else financially accountable for piracy in recent history. Neither solution is in fact a solution. They 
are both bandages strategically applied to separate wounds which, in turn, allow the neglected ones 
to continue to fester.  
 A true solution is needed- one that addresses each of the ailments copyright law faces 
caused by the digital world. A system designed to promote and facilitate licensing efforts by (often) 
low-value users who are typically ignored or priced out of traditional access would be an ideal way 
to ensure financial exploitation of works for primary creators (value gap issues) and create a healthy 
system of users' rights that more appropriately reflects the creative norms of the digital era. Such a 
system, however, is likely incompatible with many aspects of the dogmatic property-based system 
of copyright. Transitioning away from this model will be the key to successful copyright law in the 
age of the internet. The following chapter will discuss how, in the absence of meaningful 
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legislation, the private sector has begun to address these problems on its own and how these 
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V. Private Sector Solutions as Copyright’s Crutch: Creative 




 As the scope and boundaries of copyright law become less and less vivid in the wake of 
rapidly advancing technology, globalisation, and a shift in user expectations, solutions have not 
always come from legislation or court opinions. In fact, over the last decade, the private sector has 
had an enormous impact on the definitions of copyright law in practice through implementation and 
adoption of pseudo-law systems without the backing of legislation.  
 This chapter will discuss three modern alternatives to copyright law that have come about as 
proposed solutions to its problems. Each alternative sets out to solve a different set of problems 
imposed by the law. However, they are similar in that each solution is one that both operates outside 
the bounds of the law and is implemented at the discretion of content owners. The first force 
seeking to harmonise modern practices with the law is a movement known as the Creative 
Commons which was designed to counterbalance what its founders saw as a growingly intrusive 
copyright law system. Second, content owners sought to fill copyright law’s gaps with respect to 
user-generated content by creating pseudo-laws in the form of tolerated uses that arguably expand 
and restrict users’ rights under the law. Third, YouTube’s content ID system and related programs 
serve as a private enforcement mechanism for copyright-related disputes within the YouTube 
universe and other online communities. All of these solutions take advantage of the current 
ambiguity of the law in an attempt to satiate users, provide clarity, and redistribute control in a way 
that echoes the evolving paradigm in copyright law. When analysed together, these systems present 
three clear ideas. First, there is a disparity between copyright law as it is written and how those 
whom it regulates believe it should function which can be best described as a failure in the law. 
Second, where corporate entities have been given the freedom to reshape the law, they have done so 
in a way that favours themselves. Third, the main theme tying these three separate solutions 
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together is a trend of rights-holders favouring rights of remuneration and efficient means of 
enforcing those rights over exclusive control. These concepts, coupled with the issues in the law 
that have brought about the need for such private-sector solutions, demonstrate that perhaps the 
most equitable solution for all parties is a drastic redefinition of copyright law itself. This chapter 
will discuss the influence of these three systems on the law, how they benefit and degrade users’ 
rights, their immediate successes and failures, their long-term prospects as solutions and their 
implications for actual changes in copyright legislation.  
 
B. Creative Commons 
i. Introduction and the System 
 
 The Creative Commons in an American non-profit organisation founded in 2001 by a group 
of legal scholars, technologists, philanthropists, and entrepreneurs.487 The organisation is said to 
have a twofold objective.488 Its first aim is to “counteract the increasing protection of creative 
content by copyright.”489 The sense of “increasing protection” stems from the modern expansion of 
copyright rights granted in both duration and scope of protection. The Creative Commons views 
such expansions as “overreaching and detrimental both for future creators and for the users of 
copyrighted works.”490 There is a growing paradigm among creators of online works that embraces 
sharing and remix. However, Copyright law serves largely as a barrier to this process. To share or 
remix a work, under copyright law a license must first be obtained. The process of obtaining such a 
license is neither simple nor cheap. Susan Corbett noted that “the copyright or copyrights in many 
creative works is owned by large media corporations who require substantial royalty payments if 
indeed they will grant one at all.”491 Furthermore, before breaking through the barriers to obtain a 
 
487 ‘History, Creative Commons’ (2020) <https://creativecommons.org/about/history> accessed 21 May 2020 
488 Dusollier, S., ‘The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons v. Copyright.’ [2005-06] 29 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 
271, 271-2 
489 Ibid. at 272 
490 Ibid.  
491 Corbett, S., ‘Creative Commons Licenses, the Copyright Regime and the Online Community: Is There a Fatal Disconnect,’ (2011) Vol. 74, no. 4 
Modern Law Review, Pgs. 503-531. at 509  
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license from a content owner, one must determine who that owner is- a process that has become 
much more difficult in the age of internet publishing.492 Niva Elkin-Koren noted that: 
The barriers to access are thus effectuated by two separate aspects of copyright law: first the legal right to 
restrict access and to apply for injunction in case of unauthorised use, and, second, the information costs 
associated with securing a license. Creative Commons’ strategy accepts the first and focuses on the latter.493 
 
Therefore, the first goal of Creative Commons is to create a vessel whereby authors can easily 
bypass the modern restrictions of copyright law and make their works more readily available for the 
public to use. The second aim of the Creative Commons is to cure what it sees as copyright law’s 
tragic flaw- that it has become “an impediment to the creative process or the enjoyment of cultural 
resources, rather than as a necessary element of the creative process and access to artistic 
culture.”494 
 In its attempt to respond to these acknowledged problems in the law, the Creative Commons 
uses a licensing model that “instead of prohibiting the use of copyrighted works (the ‘all-rights-
reserved’ approach), purports to authorise the reproduction and dissemination of works, while also 
allowing the licensor to prohibit unwanted uses of her works (the ‘some-rights-reserved’ 
approach).495 In plainer terms, the Creative Commons is a system whereby authors may choose to 
forego some or all of the rights granted to them by copyright law for the sake of the greater good of 
the artistic community.  
 This process is manifested in the form of six legally-binding licenses that any author may 
choose to tag her work with. Each component of the license is represented by a symbol. When a 
work is given a Creative Commons license it will be symbolically tagged according to that license 
in the way that copyrighted works are tagged with the © symbol. Each license is worldwide, 
royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual (for the life of the copyright) and irrevocable (except under 
conditions of breach of contract). All rights not expressly granted by the licensor are considered 
 
492 Ibid.  
493 Elkin-Koren, N., ‘Exploring Creative Commons’ in Guibault, L. and Hugenholtz, P.B. (eds.) The Future of the Public Domain: Identifying the 
Commons in Information Law [2006] Hague: Kluwer, pg. 327   
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reserved. The licensee must include a copy of the license with every copy of the work she 
distributes.  
ii. Flaws in the System 
 
 The Creative Commons represents a manifestation of a growing paradigm in copyright law- 
that somehow the law must be attenuated for the benefit of the growing creative community. 
However, as an actual solution to the problem of copyright’s intrusion, the Creative Commons is a 
partial failure for two reasons. First, the creative commons has failed to reach mainstream adoption. 
Second, and more importantly, the Creative Commons operates within the confines of the law it 
criticises and uses its very tools. 
 To claim that the Creative Commons has failed to reach mainstream adoption is perhaps 
unfair. In fact, based on a survey of Google’s cache, it was estimated in 2014 that over 882 million 
works were published online using Creative Commons licenses.496 These numbers imply 
widespread adoption. However, the overwhelming majority of these works were published to 
amateur sites like Wikipedia, YouTube, Flikr, and DeviantART.497 While it appears that the values 
underpinning the Creative Commons system represent those of the majority, it is a powerless 
majority. These numbers, in fact, help to paint a clear picture of the structure of the content industry 
today. As most popular content is controlled by a few global corporations who have lead the way in 
lobbying for stricter copyright laws with longer terms, nearly a billion amateur works made in a 
span of 13 years represent the wants of the people- laws that support creative freedom. So, in one 
facet, the Creative Commons is a success in terms of adoption. However, as an optional system that 
is the antithesis of the laws corporate content owners have fought so hard to create, it will never 
reach full adoption. This notion brings us to the second, and most important, flaw of the Creative 
Commons system- the law within which it operates.  
 
496 'Cc-Archive/Stateofthe' (GitHub, 2020) <https://github.com/creativecommons/stateofthe/blob/master/data/notes.md> accessed 21 May 2020 
497 Ibid. 
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 The Creative Commons works within the confines of copyright law- the very system it 
argues is tragically flawed. Severine Dusollier aptly analogised the Creative Commons solution to 
Audre Lorde’s statement that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.”498 Niva 
Elkin-Koren also wrote that an alternative to the current copyright system can only come from a 
complete restructuring of the actual law- and that attempts to adapt it via the same tools that turned 
it into an unbalanced body of law are doomed from the start.499 However, Dusollier offers another 
viewpoint whereby the “master’s tools” might be able to bring down the “master’s house.” She 
posits that by using the very tools that have created this unbalanced law in an attempt to undermine 
it could have a parodic effect that alters the dialogue in such a way that changes the “social 
practices related to the spread of creative works” and could break the “constructive habit” of the 
“control/remuneration discourse that dominate[s] copyright discourse.”500 However, twelve years 
later, within the confines of a social movement with the power to effect real change, the Creative 
Commons has arguably failed. No meaningful legislation has been passed as a result of the 
revolution it sought to create and, despite its numbers, the movement has been relegated to that of 
an internet subculture of amateurs and academics. Meanwhile, the corporate content owners 
distributing the films, television shows, and music that people pay for continue to benefit from the 
archaic laws this movement arguably sought to dismantle.  
 Dusollier concluded by arguing that the Creative Commons “only addresses one side of the 
dialogue: that of the public opportunely transformed into consumers.”501 If the Creative Commons 
represents the public’s response to failings of Copyright, then Tolerated Use represents the 
opposing side- that of “(corporate) content owners.”502 
 
 
498 Dusollier (2005) Supra n.488 at 272  
499 Elkin-Koren, N., ‘A Public-Regarding Approach to Contracting over Copyrights,’ in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property. [2001] 
R.C. Dreyfuss, D. L. Zimmerman & H. First. Pg. 192 
500 Dusollier (2005) Supra n.488 at 285  
501 Ibid. at 293 
502 Ibid.  
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C. Tolerated Use: Then and Now 
 
 Derivative works, licensed and unlicensed, are common on the internet. As evidenced by the 
best seller and box office sensation, Fifty Shades of Grey, which began as Twilight fan fiction503, 
fan fiction is growing in popularity. Fan art, ranging from gallery-quality paintings to small t-shirt 
companies, are ubiquitous. Remixes and sampled music are more popular than ever, especially in 
hip-hop, rap, and electronic dance music.  
Many of these are technically infringing works, regardless of commercialisation. Although, 
some are either arguably a fair use or done through the arduous process of licensing. The law on fair 
use in America and its relative counterparts elsewhere are generally ambiguous with respect to user-
generated content at best and, at worst, criminalise these expressions. Tim Wu described this body 
of works ten years ago as “a giant grey zone in copyright, consisting of millions of usages that do 
not fall into a clear category but are often infringing.”504 Wu went on to note that “the critical aspect 
of this phenomenon are uses of works that are of a mass quantity and low value per transaction.”505 
With the exorbitant costs associated with defending against a copyright infringement action, 
especially in America, coupled with the low economic value of each individual work, there is little 
incentive for litigation. Therefore, there are very few recent judicial opinions on this body of works. 
Despite legal ambiguity and a perception of the law that favours content owners, these 
works remain ubiquitous. In an attempt to bolster relationships with fans and users while retaining 
firm control over copyright works, corporate content owners have taken advantage of the current 
legal climate and sought to establish pseudo-laws in the form of user-generated content policies. 
These “no-action policies,”506 a term coined by Wu as he suggested their inception over 10 years 
ago, serve as public statements by content owners outlining to users boundaries within which they 
 
503 Bertrand, N.’Fifty Shades of Grey’ started out as ‘Twilight’ fan fiction before becoming an international phenomenon’(Business Insider, 2015) 
<http://www.businessinsider.com/fifty-shades-of-grey-started-out-as-twilight-fan-fiction-2015-2> accessed 17 May 2021  
504 Wu, T., ‘Tolerated Use,’ (2007-2008) 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts. pg. 617 
505 Ibid.  
506 Ibid. at 633 
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may use copyrighted material to make new works. Whether these policies reflect the law as it would 
be interpreted by a judge is dubious at best, but they generally remain unchallenged. 
This section will show how tolerated use has evolved since Wu first wrote about it over ten 
years ago by examining a few of the more prevalent examples of these policies, how they affect 
users’ rights, and their potential conflicts with the law. 
 
i. Tolerated Use in 2007 
 
Wu first coined the term “tolerated use” in his 2007 paper of the same title. He defined it as 
“the contemporary spread of technically infringing, but nonetheless tolerated, use of copyrighted 
works.”507 Wu was writing in a time where our technological capabilities had just begun to surpass 
what was foreseen by the authors of copyright law. He noted that “as recently as the 1960s, it was 
very difficult to infringe the copyright law…[t]oday every man, woman, corporation and child has 
the technological ability to copy and distribute, and therefore to potentially infringe copyright…”508 
Wu noted that this newfound technological power given to users spawned a wave of infringements, 
and, from that, new ways of addressing those infringements outside of the scope of traditional 
categories of usage.509 Wu concluded, however, that there was a more perfect way to deal with 
these potential infringements given their ambiguity under the law.510 He suggested instead a system 
of “no-action” policies whereby content owners would describe to users those uses of the works that 
the owner will not enforce.”511 Wu envisioned a no-action policy as “a simple posting on the web or 
elsewhere that details the secondary uses of a work that a secondary author can make without 
gaining further permission of the owner.”512  
 
507 Ibid. at 617 
508 Ibid. at 618 
509 Ibid. at 619 
510 Ibid. at 633 
511 Ibid. 
512 Ibid.  
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Ten years later, content owners have taken Wu’s suggestion to heart and no-action policies 
are commonplace in the content world. In some jurisdictions where exceptions to infringement are 
limited, no-action policies represent the only saving grace for amateur creators seeking to make 
derivative works. However, in jurisdictions like the U.S. where fair use provides a much more 
broad set of rights to users, no-action policies are arguably at odds with the law. Wu addressed this 
point but dismissed the notion because “thanks to the inherent vagueness in the concept of fair use 
and the costs of litigation, the contours of fair use for casual infringement have not been- and may 
never be- well mapped out.”513  
The following sections will illustrate not only how no-action policies have come to life in 
the content industry but also how certain industries have gone steps further to fill gaps in copyright 
law. It will analyse the differing effects these no-action policies have on users’ rights based on 
jurisdiction and discuss the implications of the evolution of tolerated use for future copyright 
policy. 
 
ii. No-Action Policies 
 
 This section will outline how no-action policies are used in the real world, the forms they 
take, and their implications. 
 
a. Fan Fiction/Films 
 
 With fan-fiction being the quintessential body of work that has spawned the need for 
tolerated use programs, the worlds of books, film, and television are rife with such policies. 
Typically, they will vary from author to author (or studio to studio), though they come, generally, in 
one of three forms.   
 The first form is a Non-Commercial All Access approval. This is where authors have stated 
publicly that they will not enforce their copyright against fan-fiction authors who publish works 
 
513 Ibid. at 620 
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non-commercially. Neil Gaimon514, Jim Butcher515, and Stephanie Meyer516 are included in the 
large list of authors who support fan fiction in this context.  
 The second category is the Noncommercial with Exclusions approval. This includes authors 
who are willing to allow non-commercial publications of fan-fiction using their work with certain 
exceptions- most often pornographic interpretations. These authors include J.K. Rowling517 and 
Anne McCaffrey518.  
 The final category is one of No Tolerance for Any Publications. This category represents 
authors and publishers who view fan fiction as, categorically, a non-fair use infringement and will 
take legal action against any publication. Typically, authors in this category take this stance based 
on a belief that non-enforcement subjects their copyrights to risk of abandonment.519 However, 
some authors simply view fan fiction as morally wrong and upsetting.520 Whatever their reasons, 
some authors and publishing companies publicly disallow any publications of fan works based on 
their copyrighted works. A more prominent example of this in the United Kingdom is the Dr. Who 
franchise owned by the BBC.521 
b. Video Games  
 
Tolerated use policies are not exclusive to the literary and film worlds. As user-generated 
content and fan works concerning all forms of media have become ubiquitous, nearly every industry 
 
514 Fanlore.org (2018) ‘Professional Author Fanfic Policies – Fanlore’ <https://fanlore.org/wiki/Professional_Author_Fanfic_Policies#cite_ref-42> 
accessed 24 February 2018 
515 Ibid.  
516 Fanlore.org (2018) ‘Stephenie Meyer – Fanlore’ <https://fanlore.org/wiki/Stephenie_Meyer> accessed 24 Feruary  2018 
517 Waters, D., ‘Rowling backs Potter fan fiction’ (BBC News, 2018) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/3753001.stm> accessed 24 February 
2018 
518 McCaffrey, A., ‘Fan Fiction Rules – The Worlds of Anne McCaffrey’ (Pernhome, 2018) <http://pernhome.com/aim/anne-mccaffrey/fans/fan-
fiction-rules/> Accessed 24 Feb. 2018 
519 Laurel, K., Hamilton and George R. R. Martin. See: Fanlore.org. (2018). ‘Professional Author Fanfic Policies – Fanlore’ 
<https://fanlore.org/wiki/Professional_Author_Fanfic_Policies#cite_ref-42> accessed 24 Feb. 2018;  R.R. Martin, G., ‘Someone Is Angry On the 
Internet’ (Livejournal, 2018)  <https://grrm.livejournal.com/151914.html> accessed 24 February 2018 
520 Lynn Flewelling, S.L. Armstrong. See: Armstrong, S., ‘Fanfiction and Copyright’(2010)  
<https://slarmstrong.wordpress.com/2010/05/08/fanfiction-and-copyright/> accessed 24 Feb. 2018]. and Fanlore.org. (2018). ‘Lynn Flewelling – 
Fanlore’ <https://fanlore.org/wiki/Lynn_Flewelling#cite_note-nightrunner-1> accessed 24 February 2018  
521 BBC (2018) ‘Doctor Who - Frequently Asked Questions - BBC One’ 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/1mv1sSDySZXtn3Y3bsS4fPv/frequently-asked-questions> accessed 24 February 2018 
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has created policies of tolerated use in one form or another. The video game industry is a 
noteworthy example because video games have become a source of a multitude of legal issues with 
regards to user-generated content. As a result, tolerated use policies from the video game industry 
have become sophisticated and thorough. 
 Activision, the world’s first independent developer and distributor of video games for 
console systems has outlined its user-generated content policy in its terms of service. It states that 
users creating their own content from its games grant Activision a perpetual, worldwide, royalty 
free, non exclusive license to use, reproduce, or create derivative works from the UGC.522 
Activision takes the license a step farther and grants a similar license to all other users of the game 
once a player publicly posts her UGC.523 Thus, Activision acknowledges that copyright of UGC 
derived from its video games vests in the user-creator. This is a key difference from other policies 
that require no copyright registration be made for fan creations.524 Activision finishes by outlining 
types of UGC which it retains the right to terminate including harassing, abusive, sexually explicit 
or generally vulgar material.525 Insomniac games has similar provisions in its terms of service, but 
provides a clause that explicitly deems that the copyright for the UGC is owned by its creator. 
c. Video Games- Machinima 
 
 Another copyright issue associated with video games is the rising popularity of machinima- 
or using the engine of video game to create a film. Machinima film-makers play the video game in a 
way that brings life to their characters, all the while capturing the gameplay in a digital recording, 
edit that recording like film, and dub in dialogue and music. The final result is an animation-esque 
film made almost entirely from content within the video game. 
 Microsoft addresses machinima in its Game Content Usage Rules. In these rules, Microsoft 
states that it supports use of machinima for non-commercial purposes only.526 It does, however, 
 
522 ‘Terms of Use,’ Activision, <https://www.activision.com/legal/terms-of-use> accessed 31 March 2016 
523 Ibid. 
524 ‘Fan Production Guidelines' (2017) <https://intl.startrek.com/fan-films> accessed 31 May 2018 
525 Activision Supra n.522  
526 ‘Game Content Usage Rules,’ Xbox, <http://www.xbox.com/en-us/developers/rules> accessed 31 March 2016 
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have an explicit exception for ad-driven revenue from sites like YouTube.527 Blizzard, conversely, 
omits this exclusion for ad-driven revenue from the videos it allows.528 However, Blizzard states 
that “as long as the website that hosts your Production provides a free method to allow viewers to 
see the Production, Blizzard Entertainment will not object to your Production being hosted on that 
site.”529 Blizzard appears to be prohibiting machinima videos made from its games to be shown on 
subscription based or pay-to-view based websites or channels. It is possible, then, that machinima 
filmmakers would be within their rights to post their videos to youtube and receive ad-revenue from 
it. 
D. Tolerated Use and Users’ Rights- The Issues 
 
 Because copyright laws vary from nation to nation, understanding the effects of tolerated 
use policies on users’ rights requires a jurisdictional analysis. However, this analysis can be 
generalised into two categories: jurisdictions with fair use and jurisdictions without. This section 
will argue that, in jurisdictions without fair use, no action policies typically expand users’ rights 
whereas, in jurisdictions with fair use, no action policies arguably limit users’ rights.  
i. Jurisdictions Without Fair Use 
 
 The vast majority of the world live in jurisdictions that do not have “fair use” laws. Many 
countries, including the United Kingdom and most of its former colonies use a system of fair 
dealing while the rest of the world uses a system of enumerated exceptions to infringement that 
function similarly to fair dealing. These exceptions will vary from country to country. However, 
with respect to UGC, there are but a few exceptions that become applicable.  
 These relevant exceptions are for works made for private use, works that incidentally 
include material from other works, and works of parody, caricature, or pastiche. While each of these 
exceptions may have relevance to some forms of UGC, none of them nor their aggregation provides 
 
527 Ibid. 
528 ‘Video Policy,’ Blizzard, <http://eu.blizzard.com/en-gb/company/legal/videopolicy.html>  accessed 31 March 2016 
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any sense of comprehensive protection to user-creators. The private use exception offers no help to 
those who wish to share their works with others. Most works of user-generated content will rarely 
fall within the narrow threshold for incidental inclusion. Finally, parody, caricature and pastiche 
represent only a small fraction of the genres within which users are creating content. Therefore, 
generally, users who live in a jurisdiction without fair use often have little to no legal protections 
under the law for the creation of transformative derivatives.  
 In these jurisdictions, tolerated use policies become a saving grace. They expand the 
confines of the law and give users the opportunity to create in ways that they otherwise may not be 
entitled to.  
ii. Fair Use Jurisdictions 
 
 Fair use is an American legal concept, though it has been adopted in other jurisdictions like 
Israel and South Korea, and has been developed mostly through American case law. Therefore, this 
section will likewise focus primarily on tolerated use and the United States.  
 In the United States, tolerated use relies on legal ambiguity by filling in the gaps in ways 
that are seemingly compromises between creators and users rights. However, in many ways these 
policies arguably weaken users’ rights under the law and represent unnecessary compromises made 
by users. The policies, nevertheless, remain unchallenged because of the generally weak position 
users would face in litigation based on expenses.  
 There is little legal precedent to rely upon with regards to fair use and fan works/ user-
generated content. Moreover, the various holdings available are, in many ways, in conflict with 
each other.530 Cases like Prince v. Cariou, Campbell v. Acuff Rose, and Suntrust Bank set 
precedents for apparently strong user’s rights.531 However, they are undermined by others like 
Penguin Books,532 Bridgeport Music,533 and Axanar Productions.534 The law of fair use in the U.S. 
 
530 See: Chapter 1 F(ii)e 
531 See: Chapter 1F(ii)e 
532 See: Supra n. 190  
533 See: Supra n.Error! Bookmark not defined.180 
534 See: Supra n.349 See also: Chapter 1 F(ii)e  
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is, unquestionably, vaguely defined. However, the vaguely drawn borders of this legal construct and 
its partner, transformative use, result in leaving an argument to be made that most forms of user-
generated content could constitute a fair use and do not require the blessing of a no action policy.  
iii. Implications 
 
 Tolerated use policies, therefore, have very different meanings and implications depending 
on the jurisdiction in question. However, regardless of jurisdiction, tolerated use policies are the 
result of a critical failure in the law. There is an indisputable growing paradigm in the creative 
amateur communities that calls for the right to interact with copyrighted works- to transform them, 
remix them, and create derivatives as a means of new expression. Tolerated use programs address 
this paradigm in all jurisdictions. In those without fair use, where the law has almost no protections 
for users, tolerated use supplants the law. It represents the inability of legislators to adapt the law to 
a modern community- one type of failure in the law. In jurisdictions with fair use, where there are 
some provisions for a user’s right to make transformative derivatives but those provisions are 
poorly defined, tolerated use policies seek to clarify the law but do so in arguably predatory ways- 
another type of failure in the law. However, across all jurisdictions, the reality is that the law no 
longer governs this aspect of copyright but rather corporate policies. Nations of the free world do 
not allow private entities to govern in any other aspect and copyright law should not be the 
exception. It is the responsibility of lawmakers to take a stance. However, tolerated use is no longer 
simply a manipulation of inadequate or undefined legislation by content owners to control 
expression. It has evolved into a means to also monetise and profit from the expressions of others. 
E. Controlled Monetisation- The Future of Tolerated Use and Copyright Law  
 
 
 As the ubiquity of user-generated content has brought about policies of tolerated use in 
nearly every sector of the content industries, some industries have sought to take these policies a 
step further. Despite the fact that tolerated use policies were designed to target works that, by 
definition, are of low individual economic value, content owners have begun to adapt policies in 
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attempts to find ways to monetise aggregate bodies of these works for themselves. For example, 
where the damages from one fan fiction author for her infringements are minuscule, the aggregate 
value of, say, all fan fiction is substantial. Therefore, content owners have now begun to look for 
ways to, under controlled settings, monetise these works for themselves and the authors they 
represent by creating hubs within which user-authors may publish and sometimes sell their fan-
works legally. These regimes display a user-friendly facade when in reality they are often contracts 
of adhesion that require users to pay exorbitant licenses for works that, as discussed earlier, may not 
actually require one. However, these programs are in the early stages of development and may, in 
fact, represent the next step in the evolution of copyright law. This section will describe examples 
of the early-stage evolution of the future of tolerated use, how it degrades the rights of users, and its 
implications for changes in copyright law itself.  
 
i. Amazon Kindle Worlds- A Licensing Scheme for Fan Fiction in the U.S. 
 
 With its creation of the Kindle Worlds section of its massive online distribution network, 
Amazon has enabled fan fiction authors to easily monetise their works. Moreover, they’ve done so 
in a way that also makes it legal and simple. Amazon has done this by licensing content from 
various owners that are relevant to fan fiction authors.535 Amazon then allows fan fiction writers to 
write whatever they would like (within its guidelines) concerning the “worlds” it has licensed.536 
Amazon reviews the submitted fan fiction to ensure that it complies wih its licensing agreements 
before publishing it.537  
 
 
535 See: ‘Kindle Worlds,’ Amazon, <http://www.amazon.com/gp/feature.html?docId=1001197421> accessed 31 March 2016 (Amazon Publishing 
has secured licenses from Warner Bros. Television Group's Alloy Entertainment for Gossip Girl, Pretty Little Liars, and The Vampire Diaries; 
Valiant Entertainment for Archer & Armstrong, Bloodshot, Harbinger, Shadowman, and X-O Manowar; Hugh Howey's Silo Saga; Barry Eisler's John 
Rain novels; Blake Crouch's Wayward Pines series; and The Foreworld Saga by Neal Stephenson, Greg Bear, Mark Teppo, Eric Bear, Joseph 
Brassey, Nicole Galland, and Cooper Moo)  
536 ‘Content Guidelines and Review Process,’ Kindle Worlds, <https://kindleworlds.amazon.com/faqs?topicId=A2W2IF5J2WZDKT> accessed 31 
March 2016 
537 Ibid.  
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 While this program marks a giant leap in advancing fan fiction, it has its downfalls. First, 
the “worlds” Amazon has licensed are extremely limited.538 Second, even amongst the “worlds” 
Amazon has secured licenses for fans to write about, crossover and hybrid stories are not permitted 
across “worlds.” It is likely that fan fiction authors will find limitations like this too constraining as 
the very point of fan fiction seems to be unfettered exploration. However, there is no other company 
offering a legitimate way to publish monetised fan fiction as of now and Amazon’s program is in its 
early stages of development.  
 Legally, the Kindle Worlds program represents a potentially unnecessary bargain for fan 
fiction authors- and a costly one at that. The licensing scheme relies on the claim that using 
another’s work for commercial purposes is an illegal infringement. However, under U.S. law this is 
not necessarily so. Works that are sufficiently transformative will be deemed fair uses despite 
monetisation.539 However, the policy relies on the ambiguity created by conflicting case law such as 
Axanar and Cariou to substantiate this claim.540 Furthermore, the cost of the license represents the 
metaphorical “arm and a leg” that an author must pay to have her work posted. First, by posting a 
work to Kindle Worlds, an author grants an exclusive license to all original elements of that work to 
Amazon.541 Therefore, all future publications of any sort that make use of such original elements 
will be an infringement unless done so through Amazon’s channels- including publications by its 
author. Furthermore, Amazon will retain the right to other derivations of the author’s work such as 
film and television licenses.542 Moreover, the actual cost of the license is expensive. Fan authors in 
the Kindle Worlds scheme will be paid 20-35% of net revenue from their works as royalties.543 
While ebook royalties vary, the authors guild recently wrote that a 50/50 split between author and 
 
538 See: Campbell Supra n.149; Cariou Supra n.174 
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publisher are the fair terms for e-publications.544 With a rightful share of 50% of sales in mind for a 
digital author, and at only 20-35% actually paid, the fan author is essentially paying 30-60% of her 
own share to license the work she builds upon. Comparatively, when using the established 
mechanical license programs under United States copyright law for a cover song, musicians pay far 
less for their license. An artist will make between $.57 and $.74 per digital download of a song.545 
Of that, $.091 will need to be paid for the license.546 Therefore, the artist will be paying between 
12% and 16% of her share for the right to license the musical composition. Thus, in this budding 
and unregulated market of fan fiction, we see prices set at 2-5 times higher than the closest 
government-established parallel. 
 The Kindle Worlds program was cast from the same mould as traditional tolerated use. It 
relies on ambiguity in the relevant statutory and case law to craft a predatory policy that will go 
unchallenged based on the poor position any potential challenger would face coupled with the 
uncertainty of legal outcome. The only difference is that Kindle Worlds creates actual revenue for 
content owners- both direct and indirect. Kindle Worlds, however, is not the only program of its 
kind.  
 
ii. Video Games- Modding  
 
 In a world where games are easily modified by enthusiastic players from their own laptop 
computers and then may be quickly disseminated across the globe, gaming companies have had to 
adapt their strategies. In the gaming industry, there is an across-the-board acknowledgement that 
UGC represents (typically) an original creation that merits individual copyright protection vesting 
in its author. However, development companies protect themselves by granting themselves non-
exclusive rights in the content. Furthermore, many companies are finding ways to monetise these 
 
544 The Authors Guild (2015). ‘Half of Net Proceeds Is the Fair Royalty Rate for E-Books’ <https://www.authorsguild.org/industry-advocacy/half-
of-net-proceeds-is-the-fair-royalty-rate-for-e-books/> accessed 31 May 2018 
545 ‘How much do music artists earn online’ (2020) <https://informationisbeautiful.net/2010/how-much-do-music-artists-earn-online/> accessed 21 
May 2020 
546 Assuming the song is less than 5 minutes in length. (Copyright.gov, 2020) <https://copyright.gov/licensing/m200a.pdf> accessed 21 May 2020 
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consumer-created contributions both for themselves and users in ways analogous to the Kindle 
Worlds scheme. This process likewise represents a compromise that appeases both sides as the 
users are free to continue creating mods and profit from them, but the development companies 
retain their pecuniary rights in the copyrighted elements of the games that inspire these mods. 
 Daybreak Games, the developer for the wildly popular massive multiplayer online role 
playing game, Everquest, has recently launched its Player Studio.547 The Player Studio is essentially 
a marketplace for gamers to create and sell items to be used in the game.548 Players are able to 
create their own items, upload them to the marketplace (after Daybreak approves them) and sell 
them. Daybreak then pays the players 40% of the sale price.549  
 Valve Games owns Steam, an online distribution platform that represents how the majority 
of computer gamers purchase their games.550 After embracing modding as a policy, the company 
sought to use Steam as a way for fans to monetise their creations. Valve announced in 2015 that it 
was releasing a platform for modders to sell their mods on Steam.551 Valve had experimented with a 
program similar to Daybreak’s Player Studio that allowed users to sell their cosmetic item mods for 
the games Team Fortress 2 and Dota 2 in 2011.552 The program was considered a huge success as it 
paid out $57 million to content creators in the community over four years from 2011 to 2015.553 
However, Valve’s experiment with a mod marketplace was less successful and shortly after its trial 
phase began it was shut down. Yet, two years later, Valve is continuing to pursue ways to 
compensate modders. In a recent interview, Valve president, Gabe Newell, described the positive 
 
547 ‘Player Studio,’ Daybreak, <https://player-studio.daybreakgames.com> accesed 31 March  2016  
548 Ibid.  
549 Ibid.  
550 Maibergh, E., ‘Whoa, Valve Just Monetized Mods’ (Vice, 2015) <https://www.vice.com/en/article/jp5n4p/whoa-valve-just-monetized-mods> 
accessed 16 May 2021 
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effect modding has on the game development industry by illuminating the aspects of games that 
fans appreciate and want to be further explored and those they find uninteresting.554  
 In the Summer of 2017, Bethesda games launched its solution- the Creation Club- an online 
marketplace for professionally-built in-game content. Noting Valve’s failure with monetising 
modded content but wanting to solve the issue of a high demand for in-game add ons and 
modifications, Bethesda created this unique program. Amateur developers can apply to become part 
of the scheme whereby they will work as Bethesda contractors to create high quality add-on 
content. On its website, Bethesda states the Creation Club is not a system for paid mods, noting that 
“Mods will remain a free and open system where anyone can create and share what they’d like” but 
that CC content will be developed in the same professional manner that all other Bethesda content 
is- albeit with the help of some outside contractors under the supervision of internal developers.555 
 By creating distribution and monetisation methods for mods and other forms of user-
generated content, gaming companies have conceded that content editors and creators within the 
games own at least a share of the rights to their creations. In the video game world, there is no way 
to distribute in-game items or modded versions of a video game without directly interacting with 
the game’s source code. However in the literary world such barriers do not exist. Therefore, the 
arguable difference between video game monetisation platforms and the Kindle Worlds program is 
that video game companies have created this market whereas Kindle Worlds has attempted to 
monopolise an already existing one. Furthermore, the general consensus in the game-development 
community is an appreciation of amateur mods on a non-commercial basis while monetisation 
attempts have been pursued only to supply users with higher-quality content- not to try and squeeze 
a profit from an amateur community comprised entirely of its fans. However, despite being a more 
user-friendly system of controlled monetisation, the system echoes the desire to monetise the, 
previously thought to be, unmonetisable and represents an extension of tolerated use. 
 
554 Lahti, E., ‘Valve: Modders 'absolutely' need to be paid’ (PC Gamer, 2016) <http://www.pcgamer.com/valve-modders-absolutely-need-to-be-
paid/> accessed 31 May 2018 
555 ‘Creation Club,’ (Bethesda, 2017) <https://creationclub.bethesda.net/en> accessed 31 May 2018 
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iii. The BBC’s Mission Dalek and Crowdsourcing Content from Fans 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the BBC has taken a harsh stance when it comes to fan fiction for one 
of its proudest franchises, Dr. Who. On its website, the BBC tells fans “you are welcome to write 
Doctor Who fiction for your own enjoyment, we should remind you that it is not permitted for you 
to publish this work either in print or online.” This policy echoes current U.K. law by 
acknowledging that private use is allowed but refuses to condone even non-commercial amateur 
publications. As it stands, this is less of a no-action policy and more of a reiteration of copyright 
law in general. However, the BBC has begun to pivot from this position in two ways. First, in 2015, 
the BBC created a competition for fans to create stories with Peter Capaldi’s twelfth Doctor using 
provided materials and/or original content.556 Second, in 2017, the BBC launched a space where 
fans can legally post Dr. Who fan fiction- with some key conditions.557  
 The competition known as “Mission Dalek” was part of BBC’s “Make it Digital” campaign 
which was designed at encouraging amateurs to experiment with coding and digital technologies.558 
Fans were provided materials in the form of video clips and images that they could use to create a 
story but were also encouraged to create their own content as well.559 While the competition was 
likely designed as a way to promote digital technology education and fan relationships, it set the 
tone for the BBC’s new Dr. Who fan site that appears to be nothing more than a way to 
crowdsource content ideas from fans for free.  
 In 2017, the BBC launched its official Fan Fiction Site.560 The site represents the only legal 
outlet that fans have to publish their Dr. Who fan fiction and, like other examples of controlled 
 
556 Kamen, M.. ‘BBC wants your Doctor Who fanfic and fan films’ (Wired, 2015) <http://www.wired.co.uk/article/doctor-who-digital-content-
competition> accessed 31 May 2018 
557 Doctor Who (2017) ‘Doctor Who Fan Fiction: Your Chance to get Involved!’ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/doctorwho/entries/108b4bf0-ffe8-
4bab-ab25-a3f2438999ab> accessed 31 May 2018 
558 Kamen, M., ‘BBC wants your Doctor Who fanfic and fan films’ (Wired, 2015) <http://www.wired.co.uk/article/doctor-who-digital-content-
competition> accessed 31 May 2018 
559 Ibid.  
560 Doctor Who Supra n.557 
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monetisation, uses a facade of user-friendliness to exploit amateur creations. The site is designed to 
promote fan engagement by stating that it will feature advice from the show’s lead writer and offers 
basic advice on how to structure a well-written Dr. Who story.561 However, a close look at the terms 
of participation reveal what is perhaps the true motive behind the program- crowdsourcing ideas for 
new content. Based on the Copyright policies, authors retain the rights to their original creation, but 
grant the BBC the right to “use it at any time and for any purpose.”562 The policy offers the 
reassurance that the BBC will not use user’s creations in the show without written permission.563 
Regardless, the BBC has essentially created a portal whereby it can collect fresh ideas for its 
content created by its own fans without having to suffer from the traditional legal implications of 
hearing story ideas from outsiders and, more importantly, without having to pay for it.  
 This program, like the others discussed before it, notes a shift in viewing the economic value 
of fan works from that of individually low value pieces to an aggregate body of works that has 
economic value to be exploited. In the Kindle Worlds and various video games examples, the 
monetisation was direct. Content owners were providing essentially marketplaces for fans to sell 
their derivatives and taking a portion of the revenue. Here, the monetisation is indirect. There is no 




 Copyright law across the globe is founded on systems of exclusive rights. Authors extract 
value from their creations by exploiting these exclusive rights granted to them under the law. 
Traditionally, being the only person able to sell, copy, and adapt a work has been a successful way 
to ensure that authors are justly compensated for their works and thereby motivated to create new 
ones. However, the internet has fostered a community where exclusive rights have begun to mean 
very little because of the inability of authors to adequately police unauthorised uses. In the 1700s or 
 
561 Ibid. 
562 ‘Mixital Terms,’ (Mixital.co.uk., 2017)<https://www.mixital.co.uk/terms> accessed 31 May 2018 
563 Ibid.  
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even the 1980s, if someone was publishing your novel without permission, the legal process of 
suing, barring the publication, and recovering damages was comparatively simple. However, in 
today’s world, where infringing works on the internet are taken down and subsequently reposted 
elsewhere within seconds, an author that wishes to enforce her exclusive rights to the full extent of 
the law will likely find herself playing an endless game of whack-a-mole that costs more money 
than she could ever hope to recover. Thus we see an evolution in authors’ values that has 
manifested itself in these tolerated use policies. Accepting that fighting mild or potential 
infringements is time-consuming, expensive, and futile, content owners have begun to abandon 
fighting unauthorised uses of their works in favour of simply trying to extract some sort of value 
from those uses.  
 Early tolerated use was largely about the idea of indirect value. Allowing infringements of 
low economic value saved money from expensive litigation, bought goodwill from one’s fanbase, 
and allowed communities to advertise and market one’s content for free. While no royalties were 
being collected, value was gained. However, as technology has become more efficient and “micro-
transactions” has become a buzzword in the content industry, content owners are less satisfied with 
indirect value and are testing programs to create direct value as well- controlled monetisation 
schemes. Furthermore, content owners are expanding the notion of indirect value from free 
advertising to essentially free labour. While the evolution is noteworthy, the core concept remains 
the same. Authors in the post-internet world are more concerned with extracting value from 
unauthorised uses than excluding them. In legal terms, they prefer their pecuniary rights over their 
rights of exclusivity. This notion and the way in which it has manifested itself, however, is 
completely at odds with the current copyright system that is based on creating value for authors by 
granting them exclusive rights that are enforceable in courts of law. Furthermore, in practice, 
current licensing rates in these unregulated markets are far higher than those seen in comparable 
compulsory licenses. Such practice indicates predatory behaviour. Perhaps, then, it is time the law 
was changed to not only reflect those values but also to protect users’ rights.  
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 A close look at how copyright law with concern to user-generated content is actually 
functioning in the world today indicates that authors are more concerned with finding efficient 
means of compensation for uses of their works than they are with the power to prevent those uses. 
As technology and the internet have created a threat to authors well-being by providing a venue for 
infringements to be published with little options for recourse, it also provides a solution in the form 
of efficient means to track and monetise those very unauthorised publications. If the evolution of 
tolerated use illuminates problems with copyright law’s place in the modern world, YouTube’s 
Content ID offers the solution.  
F. YouTube’s Content ID and Copyright Match Tool 
 
 YouTube is the undisputed mega-hub for user-generated content on the internet. The 
website has over one billion active users with approximately one billion hours of footage watched 
daily.564 This content is a healthy mix of original amateur content, professional content, remixed 
amateur content, and pirated material. As an American company, YouTube falls within the safe 
harbour provisions of the DMCA as long as complies with provisions under the act for notice and 
take down procedures.565 However, YouTube has gone beyond its responsibility under the law by 
implementing a system of software based copyright tools to enable content owners to deal with 
infringements in a more efficient way. These tools are its proprietary Content ID software and its 
newly released Copyright Match Tool. These pieces of software use digital fingerprinting 
technology to notify content owners of infringing uses of their material that have been uploaded to 
YouTube. The Content ID system is automated via a series of if-then hypotheticals that determine 
how to deal with an infringing upload. The options include removal, monetisation, and tolerance. 
The Copyright Match tool works in a similar fashion but instead of relying on an outside database 
provided by professional organisations to find matches, it searches within YouTube’s own database 
of content. Therefore, this tool is aimed at allowing creators on YouTube to know when, where, by 
 
564  ‘Press – YouTube,’ (Youtube.com., 2018). <https://www.youtube.com/intl/en-GB/yt/about/press/> accessed 31 May 2018 
565 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 
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whom, and in what portions, their content is being re-used or re-posted.566 As opposed to the 
automated nature of Content ID, users are only notified of potentially infringing uses and must then 
take some sort of affirmative action against them. The options under the Copyright Match tool are 
to message the infringer, report the infringement, or allow it.567 The Content ID system is a tool for 
massive professional organisations such as record labels and film and television studios whereas the 
Copyright Match tool is designed to provide similar protections to the large amateur and pseudo-
professional community of YouTube creatives. While the Copyright Match Tool is still in its early 
stages and is yet to be released to all creators, the Content ID system has been around for years and 
has faced both applause and criticism from the academic and professional communities. This 
section will explore those praises and criticisms, look at academic suggestions for changes in the 
software, and analyse the implications of both these software systems for potential changes to 
copyright law.  
 
i. Flaws  
 
 These systems were designed to police copyright infringements on YouTube in a way that 
better satisfies content owners than requirements under the DMCA and other similar legislation 
elsewhere in the world. As a result, YouTube has payed out over two billion U.S. dollars to partners 
in the music industry alone through its Content ID program since its inception.568 However, these 
programs serve to enforce copyright law without any sort of government or legal backing. 
Moreover, they do so through computer analysis with little to no human element involved. Non-
legal bodies enforcing the law creates issues but those issues are multiplied when it is, in fact, a 
computer doing the enforcement. The largest among these problems created by non-human analysis 
are false positives and the failure the adequately address fair use, other exceptions to infringement, 
 
566 'Copyright Match Tool - Youtube Help' (Support.google.com) <https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/7648743?hl=en-GB> accessed 20 
August 2020 
567 Ibid.  
568 Resnikoff, P., ‘YouTube: 99.5% of All Infringing Music Videos Resolved by Content ID.’ (Digital Music News, 2016) 
<https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2016/08/08/copyright-problems-resolved-content-id/> accessed 31 May 2018 
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and tolerated uses. Moreover, the system compounds on its faults by lacking a legitimate appeal 
process with third-party review and unjustly enriches content owners who choose to monetise the 
videos through its royalty scheme.  
 
a. False Positives and Exceptions to Infringement  
 
 As an automated system controlled by computers, false positives and the failure to address 
exceptions to infringement are the obvious downside to the Content ID system. The software has 
not only issued reports for music in the public domain,569 but also fails to address uses that are 
legally fair570 or would otherwise be tolerated.571 In the United States, following a ruling in Lenz v. 
Universal Music, a content owner must consider fair use before issuing a take-down notice under 
the DMCA.572 The Ninth Circuit stated that while the analysis need not be prohibitively extensive 
to satisfy this burden, mere “lip service” to fair use would not suffice.573 Fair use requires a four 
factor balancing test that the Content ID software is incapable of replicating even on a superficial 
level. Yet, the Content ID software is given the authority to block videos published to YouTube in 
the same way as a DMCA take-down notice. While fair use is not the global norm, similar systems 
of exceptions to infringement require equally complicated analyses that the Content ID software 




569 Morran, C., ‘YouTube's Content ID System Will Take Away Your Money If You Dare Sing "Silent Night,”' (Consumerist,  2013) 
https://consumerist.com/2013/12/26/youtubes-content-id-system-will-take-away-your-money-if-you-dare-sing-silent-night/ accessed 31 May 2018 
570 Cushing, T., ‘YouTube Kills Livestream of Convention When Audience Starts Singing ‘Happy Birthday’ (TechDirt, 2013) 
<https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131014/15323524876/youtube-kills-%20livestream-convention-when-audience-starts-singing-happy-
birthdayshtml>  accessed 16 May 2021 
571 See: Higgins, P.,  ‘Mars Landing Videos, and Other Casualties of the Robot Wars,’ (EFF, 2012) <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 201 2/08/mars-
landing-videos-and-other-casualties-robot- wars> (Where Content ID prevented thousands from seeing NASA’s mission to Mars). See also: 
Fitzgerald, B., ‘YouTube Pulls Michelle Obama's Democratic National Convention Speech In 'Error,’ (Huffington Post, 2012) 
<http:/lwww.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/05/youtube-pulls-michelle-obama- speechn 1857708.html> (Where Michelle Obama’s Democratic 
National Convention Speech was blocked). 
572 ‘Dispute a Content ID Claim,’ YouTube, <https://support.google.com/youtube /answer/2797454> 
573 Lenz Supra n. 229  
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b. Higher Transaction Costs and Lack of Tolerated Use Provisions 
 
 Not only is Content ID incapable of addressing complicated fair use analyses, it also fails to 
efficiently deal with content that has been previously licensed or is publicly tolerated. As described 
earlier, content owners will often make public statements about types of uses that they consider 
tolerable and will not pursue litigation against. Users are generally free to use unlicensed content 
within the scope of these guidelines without fear of legal repercussions. However, because Content 
ID was designed to be automatic, it “took the owner’s choice of how to use their rights away from 
them.”574 Therefore, when Content ID flags a video, not only is there no consideration as to whether 
that video may fall under a stated policy of tolerated use, but there is also no consideration as to 
whether the video was licensed through formal channels.575 This system, while in theory was 
designed to be more efficient, has created many problems for content owners whose fans barrage 
them with complaints that their videos which fall under tolerated use guidelines have been removed 
or monetised.576 
c. Unfair Royalties Splits and Unjust Enrichment  
 
 Regardless of fair or tolerated use considerations, Content ID nearly always unjustly 
enriches the content owners.577 Under U.S. copyright law, claimants are only able to recover profits 
from an infringer that are attributable to the infringing work.578 The law seeks to strike a “balance 
between deterring infringing content and promoting creative uses of content.”579 However, under 
the current system in place via Content ID, content holders are not limited to profits that are 
attributable to their own content but rather receive all profits (minus a share payed to YouTube). 
 
574 Boroughf, B., 'The Next Great Youtube: Improving Content ID to Foster Creativity, Cooperation, and Fair Compensation' (2015) 25 Alb LJ Sci 
and Tech 95, pg. 110 
575 Ibid.  
576 Ibid. 
577 Ibid. at 112  
578 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012); see also Walker v. Forbes, Inc., 28 F.3d 409, 415 (4th Cir. 1994) (sating that profits a plaintiff "receives under the 
Copyright Act are those attributable to the use of the infringed work").  
579 Boroughf (2015) Supra n. 574 at 112. citing Galavis, A., 'Reconciling the Second and Ninth Circuit Approaches to Copyright Preemption: A 
Universal System Is Paramount to the Protection of Idea Purveyors’ Rights,’ (2013) 19 Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law 157, 
184-85 
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This system thereby deprives users of the right to profit from their own contributions. Boroughs 
aptly analogised this system to the equivalent of a poet being able to claim all the revenue from an 
unlicensed book of poetry that only included one of her poems.580  
 
d. Lack of a Fair System of Review 
 
 As a software system designed to enforce copyright law, Content ID lacks the most 
important aspect of traditional copyright law enforcement- judicial or, at least, third party review. 
While Content ID is not entirely automatic and does offer an appeal process,581 that process is 
judged entirely by the content owner. Therefore, while the poster of a flagged video will have the 
right to appeal the flag based on fair use or permission, the one hearing and judging that appeal will 
be the very party who, theoretically, filed the complaint. Unlike a court of law where an unbiased 
judge will make a decision on infringement, in the world of Content ID "the claimant and the 
claimant alone reviews and either accepts or rejects the dispute.”582 If the appeals process fails, 
users do have the right to file a Counter Notification which constitutes a legal action to have 
YouTube reinstate a video that has been improperly removed.583 However, it appears this action is 
only available for videos that have been removed and may be unavailable for those videos that have 
been simply monetised for the content owner.584 The only other check on the power granted to 
content holders is YouTube’s ability to disable Content ID access or terminate partnerships with 
those who “repeatedly make erroneous claims.”585  
 
580 Ibid.  
581 Support.google.com. (2018) ‘Dispute a Content ID claim - YouTube Help.’ <https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797454?hl=en-
GB&ref_topic=2778545> accessed 31 May 2018 
582 Boroughf (2015) n. 812 at 109. Citing : Wilke, N., ‘Copyright Kings Are Judge, Jury and Executioner on YouTube’,(Wired, 2012) 
<http://www.wired.comfbusiness/ 201202/opinion-baiodmcayoutube> (describing an instance in which a claimant was given full authority alone to 
review a copyright claim)  
583 ‘Counter Notification Basics - YouTube Help’  (Support.google.com, 2018) <https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2807684?hl=en-
GB&ref_topic=2778545> accessed 31 May 2018 
584 Ibid.  
585 ‘How Content ID Works,’ YouTube, <https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en-GB> accessed 16 May 2021  
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 While Content ID is a software system designed to mimic the functions of the copyright 





 Despite its criticisms, Content ID has remained intact. While some, like Boroughs, have 
offered suggestions to restructure the system586 to reflect a more balanced and fair approach to 
automating copyright law, that is beyond the scope of this paper. I am more interested in the 
implications this system has for the future of copyright law itself. YouTube’s Content ID software 
establishes a semi-successful model for using computer software to police the web for 
infringements. Nicholas DeLisa, in fact, argued that this software has paved the way for a 
compulsory synchronisation license for user-generated content on other platforms.587 However, an 
important aspect of Content ID to note is that, like modern tolerated use schemes, the Content ID 
system represents a trend of content owners to favour their pecuniary rights over their rights to 
exclusivity. This is evidenced largely by the fact that over 90% of all claims handled by the Content 
ID software result in monetisation, not takedown.588 This significant figure indicates that, in a space 
where the process of licensing is efficient, rights-holders vastly prefer new revenue streams over 
exclusivity. Furthermore, Content ID serves to demonstrate that there is a viable alternative to the 
rights-based approach for Copyright law in the digital world. Monetisation is possible, even for 
works that were originally perceived to be of too low economic value to bother with.  
 However, the current flaws of the system are glaring. The lack of provisions to protect 
users’ rights are unacceptable from accommodating fair uses to offering a share of royalties for 
 
586 Boroughf (2015) n. 812 at 114-122 
587 DeLisa, N.T., ‘You(Tube), Me, and Content ID: Paving the Way for Compulsory Synchronization Licensing on User-Generated Content 
Platforms,’ (2016) 81 Brook. L. Rev. 1275 
588 ‘Creator Academy,’ (Youtube, 2018). <https://creatoracademy.youtube.com/page/lesson/cid-optimize?hl=en-GB#strategies-zippy-link-1> 
accessed 31 May 2018 
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partial or transformative uses. The model, as it stands, is imperfect. Yet, when it is viewed as a 
prototype, or a blueprint for something much larger, it is more acceptable.  
G. Conclusions 
 
 The existence of the programs discussed in this article, Creative Commons, tolerated use 
and its progeny of controlled monetisation schemes, and Content ID, demonstrate that copyright 
law is no longer an efficient facilitator for creatives. It is an inhibitor. The law, as it stands, appears 
to get in the way more often than it solves problems. In jurisdictions without fair use, the law is 
overly constrictive. Conversely, in fair use jurisdictions, the law is overly broad and ambiguous to a 
point that it is unpredictable. Each legal system, therefore, has created a climate whereby the private 
sector has been given the ability to step forward and restructure the law in a way that suits it. As a 
result, the policies that spawned from this movement unabashedly favour content owners to a 
borderline predatory extent. While the last 10 years have seen a surge in no action policies in the 
wake of Wu’s influential paper, I predict that the coming decade will represent a shift where content 
owners opt out of these policies in favour of creating discreet hubs encouraging UGC that use terms 
and conditions to exploit the works for financial gain. The new tolerated use is not one of freedom 
of expression or even free advertising. It is one of micro-transactions and unpaid labour. Nicholas 
Carr first referred to this technique of monetising “free labor” as “digital sharecropping” in 2006: 
“Web 2.0 provides an incredibly efficient mechanism to harvest the economic value of the free 
labor provided by the very, very many and concentrate it into the hands of the very, very few.”589 
However, in rejecting this current budding system, I argue that copyright law itself can use it as a 
model for a new system that is equitable for all.  
 Ultimately, most tolerated use policies represent corporate vigilantism and exist only 
because of weaknesses in the law. While, at face value, many policies are tolerant and even 
supportive of users rights, just as many take advantage of the poor position users face under the law 
 
589 Carr N., ‘Digital sharecropping’ (Roughtype, 2006). <http://www.roughtype.com/?p=634> accessed 17 May 2021 
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and exploit it. The best solution is to absolve the need for such provisions by clarifying and or 
fixing the law at the legislative level. The inherent problem with Content ID, tolerated use, and the 
Creative Commons lies at their core- the law within which they operate. It is clear that an 
appropriate solution cannot come from a pseudo-legal crutch that props the law up into the modern 
era. The law, itself, must be changed. But how?  
 The world we live in today is drastically different from the world in which copyright laws 
were imagined. Likewise, perhaps an equally drastic change to copyright law is needed to 
modernise it. The previous analysis of the evolution of tolerated use demonstrates a movement that 
values economic rights over exclusivity. Content owners are more concerned with extracting extra 
economic value from their works than exercising their exclusive rights. Moreover, users appear 
happy to sign over pecuniary rights in exchange for freedom to create derivatives. These are not the 
values reflected in the Statute of Anne or its modern evolutions. These are values that would be 
most appropriately reflected in a system of copyright law that was based on rights of economic 
remuneration- or compulsory licenses- not property rights. Moreover, YouTube with its Content ID 
software represents a functioning microcosm where such a system exists and flourishes- in some 
ways. A legislated program that parallels these current industry examples would both serve to 
clarify the law’s stance on user generated content and ensure the protection of user’s rights by 
addressing the systems current failings. The following chapter will propose and analyse the viability 
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VI. Rebalancing the Scales of Copyright Rights: A New 
Philosophy for Copyright Policy and a Compulsory License 
for Derivative Authors 
A. Introduction 
 Up to this point, this thesis has discussed various problems copyright law faces in the 
modern, particularly digital, environment. The internet has made piracy a commonplace and 
unassailable force despite a multitude of legislative measures and technological developments 
designed to combat it.590 In turn, many of these would-be solutions carry side effects of chilling 
legitimate secondary creativity.591 Much of this thesis has hinted at the notion that a solution lies in 
a paradigm shift away from the use of property rules and towards the use of liability rules. This 
chapter will focus on those solutions. However, transitioning copyright law from a property system 
to a system of economic rights in its entirety is implausible (for the time being), would not be a 
panacea, and is not even necessary. There is likely no one-size-fits all solution to the problems 
associated with copyright law that this thesis has described. In many ways, attempts to solve one 
problem have created new ones.592  That is largely because, up to this point, derivative creativity 
and outright piracy have been treated as one and the same by the law. Legal mechanisms designed 
at targeting piracy have also been used to address unauthorised derivative infringement online. This 
failure to offer a distinction between the two and a separate solution for each has lead to many of 
the problems I have outlined.  
 The major problems copyright law faces in the digital environment that this thesis has 
observed up to this point can be summarised into five distinct issues. First, digital technology has 
created a new generation of creators looking to incorporate previous works into new ones and, 
while the law often chills this behaviour, this sort of creation is culturally relevant and valuable. Its 
development should be fostered by the law. Second, the disintegration of control over creative 
 
590 See: the analyses offered in Chapter 1 E and 2 C 
591 See, e.g.: The analysis of how content filtering technology filters out works that are fair uses in Chapters 2 C and 4 D,E  
592 See: Chapter 5 D 
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works caused by the internet and digital technology has spawned legal solutions that steadily stamp 
out users’ rights.593 Third, this same technological advancement have created a value gap for both 
primary creators and derivative creators who legitimately use existing creative works in the creation 
of new ones.594 Fourth, the lack of a clearly defined legal framework in some jurisdictions and areas 
of the law have created a digital wild west where content owners effectively govern themselves- 
leaving users with little power to assert their rights or to fairly bargain.595 Fifth, digital technology 
has altered the world in such a way that some aspects of copyright law are no longer reasonably 
enforceable.596  
 These problems cannot be solved by one change alone. Moreover, an acceptable solution 
cannot solve one of these while exacerbating others. 
 This chapter will offer two distinct suggestions in which we may re-conceptualise copyright 
law in the digital environment. The first is the idea of abandoning the notion that gatekeeping is the 
ideal solution in copyright enforcement. With respect to unauthorised secondary uses of creative 
works online, we should steer the purpose of our solutions away from takedowns and filters.597 
Over the last two decades this philosophy has lead to legal mechanisms that not only often fail to 
prevent actual infringement but have a side effect of deterring new creativity and legitimate 
secondary uses.598 We should instead use policy to target the facilitation of both secondary 
creativity and new revenue streams for primary creators. The second suggestion this chapter offers 
is that the ideal way to do this is to use liability rules to govern derivative rights in copyright. 
Within the scope of this proposal, I will also suggest a way that we may reframe the passage of time 
in copyright protection. As a result of miniature trade wars, copyright term limits have been 
extended well beyond a necessary time frame to promote creativity and instead largely serve at the 
 
593 See: Chapter 2 C, Chapter 3 C 
594 See: Chapter 4 D II  
595 See: Chapter 5 C,D,E 
596 See: Chapter 2 B,C 
597 See: Chapter 2 C,D  
598 See: Chapter 2 C 
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behest of corporate content owners far more often than individual authors.599 Without adjusting the 
actual length of the terms of copyright, this section will reject the binary system of absolute or no 
protection and suggest a diminished amount of protections early in the relative life of a work to 
rebalance users’ rights against content owners. When employed as a tandem, these policies would 
effectively reduce unauthorised derivatives online, appropriately rebalance the rights of users with 
those of content owners, provide new revenue streams for both spheres of creation, and carve out 
incentives for new creativity that has previously been chilled by the law- all while ensuring the 
continuation of strong protections for authors’ rights of reproduction and financial exploitation of 
their works in other areas.  
B. Abandoning the Role of Gatekeeping in Copyright Enforcement 
 
 My first suggestion is a theoretical one rather than a legislative one. The notion of 
gatekeeping content as a copyright enforcement philosophy is deeply rooted in the property system 
of copyright law itself. ‘This story, character, image, melody, or film is mine because I made it.’ 
The property law roots of copyright law justify this mentality. However, as described in previous 
chapters, the property aspects of copyright law have not only become difficult to enforce but have 
also lead to behaviours that impede the creation and dissemination of new and culturally valuable 
works.600 This is largely because the lines between outright piracy and derivative creativity are 
blurred under the law. The law generally treats both acts as the same, an infringement, despite the 
fact that derivative creativity is culturally valuable. Moreover, the attempts to modernise copyright 
law that this thesis has analysed have been designed to target piracy and unauthorised reproductions 
online but seep into the realm of user-generated content as well because of this lack of legal 
distinction.601 One reason this occurs is because computer programs aimed at preventing the 
 
599 See: Chapter 3 C  
600 See: Chapter 2, Chapter 3 C 
601 See e.g.: Article 17 of Directive (2019) E.U. Supra n. 441 
 
   Page 175 of 233 
dissemination of facsimile are ill-equipped to appropriately address unauthorised derivative 
creativity.602 
 The first step in accepting a shift away from the property law aspects of copyright will be 
acknowledging that gatekeeping derivative content online is an unproductive goal. Instead of 
investing time and money looking for ways to more effectively and efficiently stamp out low-value 
infringements, legislators should be looking to legally reinforce and regulate existing systems 
online aimed at monetising secondary works established by the private sector.  
 
i. The Gatekeeping Philosophy in Action  
 
 Online copyright enforcement bodies and mechanisms assume largely the role of 
gatekeeper.  As gatekeepers, their decisions are almost always binary- to allow or not allow a piece 
of content. In the notice and takedown system, a content owner sends notice to a service provider or 
host that a piece of content is an infringement and should be taken down. Theoretically, in this 
system the gatekeeper would be the ISP or the host as it would be their job to determine if the 
complaint is valid and take action accordingly. However, the system places such a high burden of 
expeditiously addressing all claims received coupled with the fact that recipients have absolutely 
nothing to lose by blindly complying with takedown requests and everything to lose should they 
inappropriately deny one, the role of gatekeeper is functionally shifted to the sender of the 
takedown notice as compliance is automatic.603 Filtering technology is beginning to replace the 
notice and takedown system online as software is able to detect copies of visual, auditory, and 
audiovisual works posted to the internet through digital fingerprinting. In online communities where 
filtering technology is in place, the act of gatekeeping is an ex ante process, where the software will 
make a determination of each piece of posted content’s compliance with copyright law before it is 
ever allowed to be posted. Non-compliant content will typically be blocked but in some systems, 
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such as YouTube’s Content ID, it may be monetised in favour of the owner of the copyrighted work 
being used. Previous chapters have addressed the technical failures related to both these systems.604 
Both the notice and takedown system and filtering technologies are aimed at stamping out 
reproductions. This thesis is in no way an advocation for the dissemination of facsimiles online. 
However, problems occur when these systems aimed at stamping out piracy are also applied to 
derivative infringements. First, piracy and derivative infringement are not the same problem. They 
have different repercussions and cultural implications. When gatekeeping programs aimed at 
combating piracy are applied to derivative content, they have the effect of chilling both infringing 
and legal creativity.605 Moreover, the infringing derivative creations that these programs prevent are 
better suited to be dealt with in other legal ways. When applied to derivative creativity, infringing 
or not, gatekeeping mechanisms are a poor solution both economically and morally.  
 
ii. Gatekeeping is a Poor Philosophy: The Economic Perspective 
 
 Gatekeeping certain types of potential infringements, specifically non-replacing secondary 
works, is a poor philosophy from an economic perspective because it eliminates potential revenue 
streams for creatives simply because it is more efficient to take down than license. Gatekeeping 
facsimiles and simple reproductions is necessary for content owners because they represent perfect 
competitors. However, secondary works with added creativity do not have the same effect on the 
value of the original work. Moreover, available evidence suggests that, when given the choice, 
content owners prefer licensing content over gatekeeping.606 It is therefore most likely that a lack of 
efficient licensing mechanisms elsewhere are why we do not see similar behaviour in other areas. 
Even if one is unwilling to accept that content owners would always prefer monetisation over 
takedown from this limited data, it undoubtedly indicates a willingness to transition away from the 
traditional takedown philosophy of online copyright enforcement where the infringements in 
 
604 See: Chapter 2 C, Chapter 5 F 
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question are non-substitutive. Acknowledging this interest is an important job for legislators. In an 
age where technology has transformed the way we perceive copyright law, or at least the notions of 
what should constitute a taking under it, content owners have likewise adapted what they want from 
the law. Takedown policies are a somewhat efficient means of maintaining control over copyrighted 
works on the internet.607 However, especially considering their overall inefficacy, it is no surprise 
that, given the option, content owners would simply prefer to allow some infringing content to exist 
if it meant new revenue streams. The gatekeeping philosophy is one of control. It provides no 
economic benefit to content owners but for the intangible benefits of monopolisation. It represents 
opportunity ignored- especially when viewed in light of the fact that, when given the opportunity to 
choose, gatekeeping is the severely minority choice.  
 Thus, gatekeeping, with respect to non-replacing secondary works, is a poor philosophy of 
enforcement from an economic standpoint as it provides no direct economic benefits while 
simultaneously robbing a content owner of the potential for new ones through licensing. It has 
simply been the only available solution up to this point.  
 
iii. Gatekeeping is a Poor Philosophy: The Moral Perspective  
 
 Gatekeeping is not only a poor philosophy for the enforcement of copyrights online from an 
economic standpoint. It is also a poor philosophy from a moral perspective as well. Ignoring the 
loss of revenue streams and direct monetary benefits offered by abandoning the gatekeeping 
philosophy, it is still one that chills creativity, silences expression, and thereby negatively affects 
society by robbing it of cultural dialogue and new creative works.  
 
iv. Interim Conclusions 
 
 The notion that we should be taking down secondary works online and preventing their 
distribution elsewhere is a poor choice of philosophy that is rooted in property elements of the law 
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that would likely never have existed had the law been conceived in the world we live in today. The 
solution is simple. A change in the way we perceive how copyrighted works should be treated is the 
first step to improving the function of copyright law in the digital world. We must prioritise access 
and balance it with economic rights instead of property ones. Refocusing the law on fostering new 
creativity through liability rules that open access for secondary creativity while ensuring economic 
viability and new revenue for content owners is the most utilitarian solution. Abandoning control as 
a priority in copyright enforcement and instead using the the law to prop up monetisation schemes 
and ensure their fairness for all parties is the modern answer to the many of the problems created by 
the digitisation of culture. Shifting our philosophical perspective is the first step. Acknowledging 
that copyrighted works, in many ways, can no longer be treated as pieces of property and nor should 
they be is how we move forward to a law that functions efficiently online and serves all parties 
involved in the creative process.  
C. Protecting Derivative Rights with Liability Rules, Not Property Rules 
 Much of this thesis has been spent dancing around the notion that property rules are no 
longer suitable methods of enforcing copyright law in the digital environment. This is a matter of 
both practicality and philosophy. First, the digital environment has removed all of the barriers to 
infringement that made copyrighted works feel as though they could be protected like property. 
Access to works, the ability to replicate them without quality loss, and the ability to distribute 
copies on massive scales are all just as available to the average British teenager as they would be to 
an industry professional. Controlling a creative work as if it were a piece of property is no longer 
possible. Moreover, attempts to use technological innovation to reestablish control over digital 
works such as DRM technology, filtering software, and notice and takedown automation, fail to 
prevent piracy. Professionals and even slightly savvy average users are easily able to bypass DRM 
mechanisms and enable anyone else to access the DRM-free material by posting it online.608 Once a 
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pirated piece of content is posted online, it is subject to the notice and takedown system which, 
while efficient at helping content owners to remove a specific infringement from a specific place on 
the internet, struggles to prevent the same infringement from instantly re-appearing elsewhere 
online.609 While modern attempts to re-establish control over creative works in the digital 
environment have been largely unsuccessful, the technological innovations that have brought us 
here have also lead to a new creative norms. With respect to appropriation, the lines between theft 
and legitimate forms of cultural dialogue and expression are blurry. The law, while offering safety 
valves of protection for users’ rights that vary in strength and breadth depending on jurisdiction, 
generally fails to offer a sturdy support framework for this kind of creativity.610 This is in part 
because some of it falls squarely within the realm of actual infringement. However, where 
appropriative creativity falls in the grey areas of the law or even, in some cases obviously in the 
realm of fair usage, the enforcement and redress systems in place grossly favour content owners.611  
 Chapter 3 of this thesis described the ineffectiveness of property law system when 
governing creative works. Chapter 4 analysed how that system has likewise disenfranchised average 
creators and served to chill a world of untapped, valuable creativity. I will not reiterate the points 
made in those chapters here. Instead, this section will focus on the practical solution. The derivative 
rights to copyrighted works should not be treated as property rights. Instead, they should be 
governed by economic rights with certain property aspects maintained to ensure future exploitation 
for creators. However, the notion of using liability rules to govern derivative rights and other 
aspects of copyright law is not new. I am far from the first academic to suggest such a measure. In 
1990, Jane Gisburg suggested the adoption of statutory licenses for derivative works low in creative 
nature, such as databases.612 Naomi Voegtli proposed that an extensive compulsory license model 
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for derivative works could be a solution to the difficulties they pose in 1997.613 In 2006, Robert 
Morrison argued that a full statutory license model for derivatives is justified under some normative 
grounds.614 Kembrew McLeod and Peter DiCola advocated for a compulsory license model for 
musically sampled works in 2011.615 Peter Menell suggested a similar model solely for the making 
of Mash-Up works in 2016.616 Also in 2016, Nicholas Thomas DeLisa argued for a compulsory 
synchronisation license specifically limited to user-generated content online.617 In 2018, 
Hugenholtz and Quintais proposed a system that allowed individuals to reproducce and make 
available to the public copyrighted works as long as it was for a non-commercial purpose.618 They 
argued that their proposed model could be supported by a variety of legal mechanisms, one of 
which being statutory licensing.619 Finally, Omri Rachum-Twaig published a book in 2019 that 
advocated for a liability rule system of rights for derivatives with disputed rates set on a case by 
case basis by the court system.620 
 This chapter will not provide a more in-depth summary of all of these previously proposed 
models. However, DeLisa and Rachum-Twaig’s proposals are of particular importance and will be 
discussed at greater lengths for the purpose of acknowledging their strengths and weaknesses and 
differentiating my suggestions from theirs. Ultimately, DeLisa’s solution represents not enough 
proposed reform while Rachum-Twaig perhaps too much and in the wrong way. My proposed 
solution likely falls somewhere in between each of theirs and is therefore ideally outlined amidst an 
analysis of theirs.  
 
613 Voegtli, N.A., ‘Rethinking Derivative Rights,’ (1997) 63 Brooklyn Law Review, 1213, 1264–5. 
614 Morrison, R., ‘Derivers’ Licenses:An Argument for Establishing a Statutory License for Derivative Works,’ (2006) 6 Chicago Kent Journal of 
Intellectual Property 87. 
615 McLeod, K. & DiCola, P., Creative License: The Law and Culture of Digital Sampling [2011] 226–29 
616 Menell, P., ‘Adapting Copyright for the Mashup Generation,’ [2016] 164 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 441 
617 DeLisa N. T. , “You(Tube), Me, and Content ID: Paving the Way for Compulsory Synchronization Licensing on User-Generated Content 
Platforms” (2016) 81 Brooklyn Law Review 1275 
618 Hugenholtz, P.B. and Quintais, J.P., ‘Towards a Universal Right of Remuneration: Legalizing the Non-Commercial Online Use of Works,’ from: 
Hugenholtz, P.B., Copyright Reconstructed: Rethinking Copyright’s Economic Rights in a Time of Highly Dynamic Technological and Economic 
Change, 2018 Wolters Kluwer.  
619 Ibid. at 260 
620 Rachum-Twaig, O., Copyright Law and Derivative Works: Regulating Creativity, Routledge, Milton. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. 
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i. DeLisa’s Compulsory Synchronisation License for UGC 
 
 Nicholas Thomas DeLisa wrote an article for the Brooklyn Law Review in 2016 that 
compared the existing scheme of Content ID on Youtube to a de-facto compulsory synchronisation 
license scheme.621 While his argument was similar in many ways to the point I made in chapter six 
of this thesis, his solution took the form of a compulsory synchronisation license for user-generated 
content on the internet. His point was that, in legislating the practice seen on YouTube, it would be 
possible to not only extend the program to other areas of the internet where UGC is commonplace, 
but also to cure some of the inherent problems of the Content ID system.622 Among those noted 
problems were the minority shareholder veto power, or the power of any rights-owner to trigger a 
“block” in Content ID regardless of her share percentage or the wishes of the majority owners.623 
DeLisa uses the example of a songwriter owning 1% of the rights to a song being able to veto the 
wishes of all six other contributing writers to monetise the content because YouTube must always 
abide by the most conservative policy set for a video.624 DeLisa argued that this problem would 
easily be solved by a compulsory license regime as the veto power would be stripped from all 
parties.625 While Delisa’s proposed compulsory synchronisation license would address and likely 
cure some of the problems he noted with the current Content ID system, his proposal fails to go far 
enough which, I believe, creates more problems than it solves.  
 First, by limiting the scope of the license to synchronisation of “sound recordings and 
musical compositions with an original visual representations for use on UGC platforms,” DeLisa 
fails to offer much more than a government-endorsed version of the existing Content ID system. 
When it comes to UGC video content, YouTube is not the only place on the internet where such 
content can be found, but its market share is 5x that of its next competitor, Vimeo, with the rest of 
 
621 DeLisa (2016) Supra n. 617  
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its direct competitors holding less than 2% of the market share.626 Moreover, Vimeo hosts largely 
professional content and offers its own system of copyright filtering similar to Content ID. This 
effectively means that YouTube is the only meaningful source of this type of amateur content.627 
Thus, there is little to be gained by arguing that the license extends the Content ID-like system to 
other platforms because there are no other platforms that meaningfully compete with YouTube. 
This means that the license would serve, in practice, only to fix the existing issues with the Content 
ID system. Theoretically the license would extend to social media platforms like Facebook, TikTok, 
Instagram, and Snapchat who are not direct competitors with YouTube but allow for the posting of 
user-created videos. These platforms, however, have been able to privately negotiate blanket 
licenses for their users with the major record companies when necessary.628 Limiting the license to 
synchronisation of sound recordings and musical compositions with original video content 
addresses one form of user-generated content that is popular at the moment. However, this type of 
expression is the least needing of legislative protection as it is easily negotiated in the private sector. 
Yes, a compulsory license for this expression would remove some predatory aspects of the 
agreements set up by these platforms on behalf of their users and it would allow users to profit from 
their creations. However, this solution also leaves out a wealth of other valuable and popular 
expression.  
 While I acknowledged a multitude of issues with Content ID and other programs designed 
to facilitate UGC instituted by the private sector in Chapter Six, building the foundation for an 
effective and efficient compulsory license regime will be far too much work to justify such a small 
scope. Ultimately, DeLisa is on the right track, but balks at the notion of complete reform. 
 
 
626 'Youtube Market Share And Competitor Report | Compare To Youtube, Vimeo, Wistia' (Datanyze, 2020) <https://www.datanyze.com/market-
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ii. Rachum-Twaig’s Compulsory License System 
 
 In her book, Law and Derivative Works: Regulating Creativity, Omri Rachum-Twaig set out 
to address and tackle many of the same problems as this thesis. Her ultimate conclusion, that the 
derivative right should be governed by liability rules, is likewise in line with my own. However, we 
have differing opinions on important nuances in the application of such a new law. 
 Rachum-Twaig defined derivative rights into five non-excluding categories of works.629 She 
argued that the derivative right should be wholly separate from the right of reproduction in 
treatment and remedies and, as such, even works that make use of certain aspects of the right of 
reproduction should not be treated as reproductions if they fall into one of the categories of 
derivative rights. This is best illustrated by a work of fan fiction that is a wholly new story but uses 
characters holding individual copyright protection. In Rachum-Twaig’s system, if the taken 
expression constitutes an inseparable part of the second work and could not be substituted with a 
different non-protected expression without undermining the purpose of the second work, then the 
second work should be treated as a derivative despite its reproductive elements.630  
 With a comprehensive definition of what should be legally considered a derivative work, 
she defined how those works should be protected. She discussed three alternative remedies models 
for derivative works before ultimately outlining her preferred solution.631 She described a 
distribution of profits in lieu of injunctive relief model,632 a blocking copyright model633 based on 
patent law, and a system of taxes and levies634 as possible solutions previously proposed in 
academic literature.  
 Abandoning injunctive relief in favour of distribution of profits benefits from having the 
effect of a compulsory license system without need for actual legislation. In American law, 
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injunctive relief is a remedy that may be sought by plaintiffs but its award is at the discretion of the 
courts. Therefore, judges may simply choose to abandon this remedy altogether without the need 
for changes to the legal code. However, without legislative action and, in light of the mountain of 
precedents supporting injunctive relief,635 it is highly unlikely that judges will collectively choose to 
deny injunctive relief in future cases. Moreover, even if such a practice were to occur, it would be 
the absolute least efficient way to replace property law remedies for derivative rights with liability 
rules as the rule would only be enforced after litigation. While it would be simple in 
implementation (theoretically), the cost of maintaining the system would be paid dearly by creatives 
who would be forced to either litigate to establish their license rates or negotiate at a disadvantage 
because of weaker financial positions in the face of potential litigation.  
 Transposing the law of blocking patents, where a patent may be granted to an improvement 
on a currently protected invention which would have the effect of preventing the first inventor from 
making use of the published improvement, into copyright law is likewise an impractical solution. 
Applying such a rule to copyright law would allow secondary authors to at least prevent first 
authors from using the derivatives they create. However, it would not actually allow the new 
derivative creation to be brought to market. The law is and would be intended as a tool to foster a 
dialogue between authors that should result in a license. However, there are important differences 
between copyright and patent law that would likely render the transposition of this law ineffective. 
The first of these differences is term limits. Patent law typically offers a term of 20 years while 
copyright offers a less defined but, even at a minimum, much longer term. License negotiations are 
possible with patents because there is a reasonable expectation that, at the least, the blocking patent 
will be economically viable (even if it is only for a short period of time) at the end of the first 
patent’s term. In other words, the improving inventor has far more bargaining power at the created 
negotiating table because she knows that, even if no deal is reached, she can exploit her patent 
 
635 Rachum Twaig cites one case where distribution of profits was chosen over injunctive relief but this is by far the exception with injunctions being 
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(even if only for a short time) once the primary patent expires. If John Smith, a 19-year old college 
student attempts to negotiate with Disney over a blocking copyright to a new story about Elsa and 
Anna from Frozen, Disney’s refusal would require him to wait 83 years before he could legally 
publish his story. Nineteen years is a lot less time to wait than the potential century or more offered 
by copyright law. Moreover, there are important differences between the nature of an improvement 
for an invention and a derivative of a copyrighted work that make potential negotiations less likely 
to happen on the copyright side. Particularly, with an invention, the financial implications of an 
improvement can often be far more tangibly seen. It may make the invention more efficient or 
effective at doing its prescribed job- something that immediately translates to money saved and/or 
value created. However, with copyrights, where each creative work lends itself to an infinite 
number of “improvements” or derivations, and the economic value of those derivations is tied 
directly to the public’s subjective response, there is simply no way of knowing with the certainty 
equivalent to a patent improvement if the derivation would lead to the financial success necessary to 
justify a license. With these differences in mind, it seems highly unlikely that any system based on 
blocking patents applied to copyright law would lead to meaningful negotiations or more bargaining 
power for secondary creatives. It would, at best, provide a way for secondary creators to safely 
market their derivative works to content owners. However, it would not have the effect of strong-
arming them into a license negotiation in the way that blocking patents often do. Such a system 
offers no assurances that new, culturally valuable, works will actually be made and brought to the 
public.  
 Twaig also described a model copyright protection that utilises taxation and levies to 
compensate artists while allowing free access to their works.636 Such a model was originally 
proposed637 by William (Terry) Fisher and would theoretically use digital fingerprinting technology 
to track the uses of registered works online for the purposes of establishing remuneration rates for 
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their authors from the pool of collected taxes.638 Fisher claimed that such a model has particular 
relevance in light of new creative practices- particularly remix and mash up.639 However, while 
such a model would be quite successful at identifying derivatives that make use of pieces of an 
original work like mash ups or sampled music, it would likely be wholly unable to identify and 
appropriately compensate for derivatives that do not include digitally fingerprinted material. Such 
works like fan fiction, fan films, sequels, prequels, and fan art make up a huge portion of the body 
of derivative works. Even if one is willing to accept the legislative and economic hurdles necessary 
for a tax and levy based system640 of copyright law, its limited scope of application to the right of 
reproduction and a niche set of derivatives makes it an unappealing solution.  
 After discussing these three alternative proposals for copyright reform, Rachum Twaig 
offered her solution- the use of compulsory licenses to govern the derivative right. Her solution is 
elegant in that it beautifully counters one of the key critiques of the current compulsory license 
systems in copyright law- price ceilings set by fixed rates. In the music business, the fixed rate for 
cover songs serves more as a starting place for negotiations than the actual rate. In fact, the vast 
majority of licenses to make cover songs are privately negotiated and end up at a rate significantly 
lower than the statutorily mandated one.641 Moreover, establishing either a single rate or a system of 
rates that fairly applied to all types of derivative works would be a near impossible task. Disney 
paid four billion dollars each for both the Star Wars and Marvel franchises but it would be difficult 
to name another franchise that would command anywhere close to that kind of price in today’s 
market. The majority of creative works are significantly less valuable. How, then, can any 
statutorily set rate appropriately compensate authors when their works are used? Rachum-Twaig 
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 Her proposal required that a license be granted but left it to individuals to negotiate the rates 
of the license privately.642 If no agreement could be made, a judicial tribunal specialising in such 
matters would set an appropriate rate for them.643 She compared this to the practice of establishing 
damages. The judiciary would be allowed to rely on expert witnesses and testimony. This, 
combined with the judges’ experience, should make for a reliably fair process of determining the 
rate. Rachum-Twaig specified that the rates should always be set as a matter of percentage of 
royalties in lieu of a fixed price on a per-use basis. This, she argues, will simplify the process 
because it will clarify the court’s goals in establishing a rate by requiring that they determine the 
contributions by both negotiating authors as a percentage of the final work and it won’t unduly 
burden secondary authors with upfront license costs.644  
 While Rachum-Twaig’s solution is elegant in many ways, it has flaws. First, as she 
acknowledged, the costs of utilising the tribunal system to determine the royalty rate would be no 
different from the current costs of litigation.645 Her solution to this problem is two fold. First, she 
would have a portion of the royalty paid be used to fund future adjudication to the extent that it 
related to the royalties.646 She argued that forcing the derivative author to internalise the costs of the 
model would create an effective entry fee for the making of derivatives which would prevent 
misuse of the model.647 Moreover, she is relying heavily on the incentives for both parties created 
by the model to come to an agreement without the aid of the courts. However, I feel that Rachum-
Twaig has neglected to acknowledge an important factor here, bargaining power. Theoretically, the 
traditionally strong bargaining power held by the primary author is balanced by the fact that a 
license cannot be refused. Rachum-Twaig seems to imply that the cost of litigating the royalty rate 
is an equally powerful incentive for each party to reach an agreement. The reality, however, is that 
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it likely is not. In fact, the costs of potential litigation are much more easily weathered by large 
entertainment corporations (the holders of the majority of the most valuable and popular copyrights) 
than they would be for an average derivative creator. Regardless, in any situation where one of the 
parties is significantly wealthier than the other, that party will have much more leverage in the pre-
litigation royalty negotiations. Any party unprepared to see negotiations through a potentially multi-
million dollar litigation process will be forced to accept a potentially predatory license rate or no 
deal at all. While there will be situations involving every possible combination of wealthy and poor 
parties on each side of the negotiating table, the most common will likely be an average individual 
or small company negotiating for derivative rights with a large, wealthy corporation. Moreover, one 
of the main reasons both Rachum-Twaig and I have called for a liability rules system for derivatives 
is to open access to average creators who have been disenfranchised by the current system. While 
Rachum-Twaig’s proposed system of negotiate first, litigate second would likely work quite well 
when both parties to the negotiation are large corporate entities, so does the current system of 
copyright law. It is the rights of average, less economically significant, parties that we should focus 
on when changing the way copyright law works because they are the ones who are most often left 
out by the current system.  
 
iii. An Alternative Model  
 
 Differentiating my model from Rachum-Twaig’s is not difficult. First, I respectfully reject 
her solution to the problems posed by fixed-rate royalties and likewise the implication that they 
create an inherently unjust system and should be avoided. Second, I would look to temper the 
system by maintaining certain strong reproduction rights that Rachum-Twaig incorporates into 
derivative ones in her system. 
a. Setting an Appropriate Rate 
 
The problems created by fixed rates in compulsory license schemes have been widely 
discussed both in this thesis and other academic literature. The most oft discussed issue is 
 
   Page 189 of 233 
that fixed rates typically create a price ceiling instead of a standard and efficient rate. In 
other words, parties continue to privately negotiate instead of using the license scheme but 
use the rate set by the scheme as the maximum possible rate to be paid. This nature of the 
practice can be harmful to content owners, particularly those of especially valuable content 
who could, in a free market, command royalty rates much higher than the legislated rate. I 
feel, however, that this imbalance does not render the notion of a fixed rate as unequivocally 
unjust. Instead, the legislator must take this expected behaviour into account when setting 
the rate. The first way to do so would be in changing the way royalty rates are defined.  
 Currently, there are but a few compulsory licenses used in copyright law available for 
analysis. However, with respect to the mechanical license for musical compositions in the United 
States, there is much legislative history that provides insight as to how the rates were established. 
The fight to establish a mechanical license for musical compositions in the United States began in 
1905 over concerns of potential monopolisation of the player piano roll industry.648 There was a 
tremendous degree of uncertainty as to whether copyright law actually covered the right to control 
the manufacture of and sale of piano rolls and other mechanical devices that had the effect of 
reproducing the sound of the musical composition.649 The battle began in the courts with publishers, 
composers, and one manufacturer of player piano rolls (The Aeolian Company) fighting for the 
right to fall under the umbrella of copyright protection with the rest of the player piano companies 
and some newly emerging phonograph record companies fighting against them.650 The fight was 
less about copyright law than it was antitrust as it became apparent that the Aeolian Company had 
secured exclusive licenses for production of player piano rolls with virtually all of the major music 
publishers and was looking to monopolise the industry.651 However, from this, the United States 
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passed its first mechanical license for musical compositions in 1909.652 The license has been 
adjusted, and even suggested to be abolished, multiple times over the course of the last 111 years. 
However, a standardised rate of $X per manufacture has been a constant since its inception. In the 
legislative debates preceding the passage of the first license bill, Congress debated using a royalty 
of 10% of the retail price, $.02 per recording, or 10% of the retail price with a minimum of $.02.653 
However, it ultimately settled on the flat fee of $.02 per recording with no explanation as to why the 
percentage royalty was eliminated.654 From here onward, the notion of using a percentage was not  
given serious consideration again until the 1970s. Instead, rate adjustments were made typically to 
combat inflation with the intention of maintaining the original relative percentage of royalty paid. In 
the late 1970s, however, Congress created the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT) with the goal of 
delegating the work of setting royalty rates to it. Congress set forth four criteria designed to guide 
the CRT in setting its adjustments. The criteria were: 
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public;  
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his creative work and the copyright user a fair income 
under existing economic conditions;  
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product made available 
to the public with respect to relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, 
cost, risk, and contribution to the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their 
communication;  
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on generally 
prevailing industry practices.655 
 
The CRT heard arguments for and against changing the flat monetary rate to a percentage in 1980. 
Songwriters argued that the rate should be set at 8% the retail price of each phonorecord, Music 
publishers were advocating for 6%, and record companies argued that the rate should stay at its 
current price of $.0275 and not be represented as a percentage of price.656 Ultimately, the tribunal 
elected to fix the rate as a flat fee without explanation but Greenman and Deutsch provide an 
excellent analysis of the costs and benefits of a percentage based system in their history of these 
 
652 Ibid.  
653 Ibid. at 10 
654 Ibid.  
655 17 U.S.C. §801(b) (Supp. IV 1980).  
656 Greenman and Deutsch (1982) Supra n. 648 at 60 
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proceedings.657 Ultimately, they set out that the great advantage of the percentage royalty is that “it 
perseveres a ratio between mechanical royalties and recording company revenues, and to that extent 
adjusts for inflation automatically, without requiring any further legislative adjustment.”658 They 
also characterised three main issues with a percentage based royalty. The first is determining the 
price to which the percentage would be applied.659 Retail prices, the preference of songwriters and 
publishers, while typically uniform in record sales, can often be skewed by deep discounts.660 
Wholesale prices also represented a difficulty because of the differences by which small and large 
record companies distributed their records and the transactions that governed those distribution 
agreements.661 The second problem with a percentage royalty was the increased difficulty 
associated with administering it.662 Finally, a percentage based royalty may have an impact on the 
value generated for individual authors and composers in situations where licensed works were sold 
at discounted prices- thus perhaps increasing their average royalty rate but reducing the actual 
royalties paid.663 
 Despite the difficulties they pose, I agree with Rachum-Twaig that rates should be defined 
as percentages of royalties paid instead of a fixed price per use utilised by the mechanical license 
for musical compositions. This not only has the benefit of automatically adjusting to inflation 
discussed by Congress in the establishment of the compulsory mechanical license for musical 
compositions, but it also has the added benefit of reducing entry fees and opening access for 
average creators. Moreover, it is more applicable to a compulsory license that will affect more than 
one type of media as it can account for the inherent price differences across those media. For 
example, the fixed rate of $.09 per sale may be perhaps fair for the mechanical license for musical 
compositions that typically are sold for $.99 but would be wholly unjust for films that are sold for 
 
657 Ibid. at 60-62 
658 Ibid. at 60  
659 Ibid. 61 
660 Ibid.  
661 Ibid.  
662 Ibid.  
663 Ibid.  
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10 times or more that price. Because derivative works can take the form of musical compositions, 
films, literary works, and much more, a single flat rate would be unfeasible. However, referring 
back to the previous example, setting a rate at 10% of the retail price would accommodate all 
equally. Although ten percent, when considering it represents the maximum possible value paid 
(and often much more than the actual value)664, is likely not a fair rate and the most difficult part 
will be establishing a universally fair one. I find, when looking to the legislative history of the 
United States’ mechanical license for musical compositions for guidance, the most helpful piece is 
the four guidelines665 for establishing rates set forth by congress to the CRT.  
 With these guidelines in mind, a fifty percent revenue fee is likely much closer to 
appropriate. Such a rate is hefty enough to incorporate the more valuable works on the market fairly 
while still serves as an adequate starting place for private negotiations that would be far more 
commonly adopted.666 It would maximise the availability of creative works by immediately opening 
access to make them- even if the starting place for license negotiate is higher than it needs to be. It 
offers the potential for a fair return on licensed works for both parties. Moreover a maximum of 
50% royalty for the primary author implies that the creative contributions of the derivative author 
should be, in theory, at least equal to those of the primary. This reflects the CRT’s third criterion 
stating that the license reflect the relative roles of each party.667 It is also an important philosophical 
distinction to make as the system should not be used to grant licenses to free-riders. It should 
promote legitimate derivative creation only. Finally, when applied strategically, such a rate can be 
minimally disruptive to current industry practices. This will be discussed in-depth in the following 




664 See: Abrams (2010) Supra n. 280 
665 Supra n. 655 
666 Abrams (2010) Supra n. 280 
667 Supra n. 655 
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b. A Percentage Based Royalty and Underpriced or Noncommercial Works 
 
 One of the main applicable arguments against a percentage based rate is that it will serve to 
underpay creatives for licensed works that fail to generate revenue or are marketed for free or 
heavily discounted prices. The latter may have the effect of giving secondary authors unnecessary 
leverage in competing with the authors whose work they license. First, when licensed works simply 
fail to generate revenue, such failure can be attributed to a lack of public interest. Therefore, the 
work likewise does not serve as relevant competition to the base work from which it derives. One of 
the main strengths of a compulsory license for derivatives is that it will facilitate the creation of 
many new works. Some of these works will inevitably be of poor quality or simply unpopular and 
will generate no meaningful revenue for the authors who license them. This is seen as a necessary 
trade off with little harm to the economy of creative works. However, popular derivatives that are 
sold at a deep discount or even made available for free arguably represent a fear for primary 
authors. After all, what good is a 50% royalty if the licensed product is made available for free? The 
first perspective is that non-commercial works will not represent viable economic substitutes for 
professional ones. Canada has successfully adopted this perspective with its exception to 
infringement for non-commercial user-generated content. The notion that content made with the 
intention to be distributed for free will grow to supplant paid-access content altogether is irrational. 
While some amateurs will be happy to create some types of work as a hobby and give them away 
for free, low budget films and hobbyist fan fiction will never replace Hollywood movies and best-
selling literature. I believe that the nature of the inherent economics associated with creating and 
marketing a creative work will serve to create a healthy balance between free amateur content that 
may appeal to some small audiences and professionally-made for-profit works that generate 
revenue for both parties to the license. However, in order to combat potential misuse of the system, 
the license rate should apply both to traditional revenue streams as well as any ad-based revenues 
for free-to-access content.  
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c. How to Apply the Percentage Royalty 
 
 One of the key difficulties posed by a percentage-based fee is determining to which price 
should it be affixed. In setting its compulsory license rate, the music industry was concerned solely 
with whether retail or wholesale prices should be the standard and that was enough of a 
complication for it to avoid a percentage-based royalty altogether. Here, setting a royalty designed 
to function efficiently across all types of media is an especially difficult challenge. This challenge is 
exacerbated by modern content delivery mechanisms such as streaming and ad-based revenue 
models. However, I believe that there is a simple solution.  
 Instead of establishing the rate as a “50% revenue” or “50% profits” or “50% 
wholesale/retail/stream price” the simplest way of ensuring that the licensing author receives her 
fair share for all revenue generated is by adding them as a co-author of the licensed work whose 
statutorily granted share of royalties is 50%. Doing this would guarantee the licensing author a fair 
share of all forms of revenue generated by the licensed work without the need for tedious detailing 
in the legislation. Moreover, it serves the final criterion of the CRT’s directive requiring license 
rates to be minimally disruptive to current industry practices. Division of author’s royalties 
according to their contribution is a common practice is most entertainment industries as many 
works, especially those in the music, film, and television industries, have multiple authors. 
Funnelling the license into this established system would be minimally disruptive.  
 
The specifics of this system would be as follows:  
 
 In cases where the licensing work is co-authored. Each author’s contribution will be 
reflected relatively in their share of the derivative work by halving it. For example, Authors A,B,C 
collectively wrote a novel for which each author is attributed 33.33% of the publishing rights. 
Author D writes a prequel under the derivative license. Author D will collect 50% of royalties for 
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the derivative with authors A,B, and C collecting the other 50% in shares equivalent to their 
contribution in the primary work. In this case, that would be 16.66% each. 
 In cases where multiple works are licensed for use in one new work, each licensed work 
shall represent an equal percentage of the overall 50% share, with co-authored works then dividing 
their portion amongst co-authors as determined by their own pre-existing agreements. For example 
where a licensed derivative is a mash-up of Songs A, B, C, D, and E, the rights for the sound 
recordings and musical compositions of each song will represent an equivalent share of the 50% 
royalty. In this case composers A, B, C, D, and E will receive a 5% royalty for the new work and 
owners of the sound recordings A, B, C, D, and E will also receive a 5% royalty. If the musical 
composition for song C has two composers, each will receive a share of the 5% allotted to them 
according to their preexisting ownership rights. If the owner of the rights to the musical 
composition for Song D is the same person as the owner of the rights to the sound recording for 
Song D, that person will effectively receive a 10% royalty, so on and etc.  
 In cases where a new author seeks a license to make a derivative of a previously licensed 
derivative, the 50% fee will be apportioned to the first derivative author and the content owner/s in 
relative to their original arrangement. For example, author A writes a sequel to author B’s novel X 
under the scheme. Authors A and B split the revenue at 50% each. Author C wishes to write a spin 
off of the derivative sequel that uses both original elements from novel X and author A’s newly 
added elements from the derivative. Author C licenses the spin-off under the scheme and collects 
50% of the revenue from it while authors A and B each collect 25%.  
 While this does not necessarily simplify the process of calculating and collecting royalties, it 
appropriately transfers the burden from the legislator to the parties involved. Moreover, if disputes 
occur, treating the licensing author as if she were a 50% co-author of the derivative provides a clear 
way for courts to appropriate royalties after litigation.  
 However, there should be restrictions placed on typical powers of co-authorship and it 
should be limited to only an economic right. The licensing author should not have the power to 
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market or license the derivative work or to assert moral rights as a traditional co-author would- only 
the right to collect royalties as one and transfer or assign her rights. However, in the event that the 
licensed derivative were infringed, in order to protect her own financial stake, the licensing author 
should be allowed to bring about an infringement action on behalf of the derivative author. The 
derivative author should be given the opportunity to join the litigation or collect a portion of the 
compensation received according to her ownership percentage of the derivative work. This would 
be necessary to prevent derivative authors who “sleep” on their own rights from causing economic 
harm to the authors they license works from. These rights would need to be statutorily defined, 
likely with a distinct term for the newly created compulsory authorship rights.  
 This is admittedly an imperfect system. Notably, problems arise in cases where multiple 
works are licensed in the use of one new work. The system treats all licensing authors as equivalent 
despite the fact that their contributions to the new work may not be. However, the system is 
designed to set a baseline with the expectation that it will be, like the compulsory license for 
musical compositions, rarely used in its statutory form. There is the expectation that private 
negotiations will determine licensing rates far more often than the statute, and as such, will sort out 
nuanced issues of fair appropriation that a statute could not efficiently determine anyways. It is 
designed more as a tool to provide bargaining power to secondary authors while still representing 
an acceptable- though not ideal- economic tool-of-last-resort in the absence of meaningful 
negotiation.  
 
d. Tempering the Compulsory License for Derivatives  
 
 While I believe that opening access to new creativity is paramount in importance, I also 
acknowledge how disruptive a compulsory license to make derivatives could be. Therefore, I 
believe it is necessary for the newly created derivative right to be tempered in a multitude of ways. 
The abolishing of a creator’s right to refuse a derivative license represents a stark change to modern 
copyright law. It would be an uncomfortable intrusion for many artists. Moreover, such a change in 
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the law will inevitably interfere with an artist’s ability to exploit her own works. I believe some 
measures should be in place to insure that creatives would maintain some rights in light of such 
changes. The ideal way to do this would be two-fold. First, certain reproduction rights must be 
strengthened and excluded from the derivative license. Second, the license should not be 
immediately accessible once a work is published. Tempering the open access offered by the license 
with a short period of time in which authors may exploit their own works without worrying about 
competing with other derivative authors will allow them to maintain some level of control over the 
creative direction of their works. Rachum-Twaig and I agree on this second premise. 
 
e. The Balance of Rights of Reproduction with Derivative Rights  
 
 Creating a compulsory license for derivative works will almost certain incite a free-for-all 
whereby the market is flooded with derivative works. For the first time, authors will be able to 
rework their favourite works and present them to the public no matter their personal economic 
standing. This is surely a worrisome idea to owners of existing popular works. Strengthening 
certain rights of reproduction and clearly defining the boundaries between the derivative and 
reproductive rights is one way in which the legislature could temper the freedoms offered by a 
compulsory license to make derivatives. In order to do so, we must have a clear idea of the types of 
works that the compulsory license would be intended to foster and likewise the kinds of works that 
it should not be enabling.  
 It is perhaps easier to start with the kinds of works a compulsory license should not allow. 
The license should not easily be exploited by free-riders or any others looking to siphon profits 
from a popular expression with little added creativity. The purpose of the license is to expand our 
creative catalogue and promote creativity. However, it should not become a tool for facsimile or 
even pseudo-facsimile. Moreover, it should not provide derivative authors with an unfair 
competitive advantage against original authors. Ideally, the license would promote the creation of 
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works that never would have been made without it without placing too hefty of a burden on the 
economic viability of original works of authorship.  
 The first, and easiest, way to achieve this goal is to not apply the license to the less creative 
categories of derivative works. Pamela Samuelson argued there are essentially three categories of 
derivative works: short versions of the first works, faithful renditions (i.e. translations), and 
transformation of works from one genre to another.668 She also added that sequels, prequels, and 
works of criticism should also be considered derivatives.669 Omri Rachum-Twaig, building on 
Samuelson’s research, parses derivative works into five categories: short versions of the first work, 
translations and communications to new audiences, improvements and developments of first works, 
disassembly and reconstruction of first works, and taking parts from the first work to make a new, 
entirely separate and different work.670 Short versions, faithful renditions, and translations or 
presentations to new audiences are all categories of work that require limited new creative input. 
While they represent derivations of the first work, they are not the sort of new creativity that our 
current cultural breadth is lacking or that a compulsory license should foster. Moreover, these 
categories of works represent the greatest potential for harm to first authors under a percentage 
based license scheme. After all, the ability to translate Harry Potter to any language and release it 
for substantially lower prices (or even free) would be indescribably harmful to J.K. Rowling in each 
of the markets where the translated language was spoken. The same is true, while not equally so, 
with abridgements and other shortened versions as they are not wholly substitutive but inarguably 
attempt to be such for some audiences. Establishing that the compulsory license shall only apply to 
derivations that improve, develop, disassemble and/or reconstruct, and/or take parts from the first 
work to make a new separate work is a simple way to limit the scope of the license to the types of 
works with the most cultural value and least potential for economic harm.  
 
 
668 Samuelson, P., ‘The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work Right’ (2013) Geo. L.J. 1505, 1518-27  
669 Ibid.  
670 Rachum-Twaig (2018) Supra n. 620 at154-56  
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f. Employing a Waiting Period Before the License Takes Effect  
 
 The purpose of this proposed legislation is to rebalance the rights of users against those of 
creators. However, it is important not to take that rebalancing too far and tilt the scales in the 
opposite direction. The goal here is a balance, not an anarchist upheaval of the current system. 
Thus, it is important to note the effect a compulsory derivative right would have on an author’s 
ability to exploit her own works through derivatives. Allowing the right to take effect immediately 
upon publication would likely have one of two reactions. First, authors would find themselves 
scrambling to compete with derivative authors licensing their works or, second, authors would 
delay publication of works until they had time to also produce a series of derivatives and would 
release them as bundles. Neither outcome is ideal. This thesis has spent much time discussing how 
the extensions of copyright terms have had the the effect of chilling secondary creativity and often 
blocking secondary creators from accessing valuable and relevant creative raw materials. This 
should be balanced against the author’s right to exploit her own work. Therefore, a waiting period 
before the license takes effect should be employed in order to allow authors a short monopoly 
period on derivatives before the public has the right to join in. Rachum-Twaig also advocates for 
such a blocking period in her proposal.671 However, she fails to define what it should be outside of 
the notion that it would “most likely, have to vary with respect to different types of works.”672 Her 
suggestion ends with “the intention is for short time periods measured in months or several years 
depending on each type of work.”673 Again I agree with Rachum-Twaig in principle but disagree in 
her application. I believe that a cooling off period is absolutely necessary but also believe that a 
uniform period of time for it can easily be established and needs to established.  
 Copyright law applies to a plethora of different types of creative works and, for the most 
part, grants the same term to them all. While Rachum-Twaig is correct in her assertion that “making 
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a motion picture version of a book requires greater time than a sequel book,”674 the economically 
impactful life of a film is often far different to that of a novel or a photograph. However, the law 
applies the same monopoly term limits to all of them. Moreover, one of the key pitfalls of copyright 
law that this thesis has discussed which has brought us to needing this reform is legal ambiguity. 
Vague aspects of copyright law have lead to its exploitation by larger content owning corporations 
at the expense of users. I believer clarity and definition are more valuable than an attempt nuanced 
inclusivity. Therefore, a fixed term for the blocking period is most appropriate.  
 Thus comes the inevitable question of for how long should the period be? I believe the 
simplest solution is to look to existing law and practice in a similar field- patents.  
 The law of patents typically grants a term of 20 years for which an inventor may monopolise 
and exploit her invention before it is made free for the public to use and exploit as their own. This 
term applies to medical technology, car parts, and virtual reality gaming alike. It is, therefore, not 
based on the expected economic life of the product but on the notion of a reasonable time of 
exploitation. In England, the first uniform patent term was 14 years.675 While there is no clear 
explanation for the 14 year term by the legislator, academic speculation indicates that it was based 
on the typical term of an apprenticeship at the time.676 At the time, the typical term of an 
apprenticeship was 7 years. Doubling that term for the length of a patent allowed master craftsmen 
the ability to train multiple generations of apprentices without worry that they would be able to use 
the knowledge imparted to them to compete against her too quickly.677 In the United States, the first 
 
674 Ibid.  
675 Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.) (“[A]ny declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any Letters Patents and Grants of 
Privilege for the term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made of, the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures within this 
realm, to the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of making such Letters Patents and Grants shall not 
use, so as also they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state . . . [t]he said fourteen years to be accounted from the date of the first 
Letters Patents, or Grant of such Privilege hereafter to be made, but that the same shall be of such force as they should be, if this Act had never been 
made, and of none other.”).  
676 Lester, S. & Zhu, H. 2019, ‘Rethinking the Length of Patent Terms’, American University International Law Review, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 787-806, 
at 789 
677 Ibid. at 790 
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uniform patent term was also 14 years.678 Today the term has been extended to a minimum of 20 
years by the TRIPS agreement and is now the uniform standard.  
 That term is not without criticism however. Since the 1960s, many economists and legal 
academics have criticised patent law’s long term and uniform application as inefficient and 
unnecessary.679 However, since much of the criticism is centred around the idea that patent terms 
are too long, it is reasonable to note that, with respect to innovation, 20 years is plenty of time to 
economically exploit an invention.  
 The types of works covered by patent law are vastly different to the types of works covered 
by copyright law. However, the underlying purposes of both laws are to promote new creations- 
both aesthetic and useful ones- through economic incentives. The economic incentives for a 
valuable copyright now extend far beyond those of a valuable patent. However, the comparison of 
why that may be is outside the scope of this thesis. Regardless of whether the current patent term is 
the ideal length for its own purpose does not invalidate it as a useful starting point for a blocking 
period in a compulsory derivative license. Applying a twenty year blocking period before the 
license takes effect achieves two goals. First, it provides a sense of legislative precedence to the 
term. Second, the actual time period satisfies the needs of the blocking period itself. It allows ample 
time for creators to exploit their own works in whichever ways they may choose. Twenty years is 
plenty of time to make sequels, prequels, remixes, spin offs, adaptations, and any sort of derivation 
a creator may want to explore. It is reasonable to assume that any derivation not made within 
twenty years most likely never will be made. There are obvious exceptions to this. The first of the 
Star Wars prequels was released 22 years after the original film debut and films are still being made 
now over 40 years later. However, creators will adapt to the new law and learn to work within its 
 
678 Ibid. at 791 
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Novelty: Information, Technological Change, and the Patent System, [1996] 35; Thurow, L., ‘Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property 
Rights,’ (1997) 75 Harvard Business Review 95, 103; Carroll, M.W., ‘One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law,’ 
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new time constraints. Moreover, in reference to the previous example, the recent resurgence of Star 
Wars content can be attributed to its acquisition by Disney- an example of how licensing enables 
creation that otherwise would have likely never been made. From the perspective of derivative 
creators looking to acquire licenses, a 20 year period is less than ideal but also workable. Most 
importantly, it is not so long as to cut off derivative artists from adapting works made by their 
contemporaries. It provides access to relevant and modern cultural raw materials. A twenty year 
waiting period strikes a delicate balance between the wants and needs of both parties. Moreover, if 
we look at the time period from a perspective similar to the license rate and assume that the period 
represents the maximum time a creator will exclusively exploit her own creations it begins to feel 
even more fair. It is reasonable to expect that a much shorter time period of derivative exclusivity 
will, in some cases, prompt creators to be more proactive about licensing their works before they 
lose the ability to refuse a license. The knowledge that a license will become compulsory in X 
amount of years gives extra bargaining power to those wishing to negotiate for licenses before the 
waiting period expires.  
 D. An Example of What the Statutory License May Look Like 
 This section will give an example of what such a license may look like when implemented. 
It could read as such: 
 
The right to make a derivative work shall be governed by a compulsory license granted by this 
statute. 
 
The right to license a work to make a derivation shall become compulsory on the first day of the 
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Types of derivations excluded from the compulsory license scheme: 
 -Annotations or shortened versions of an original work 
 -Translations of an original work 
 
Under the compulsory license scheme, two new types of authors shall be recognized, each with 
their own rights.  
 
The author/s of the original work for which a license is being sought shall be referred to as the 
Compulsory Primary Author/s (“CPA”).  
 
The author/s of the newly created licensed work shall be referred to as “Secondary Author/s” 
(“SA”).  
 
A Compulsory Primary Author (“CPA”) shall have the right to: 
 -Collect royalties from the licensed author up to the amount of 50% for all exploitations of 
  the work for which she is listed as the CPA  
 -Claim ownership of the work on behalf of the licensed Secondary Author for the purposes 
  of bringing about an infringement action or issuing a takedown notice against a third 
  party.  
  -In the event that a CPA brings about an infringement action against a third party on 
   behalf of the licensed SA, the licensed SA shall have the right to be listed as 
   a co-claimant and/or must be attributed any proceeds of the litigation (minus 
   costs) proportional to her share of royalties as dictated by the license.  
 -Be identified as the CPA in all relevant circumstances subject to traditional rules of  
  assertion of moral rights 
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 -Assign or transfer all rights granted under this provision excluding the moral right of  
  attribution  
 
A Compulsory Primary Author shall not have the right to: 
 -Grant or deny a license to use any work for which she is a CPA 
 -Reproduce, display, perform, communicate to the public, or make an adaptation or  
  derivation of any work for which she is a CPA without license by the SA.  
 -Object to uses of the licensed derivative by the licensed derivative author on the grounds 
  that they represent a derogatory treatment of the original work 
 
The rights of a CPA are limited, in part, to situations in which the CPA is not also the author of the 
licensed derivative. In cases where a CPA is also an author of the licensed derivative, the 
restrictions placed on her rights as a CPA shall not interfere with her rights as a traditional author in 
the new work. 
 
The duration of the rights granted to a CPA will be, at most, limited to the term of her own work for 
which she has granted a license.  
 
The rights of a Secondary Author who has obtained a license to make a work under this scheme 
shall be the same as those of any other bona-fide author under copyright law.  
E. Exceptions for Non-Commercial Works 
 The compulsory license has been designed in many ways as a means to address weaknesses 
seen in the Canadian Copyright Modernisation Act. It addresses the Act’s inability to deal 
appropriately with commercial content as well as its inadvertent shifting of revenue away from 
creative parties and into the hands of content hosting sites. However, on its own, the license does a 
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poor job of addressing non-commercial UGC and is best applied in tandem with an exception for 
these types of works.  
 Alone, the license would still require non-commercial works like memes or free fan fiction 
to undergo the 20 year waiting period and still be subject to licensing procedures. However, there is 
no need to impose those restrictions on non-commercial works. The 20 year waiting period is 
designed as a counter-balance to following loss of derivative exclusivity, and the competitive edge 
that goes along with it. Non-commercial works do not represent true competitors because they are, 
economically speaking, not allowed to compete. Non-commercial remixes may, at times, divert 
attention from their original counterparts, but more often they will serve to complement them. 
Moreover, the lack of economic incentives for non-commercial derivative authors is sufficient to to 
balance their power to use creative raw materials without permission or payment. However, in order 
to ensure that the non-commercial exception is not abused in a way to subvert the requirements of 
the compulsory license for derivatives, three important considerations must be well defined.  
 First, the definition of “non-commercial” must be narrowly construed in this situation. Any 
works made under this exception must not be allowed to garner any revenue for their authors, 
including ad based revenue on free-to-view platforms. Otherwise, it would serve to subvert the 
established safety valves present in the compulsory licence that do not apply to non-commercial 
works, such as the waiting period or the requirement of sharing revenue. Moreover, indirect 
revenues such as donations through sites like Patreon may require special rules. This could be as 
simple as not allowing links to donate to be posted alongside works looking to qualify for the non-
commercial UGC exception. It may, however, be best to leave the definition of when indirect 
revenues serve as a backdoor to avoiding the license fees and/or waiting period to the discretion of 
courts.  
 Second, there would also need to be strictly defined rules that either limit or prohibit the 
crowdsourcing of funding to make non-commercial remixes. This issue was tackled by the private 
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sector in the Axanar case discussed previously.680 Owners of the Star Trek copyrights, 
CBS/Paramount, sought injunction against a fan film when it was found to have raised $1,000,000 
in funding from a crowd-sourcing website. The resulting settlement outlined a policy for the amount 
of money that may be raised to create a Star Trek fan film without concern of infringement. 
Governments may consult this and similar policies from the private sector to find a range of funding 
that content holders find tolerable and non-competitive.681  
 Third, there should be a legislated program to prevent third party content hosting services 
from unjustly profiting from this kind of content where all other parties are legally unable to do so. 
The simplest solution without creating another licensing mechanism would be a levy imposed on all 
services of this nature with the revenue apportioned amongst content owners. Here, the same digital 
fingerprinting technology I have criticised throughout this thesis finds a valuable use. It may be 
used to identify works used and posted online for the purpose of appropriating royalties paid by the 
levy. Though I have spent much time criticising the efficacy of these softwares, their flaws are more 
tolerable when they are not being used to silence creative expression.  
F. Retroactive Application 
 One important question concerning the implementation of such a license is whether it should 
apply retroactively. I believe the simplest answer is a yes with a caveat. Retroactive application of 
new copyright laws is commonplace, especially when the new laws benefit the financial earning 
potential of major content holders.682 There is no reason why a law looking to temper their rights 
should be eased into effect. However, with the notion of causing as little disruption to the structure 
of the industries involved in mind, its retroactive application should be tempered. 
 The license should apply retroactively to all works currently covered by copyright. 
However, for existing works, the 20 year waiting period would begin to toll at the time of the 
 
680 See: Axanar (2017) Supra n.349 
681 Ibid.  
682 The United States has passed retroactive term extensions multiple times. See: Chapter 3 C 
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license’s implementation- not from the point of the works’ creation. In other words, while the 
license would apply to works already covered under copyright law, the waiting period should not be 
retroactively applied. This, coupled with the tedious amount of time it would take to pass such a 
law, would provide content holders ample time to prepare for its consequences while still having an 
immediate impact on the rebalancing of users’ rights.  
G. Conclusion 
 The internet and technology have revolutionised the way media is created, stored and 
disseminated. From that revolution we have seen a massive increase in both piracy and derivative 
infringements or potential infringements. This chapter and this thesis do not claim to offer a 
solution for piracy. However, it serves as a criticism of the history of legal solutions that treat piracy 
and derivative infringement as one and the same. The historical method of combating online 
infringement has been facilitating the assertion of property rights for creators in the online 
environment. Expediting the process of removing infringing content from the web has been the key 
tactic for lawmakers. This began in the early 2000s with the invention of notice and takedown 
procedures. It has since evolved into providing additional legal insulation for digital rights 
management tools and technical protection measures developed by the private sector to build digital 
fences around its cultural property.683 Most recently, the trend has moved towards looking at how 
digital fingerprinting technology and online filters may be incorporated into the law to prevent the 
need for takedown requests by blocking infringing content before it is ever posted. From this 
evolution of legal practice we have doubled-down again and again on the philosophy that 
gatekeeping content online is the ideal way to protect content owners. However, this philosophy, 
though it makes sense when applied to facsimile reproductions aimed solely at enabling online 
users to access content for free that they would otherwise be required to pay for, is far less ideal 
when applied to new creative works that simply make use of existing ones. It robs the public of new 
 
683 See: Chapter 1 and 2 
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creative works and it robs creators of new revenue streams. Moreover, when trying to apply 
enforcement mechanisms designed to prevent piracy to derivative works as well, we end up chilling 
a wealth of legitimate creativity made under exceptions to infringement in the process. This thesis, 
again, regrettably does not have a solution for online piracy. However, it is a plea that we stop 
treating derivative creativity as such. It has offered a path to do that.  
 A compulsory license to make derivatives will enable users access to content that they 
crave. It will promote a new body of creative works and foster a new generation of creators. It will 
create the potential for new revenue streams both for content owners and new derivative creators 
alike. It will likely incite the creation of organised collective licensing bodies in the film, television, 
and publishing industries similar to those seen in the music industry. It will end the chilling of 
legitimate derivative creativity online. It will reign in the predatory licensing policies that have 
evolved for user-generated content as a result of vague and outdated laws. It will rebalance the 
rights of users against those of content owners after decades of legislation that have shifted power 
more and more to the side of corporate interests. It will promote the creation of millions of 
absolutely terrible works that most people will never see. It will also promote the creation of 
millions of creative works that never would have been made otherwise, some of which will 
undoubtedly be quite popular. It will legitimise a behaviour that is commonplace online and 
transform it from an illicit nuisance to an economic opportunity. Finally, it will refocus copyright 
law on its purpose- the promotion of creative works and allow it to work for everyone not just a 
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VII. Conclusions of this Thesis  
 The overarching research question this thesis sought to answer was how we may 
appropriately balance author’s rights with the dissemination of information in a digital world in a 
way that leads to a system of copyright law that is practical, fair, and enforceable. It hypothesised 
that the fundamental aspect of copyright law, its basis in property and the application of rules within 
that paradigm, has hindered its ability to competently address issues of balancing the rights and 
interests of content owners and those of users who wish to make secondary works online.  
 Each individual chapter has set out to test this hypothesis and answer this research question. 
Chapter one set forth the issues relevant to this thesis, namely that piracy is a near unassailable 
force online, that user-generated content has risen in popularity, and the derivative creativity 
associated with it represents a new and culturally valuable phenomenon. These two forces must be 
balanced against one another. It also described the systems in place that currently address both 
piracy and UGC and how they are inadequate as a means of both preventing piracy and 
simultaneously promoting new creativity from users. Chapter two introduced the notion that 
perhaps the property law system that influences copyright law protection exacerbates problems with 
this delicate balancing act. It argues that control is paramount in a property system and is all but lost 
for digital creative works online. It introduces the concepts of property and liability rules in legal 
entitlements and argues that liability rules are far more effective tools for copyright enforcement in 
the online environment based on this notion of lack of control. Chapter three argues that regardless 
of the efficacy of online enforcement strategies or the legal constructs that inform them, copyright 
law has developed into an overprotective scheme that leaves users behind. New legislation and 
policy should be informed by its conclusion that the law is fundamentally out of balance. Chapter 
four introduces legislative measures from separate jurisdictions that aim to solve this issue raised of 
how to balance creators’ rights against the dissemination of information in a digital world. It 
compares the two, analyses their strengths and weaknesses and concludes that neither solution is 
adequate largely because of their reliance on property law mechanisms in the digital space. Chapter 
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5 analyses how the the private sector has addressed copyright’s failure to adequately map out 
treatment of user-generated content in a world that demands space for this sort of derivative 
creativity described in chapter one. It analyses how tolerated use and controlled monetisation 
policies represent not only a failure in the law but a shift in private sector policy that demonstrates a 
propensity for monetisation of derivative creativity. However, the analysis also demonstrates how, 
in the absence of clear legislative backing or oversight, these private sector systems of pseudo-laws 
can be predatory and are insufficient as a solution on their own.  
 The final chapter, my own conclusion and solution, is informed by each of the preceding 
five. It addresses the problems outlined in chapters one and three. It builds off of the failures and 
successes of the legislative measures analysed in chapter four but from a perspective informed by 
the arguments about property rules set forth in chapter two. The solution I propose is also finally a 
reflection on the private sector initiatives analysed in chapter five and how they may be applied in a 
legislated system that is fair and just for all parties involved. It serves to answer the question of how 
may balance these two adversarial parties and their rights against one another in the digital world. It 
also answers the key hypothesis of this thesis by advocating for a solution based on liability rules, 
not property rules.  
 This thesis has served as a criticism of modern copyright law, or at least its ability to 
function efficiently and adequately amidst a digital world. It is an argument first that the system 
established 300 years ago is no longer the most appropriate way to address the goals of the law. 
Second, it is a calling for a rebalancing, a suggestion that the law has grown to disproportionately 
favour creators- largely represented by a few multinational corporations. A generation ago there 
were only creators and consumers. However, innovation has bred a third party in the 21st century, 
users, and the law has failed to accommodate their role in this trichotomy. There are legal 
constructs in place that have developed to establish a place for user creativity. The laws of 
transformative and fair use in the United States, fair dealings in the United Kingdom, and various 
niche carve-outs amidst exceptions to infringement elsewhere all provide some protection for user 
 
   Page 211 of 233 
creativity. However, these laws are either too narrowly applied or too vague to offer true security 
and are often undermined by non-legislated policies issued by content owners themselves. 
Moreover, attempts to modernise copyright law typically take the form of anti-piracy measures 
which ignore users’ rights and likewise undermine existing legal carveouts for them. These 
measures chill creativity, silence free speech, rob the world of valuable creative contributions, and 
block the potential for legitimate transactions that would create revenue for content owners and 
users alike.   
 There are four conclusions I have drawn from writing this thesis. First, copyright law is 
antiquated and must be changed to function in the digital space. Second, the law must come to 
distinguish between piracy and derivative creativity and offer separate frameworks for each. Third, 
the law has grown to be overprotective and must be rebalanced to adequately reflect the needs of 
creators, consumers, and users alike. Fourth, a compulsory license for derivative creativity is the 
most appropriate solution to both legally distinguish this sort of expression from piracy and 
rebalance the power structure of users, consumers and creators. 
A. Copyright Law is Antiquated and Must be Changed to Function in the Digital Space 
 First, copyright law, despite its many changes over the years, remains in many ways an 18th 
century legal construct used to address 21st century issues. While some laws do not face 
obsolescence with time, copyright law has struggled to keep pace with the technological innovation 
that has resulted from society’s development. While the simplified premise that creative works 
deserve protection to ensure the financial security of creators and thereby incentivise more creation 
rings just as loudly as it did in 1710, the appropriate means to achieve this end feels different. The 
notion of treating creative works like pieces of property made sense in a time where the ability to 
create and disseminate them was so limited that they could be controlled as such. However, one has 
to wonder if someone were to propose copyright law’s modern iteration for the first time now, a 
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system so easily subverted, that so often chills creativity and expression, and is readily used as a 
tool to silence free speech, would they not be mocked for such a proposal?  
 The use of property rules to govern creative works has grown obsolete in many respects. 
Piracy has developed into a relatively small, yet completely unstoppable, subculture and there is 
ample room for more research on how the law might be adjusted to address this phenomenon. 
While this thesis addressed the issues posed by piracy, it did so with the purpose of highlighting a 
different failure of the law. User-generated content, or works of derivative creativity, remix, 
appropriation, collage, and re-imagination, have become ubiquitous in online culture yet the blurred 
legal line between these types of works and piracy creates problems. UGC’s rise in popularity has 
seemed to largely correlate with the invention of technology to make and distribute these types of 
works. Despite the obvious cultural value of these works, copyright law, constrained by its property 
law mechanics, has struggled to foster the development of this type of creativity. This is not entirely 
for lack of effort. Various jurisdictions have created carveouts and exceptions to infringement 
designed to protect many types of user-generated content. However, these exceptions, in practice, 
are often impotent lip service paid to derivative creators. Legal ambiguity has created a climate 
where content owners have been able to make their own rules with respect to this sort of creativity. 
That has, in turn, fostered a system of predatory and exploitative treatment towards derivative 
creators. However, the recent focus on legal reform aimed at stamping out piracy at any cost has 
been the largest prohibitor to derivative creativity.  
B. The Law Must Distinguish Between Piracy and Derivative Creativity  
 The main indicator of the law’s growing obsolescence in the digital age is its growing 
inability to address and enforce against unauthorised uses of creative works. Content owners lack 
the ability to control their creations that was available in an analog world. Piracy constitutes an 
ever-present threat to the function of a legitimate creative marketplace and must be addressed by the 
law. However, as it has become more and more difficult to prevent piracy, legislators have sought 
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to stop it at nearly any cost. Unfortunately, these associated costs have typically been valuable 
derivative creativity. The law, in its vain attempt to stamp out piracy online, subverts users’ rights 
and prevents the development of a valuable secondary markets for creative works. Legal policies 
that seek to “modernise” copyright law typically do so with piracy as the focus and take a sweeping 
and indiscriminate approach. As a result, derivative creativity is lumped into the same box as piracy 
and receives the same treatment. However, there is ample evidence that, given conditions where 
they were able to do so, content owners would not treat this kind of creativity in the same way as 
they would piracy. Moreover, UGC is often creative and culturally valuable. It deserves to be 
fostered by the law.  
  The law must distinguish piracy from valuable derivative creativity and offer solutions to 
the problems each practice imposes separately. Solutions geared towards piracy that infringe upon 
the rights of users are unacceptable just as policies designed to foster UGC that likewise promote 
piracy should also be unacceptable. However, in recent history there have been relatively few 
policy changes designed at promoting user-generated creative works while every few years seems 
to mark the implementation of new anti-piracy strategy. The implementation of legislation that 
recognises works of UGC as culturally valuable and seeks to protect them in a tangible and 
accessible way would be a healthy start.  
C. The Law is Overprotective and Must be Rebalanced 
 Despite the issues that arise from legal failures to adapt to modern technology as well as 
those associated with the grouping of piracy and derivative creativity into the same category, the 
law has failed users in a third way. It has grown overprotective as a result of the steady expansion 
of owners’ rights coupled with the parallel constriction of safety valves on these rights (user 
protections) over the last century. In the United States, the term of a copyright has been extended 
from 14 years to potentially 10x that figure or more over the last 100 years. The public domain, the 
greatest safety valve of all to protectionist copyright measures, feels more and more like a myth as 
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term extensions continue to be passed. Moreover, this strengthening of protection for creators has 
not been met with equivalent balancing for users and consumers. Laws allow content owners to 
digitally prevent consumers from privately copying or transferring content they have paid for from 
one format or medium to another. The same laws prevent users from accessing content for the 
purposes of legal remix or transformation. Moreover, the safety valves that have arisen such as fair 
use, fair dealing, and other exceptions to infringement are largely ineffective either because they are 
too vague to offer confidence in the legitimacy of a created work or too narrowly applied to protect 
it. The majority of the most valuable copyrights today are controlled by but a few large 
multinational corporations. These corporations have been able to wield tremendous power to 
influence legislators and, as a result of their lobbying efforts, we have a system of law that 
tremendously favours the economic interests of these few corporations.  
 An analysis of the philosophical foundations for copyright law demonstrated an across-the-
board preference for a strong set of users rights. The Lockean commons call for it, Beckham’s 
utilitarianism calls for it, economic theory supports it, and even Hegel’s creator-centric personality 
theory allows for strong carveouts for secondary uses. The law we have today is not the result of 
philosophical ethics or even the promotion of new creativity. It is the result of corporate lobbying 
and international trade wars. I have tried to explain in this thesis what users’ rights are, what they 
should be, and how we can change them to become that. My final conclusion is that, in order to 
both distinguish derivative creativity from piracy and expand users’ rights to better align them with 
the expansion to owners’ rights, a compulsory license for derivative works is the ideal solution.  
D. The Appropriate Solution is a Compulsory License for Derivative Creativity 
 A compulsory license for derivative creativity solves three problems. First, it helps to adapt 
the law to the difficult digital environment that it currently governs. It does so first by legitimising 
an already ubiquitous behaviour. However, in doing so, it turns this behaviour into a new revenue 
stream for content owners and users alike. It also will shift the notion of how we should be using 
modern technology to enforce copyright online from a gatekeeping and takedown philosophy to one 
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of creative promotion and monetisation- a philosophy that resonates more harmoniously with the 
underlying goals of copyright as a whole. Second, it distinguishes secondary creativity from piracy 
and establishes the former as a socially valuable contribution that shall be fostered by the law. 
Third, it props up users’ rights in a way that appropriately rebalances them against the historically 
strong rights of creators. However, it does so in a way that is not unduly disruptive to the existing 
creative economy. The nuances of the license I have proposed are all aimed at either addressing 
problems caused by similar legislation, such as the value gap created by Canada’s non-commercial 
exception for UGC, or to ensure that the new system would be minimally disruptive and feasible to 
implement.  
E. Final Words 
 This thesis is a criticism of a system that typically functions and develops with little scrutiny 
outside of the private-sector interests that influence it. It is, in many ways, an overly-optimistic 
assertion of how the law can change for the better. However, if it is unrealistic in any way, it is only 
because the suggestions I propose will not be introduced- not because they can not or should not. If 
there is one singular point I would like to drive home to any unfortunate soul who has been required 
to read this thesis in its entirety, it is that copyright law has lost its focus and should reset its sights 
on ways in which it may promote new creativity. This includes all forms of creativity, not just 
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